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ABSTRACT

This is a study in the religious philosophy of the Canadian philosopher Charles
Taylor. I focus in particular on the role of transcendence in his later writing on
religion and secularity with the aim of contributing to a better understanding of his
overall vision of the way out of the malaise of modernity, namely, his adumbration
of a pluralistic solution, which I call "inclusive humanism" in contrast to both a
narrow religious humanism on the one hand, and a narrow "exclusive" secular
humanism on the other. Transcendence as transformation is the centerpiece of
Taylor's hope for the moral and spiritual health of the late modern West, a
civilization that he argues is struggling to maintain its commitment to a number of
demanding universal moral standards in the face of dwindling resources for
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articulating continued affirmation or practical commitment. While Taylor believes
that the Judeo-Christian tradition contains within itself the potential for renewal, his
pluralist vision is open to the possibility of a new, inclusive humanism. The
requisite transformation he envisions is modeled after religious conversion, but it is
also clear that Taylor is open to non-religious possibilities.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Let us pose the question once more in principle: Is faith possible without
transcendence? Can man be taken possession of by a goal belonging to the inner
world, that has the character of faith, because its content appertains to the future and
is therefore, so to speak, transcendent to the present and in contrast to the suffering,
discordancy and self-contradictory reality of the present?--a goal which, like so many
religious faiths, has the tendency to delude us concerning the present, to console, to
find a substitute in something non-existent, non-present?--and is nevertheless
capable of successfully calling for self-sacrifice and renunciation in the interests of
this illusory future?
-- Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History 1

In his review of Charles Taylor's A Secular Age, Richard Bernstein remarks that the
800-page book "is so richly textured that it is difficult to know how to approach it." 2
Bernstein, I think, probably echoes the experience of many of Taylor's readers. Even
Taylor, in the brief preface to his work, recognizes that there is a fundamental lack of
unity in the book. "I ask the reader who picks up this book not to think of it as a
continuous story-and-argument, but rather as a set of interlocking essays, which
shed light on each other, and offer a context of relevance for each other." In what
follows I take up the question of transcendence, and the role that it plays in Taylor's
Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1953), 218.
1

Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of the
Harvard University Press, 2009), ix (cited in text as SA).
2

1

work, especially in A Secular Age, and other recent writing on religion and secularity.
Transcendence, indeed, may well be considered the most salient topic running
throughout the several "interlocking essays," and also ties A Secular Age to Taylor's
other work, especially Sources of the Self. 3
Although transcendence is the best candidate for a unifying theme in Taylor's
most recent thought on religion, his understanding of transcendence is anything but
straightforward. His use of the term is easily misunderstood, and has caused some
confusion among the reactions to his thought. In the following pages my aim is to
clarify Taylor's understanding of transcendence, the role that it plays in his broader
critique of our secular age, and the unique challenges that our age poses for those
committed to the affirmation of humanity.
One outcome of Taylor's engagement with the question of transcendence and
secularity is greater clarity surrounding a set of questions too often thought to have
obvious, if not simple, answers. Taylor challenges the dominant picture of
secularity, which tends toward a complacent acceptance of one or another form of
what Taylor calls a "subtraction theory" of secularity. According to subtraction
theories the decline in religious belief is a natural outgrowth of modernity, to be
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989), (cited in text as SS); Richard
Bernstein, "The Uneasy Tensions of Immanence and Transcendence," International
Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 21, no. 1 (December 2008): 11.
3

2

explained as a mere "subtraction" of adventitious beliefs and practices, these having
been superseded by modern scientific and technological means. As Taylor explains
the idea, subtraction theories explain modernity and secularity "by human beings
having lost, or sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, confining
horizons, or illusions, or limitations of knowledge" (SA 22). Taylor challenges a
certain complacent acceptance of this kind of story of modernity, and brings the
weight of his reputation as a major philosophical thinker, and his well-earned,
undeniable claim to our attention and serious consideration to a set of issues long
thought by many to be closed, or hardly worthy of serious consideration.
This is Taylor's métier: complicating and problematizing answers to questions
that to many seem to be obvious, and so safely neglected. Indeed, one of the most
compelling aspects of A Secular Age is Taylor's sympathetic treatment of the
phenomenological description of unbelief. This stems from more than a sense of
argumentative fairness, however. As Nicholas High Smith points out, Taylor is
methodologically committed to a "cultural theory" of modernity, which attempts to
understand the developmental history of culture in terms of a comparative approach
to culturally contingent, internal pressures driving the development. As Smith puts
it, what Taylor thinks is necessary is the careful reconstruction of "the intrinsic
appeal of the values embedded in the Enlightenment outlook as it emerged

3

historically through a contrast with the preceding moral horizon" 4 The culturetheoretical approach demands a particular sensitivity to the original appeal of
values, as well as the affective draw of the preceding cultural understanding. This
contrasts with the "acultural" approach that seeks to understand the evolution, or
cultural development in terms of non-contingent, "cultural neutral," feature that
defines the trajectory of cultural development. "Subtraction theories" fit well into
the "acultural" category of theories of modernity. As Smith explains, the cultural
theorist is careful to "reconstruct the intrinsic appeal of the values and standards that
help constitute modern culture, as they arose out of mutation from the values and
standards of the predecessor culture." Smith's characterization of Taylor's cultural
theory of modernity is especially salient in A Secular Age, where Taylor focuses on
the development of one particular feature of modernity, secularity. I think
philosophers, regardless of their ultimate take on the picture of our age that Taylor
paints, can appreciate that he undermines the standard lines of both sides of the
polemic surrounding religion and transcendence since the Enlightenment. 5
This is primarily a study in the religious and moral philosophy of Charles
Taylor. In subsequent chapters I develop an interpretation of Taylor on
Nicholas H. Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals and Modernity (Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 200.
4

5

Ibid., 204.
4

transcendence, a reading that is consistent with his overall philosophical project, and
I tie this understanding of transcendence to a set of moral challenges that Taylor
argues, successfully in my view, are unique to our age. Beyond his diagnosis of our
"malaise" in a secular age, and his problematizing the usual polemics surrounding
religion, Taylor also has a positive vision for a way forward, albeit one he has
insufficiently developed. My aim is to contribute to a better understanding of
Taylor's moral/spiritual prescription for the ills of our age, and the role
transcendence plays in overcoming the challenges of life in our late modern secular
age. 6 To that end, in the following pages I defend the thesis that Taylor's account of
transcendence is capable of supporting a pluralistic vision of an inclusive humanism. 7

Taylor often uses the terms "moral" and "spiritual" as near synonyms. In his
wider project they are closely connected ideas, inseparable. In Sources of the Self he
explicitly defends his use of "moral and spiritual" in the same breath, as it were, by
pointing to the wider project of the book, and of his conception of the moral
economy of the self. Whereas the "moral" tends to be associated with otherregarding considerations and intuitions, "our reactions on such issues as justice and
the respect of other people's life, well-being, and dignity," the "spiritual" broadens
the set of concerns to include the more self-regarding questions, including our
personal dignity, the spiritual concerns "what makes life worth living." Still, they
are close to the traditional questions of morality: "What [spiritual issues] have in
common with moral issues, and what deserves the vague term "spiritual," is that
they all involve what I have called elsewhere "strong evaluation," that is, they
involve discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which
are not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices but rather stand
independent of these and offer standards by which they can be judged" (SS 4).
6

Taylor uses the term "inclusive humanism" at least as early as 1988. See,
Charles Taylor, Review of The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy
7

5

With this term I intend to refer to any view of the goodness of human life predicated
on the spiritual devotion, or moral allegiance, to a conception of some good beyond
human life. It is "inclusive" because it includes more than the goodness of life in the
conception of the good for humanity. At the same time, I conceive of inclusive
humanism to be neutral on the question of the content or articulation of this good
beyond the human in which the goodness of humanity is rooted. The key element
in any adequate inclusive humanism is that the conception of the good beyond
humanity be such as to effect a transformation radical enough to effect a change in
identity, and which self-understanding makes it possible to sustain an affirmation of
and devotion to universal benevolence and justice.
Taylor does not believe a narrow "exclusive humanism" (one that excludes
transcendence) is likely to provide sufficient support for the practical affirmation of
universal benevolence and justice, and we therefore need to reconceive humanism in
such a way that it satisfies the human desire to transcendence. Taylor's preference is
clearly for a religious, specifically a Roman Catholic, articulation of a transcendent
(or Christian) humanism, but I argue here that his deeply pluralistic moral and
religious thought, including his position on transcendence, is not limited to religious
belief as a ground for morality. The pluralistic humanism that Taylor hopes for
and Philosophy, by Martha C. Nussbaum. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 18, no. 4
(December 1988), 805.
6

allows for both a religious and a non-religious fundamental understanding of
transcendence, but requires the overcoming of the self-satisfaction in most forms of
secular humanism, that is, overcoming humanity through self-transformation or
decentering.
Taylor never elaborates on the details of what the other options are, although
he does occasionally allude to alternatives along the lines of deep ecology, and
neither do I in the present study. In the conclusion, however, I point out the
promise of a pragmatist, especially a Deweyan, option for a non-reductive naturalist
approach that emphasizes transcendence as transformation, even recognizes the
necessity of the "religious experience" of self-transformation for a true humanism,
but nevertheless remains entirely intramundane. 8
Chapter Summary
In Chapter Two, "Challenges to Humanism and Transcendence in a Secular Age,"
which immediately follows this introduction, I offer a discussion of Taylor's
secularity thesis, his claim in A Secular Age that the modern West is secular in a very
specific sense, what he calls "secularity 3." I explain his understanding of "secularity
3," his name for what makes our age distinctive with respect to the believability of

Some pragmatists have called for a "pragmatist enlightenment," or what one
might call an "enlightened enlightenment." I think Taylor's thought makes a
contribution towards this wider goal as well.
8

7

transcendence relative to pre-modern ancestors. This chapter also includes a
refutation of a recent challenge to Taylor's secularity thesis from Ruth Abbey, who is
otherwise one of Taylor's best interpreters and a sympathetic reader and critic
working today, and a clarification of Taylor's definition of "religion" in A Secular Age,
in order better to understand the commonly misunderstood project of that book, and
its relationship to the concept of transcendence. The aim of the chapter is to explain
and to defend Taylor's secularity thesis, but also to lay the groundwork for
subsequent chapters, all of which presuppose some familiarity with the main thesis
of A Secular Age.
Chapter Two closes with an account of the problems that Taylor first
broaches in the concluding pages of Sources of the Self, and which form the basis of
his critique of exclusive humanism (Taylor refers to "Enlightenment humanism," or
"Enlightenment naturalism," in Sources) and his implicit vision of a transcendent, or
inclusive humanism in A Catholic Modernity? and A Secular Age. I explain the moral
dilemmas that Taylor sketches in the concluding chapters of Sources of the Self, a set
of problems unique to late modernity, focusing the discussion on what Taylor calls
the dilemma of "mutilation" and the "maximal demand," on the one hand, and on
the question of the adequacy of exclusive humanism to support our particularly
demanding set of moral imperatives. "High standards," Taylor avers, "need strong
sources" (SS 498), and he questions whether the naturalist secular sources available
8

in late modernity can genuinely afford the adequate affective allegiance needed to
empower the commitment to the practical realization of the demands of the
standards of morality to which we already find ourselves committed. Though not
an exhaustive list, Taylor's favorite examples of the latter are universal benevolence
and justice.
One of the difficulties faced when writing on Charles Taylor is that he often
presupposes a familiarity with his earlier work, especially his philosophical
anthropology from Sources of the Self. Some understanding of his earlier work is
exceedingly helpful for an adequate understanding of his later work on religion,
transcendence and secularity. A related difficulty is presented by the distinctive,
and idiosyncratic terms he often employs in the presentation of his ideas. Although
Taylor's philosophical training and long career in philosophy has been in the
twentieth century analytic tradition, he writes in his own idiom a lot of the time,
defining his terms to suit his wider project without always considering the
commonly accepted vocabulary of the discipline. Because it engages more of
Taylor's early work than other chapters, this chapter also takes up the challenge
presented by Taylor's philosophical originality, and allows for some preliminary
conceptual clarification.
Chapter Three, "Varieties of Transcendence in a Secular Age," anticipates the
full account of Taylor's view of transcendence in Chapter Four. I briefly consider the
9

very idea of transcendence, and survey a recent influential taxonomy of
philosophical positions on transcendence developed by the theologian Wessel
Stoker. This chapter also includes a consideration of important concepts from
Taylor's work relevant to transcendence, including further consideration of
"exclusive humanism," and the notion of the "immanent frame," both of which are
important to understanding Taylor's concept of transcendence.
The primary thesis is advanced in Chapter Four, "Transcendence as
Transformation and the Promise of Inclusive Humanism." The justification for
waiting until the fourth chapter to bring together the thesis is just that a fuller
appreciation for Taylor's understanding of transcendence and the role it plays in his
wider philosophical project and critique of modernity is greatly aided by the
preliminary discussions of the first three chapters. This chapter begins with a more
detailed consideration of Taylor on transcendence, and a consideration of other
recent characterizations of transcendence in Taylor's work. It becomes evident that
the basic structure or fundamental ideal of transcendence for Taylor is not limited to
the understanding of transcendence as used in his working definition of religion "in
the strong sense," but may be understood to encompass a broader range of
transcending. This wider understanding of transcendence Taylor's philosophical
position supports what I call an "inclusive humanism," and distinguish it from the
"exclusive" variety that is one of the secular targets in A Secular Age. Inclusive
10

humanism recognizes that the desire to transcendence is more than an adventitious
feature of human history, something to be sloughed off as unnecessary with the
advent of modernity. On the contrary, according to Taylor, it is an important feature
of our humanity and may be the best way to provide much needed support for the
affirmation of our moral standards. At the same time, while inclusive humanism
includes a role for transcending, it does not exclude possibilities for intramundane
transcendence, so long as these allow for legitimate transformation, and the
overcoming of the narrow self-satisfaction of exclusive humanism (SA 553).
There are two criticisms of Taylor on transcendence considered in Chapter
Five, "Two Critics of Taylor on Transcendence." The appearance of A Secular Age
created quite a stir in professional philosophy, and its publication was followed by a
flurry of responses. It would greatly lengthen the present work if even half of these
were considered here. Rather than attempt a comprehensive defense of Taylor on
transcendence, I have chosen two representative philosophical critiques. I begin
with Martha Nussbaum, who has had a longstanding conversation with Taylor on
transcendence, beginning years before the publication of A Secular Age. Nussbaum
also represents a distinctively external critique, and one that Taylor takes up
explicitly in A Secular Age, and helps us clarify important points Taylor makes
relevant to countering all three of the critics considered. Iain Thomson has made
some of the strongest critiques of Taylor on transcendence. Thomson considers the
11

Heideggerian element of Taylor's thought, arguing that that there may well be a
conflict between Taylor's robust pluralism on the one hand and his ontological
commitments on the other. Thomson also puts forward a strong version of
Nietzsche's critique of "otherworldly nihilism," as a foil to Taylor. Not only are
Nussbaum and Thomson representative of the strongest critiques of Taylor, but they
also compliment each other well, since the main line of Thomson's argument takes
Taylor into very close proximity to Taylor's engagement with Nussbaum. In both
cases our understanding of Taylor on transcendence is considerably clarified by
consideration of two of his most thoughtful critics.
Although I argue that Taylor's understanding of transcendence as
transformation is not limited to religious senses of transcendence, and that his
pluralism commits him to at least some secular visions of transcendence which may
support an inclusive humanism, I do not, however, explore what a non-religious
inclusive humanism would look like in detail. In concluding Chapter Six,
"Pragmatism and Inclusive Humanism," I do, however, suggest what I think is one
of the most promising possibilities for a naturalist interpretation. I point to a certain
compatibility of viewpoint between Taylor and pragmatism, perhaps especially John
Dewey. Although I do not develop it in detail, I believe there is ample room for a
constructive engagement between Taylor and pragmatism and suggest that Dewey's

12

thought is among the most promising directions a naturalist vision of inclusive
humanism may take.

13

Chapter Two
Challenges to Humanism and Transcendence in a Secular Age
What does it mean to say that we live in a secular age? What are the consequences,
losses, and gains? These are guiding questions in Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age. As
with his critique of modernity in general at the heart of his critique of secularity
Taylor is concerned with what we might call the moral and spiritual health of late
modernity. In this respect his theory of modern secularity may be read as a
continuation of his earlier work, especially Sources of the Self. As in his earlier work,
in A Secular Age Taylor also aims to “retrieve buried goods” so they may once again
empower one to do the good, in his more recent work on religious belief under the
conditions of late modernity Taylor aims to rescue, or at least rehabilitate, the
viability of belief in transcendence in spite of what he argues is a strong bias against
transcendence in our day. Taylor concludes Sources of the Self with the suggestion,
without providing an argument that belief in transcendence may turn out to be the
best solution to the moral and spiritual dilemmas that follow from the picture of the
modern identity developed there. His reasons for holding this position are made
explicit in his most recent work, where he advances an argument not only for the
continued viability of belief in transcendence, but also for the need of a
transcendence as transformation, in other words, for an understanding of humanism

14

that does not exclude the possibility of transcendence, nor privilege religious
transcendence.
A Secular Age traces the development of modern secularity, or what Taylor
calls “secularity 3,” understood as the global shift in the pre-theoretical background
conditioning the horizon of possibilities available for religious belief. Taylor oﬀers a
Heidegger-inspired genealogy of the “largely unfocused background, “ or the
“context of belief,” of the late modern West. 9 Contrasting our age with our premodern ancestors, Taylor argues that the change from “a society in which it is
virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the
staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others” warrants calling our
age secular in a radical sense that reaches to the very roots of lived experience for
believers and unbelievers alike (SA 3, 19). Moreover, this development poses
unprecedented diﬃculties for belief, including a weakening of the plausibility
structures 10 of transcendence, the apparent threat that a purely immanent
perspective may eclipse transcendence.

The Heidegger-inspired elements of Taylor's though in this case, and in his
critique of epistemology, owe much to the influence of Hubert Dreyfus. Their longstanding collaboration on epistemology has culminated in their recent co-authored
book, Retrieving Realism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).
9

The term "plausibility structure" is taken from sociology of knowledge. For
an interesting use of the term in the context of modernity and religious belief (or
10

15

While “secularization” remains a hotly debated topic in contemporary
philosophy and other disciplines, especially sociology of religion, and the term
“secular” or “secularization” remains contested as to its meaning as well as its
appropriateness as a description of our age, it is safe to say, with Taylor, that there
have been major changes with respect to religion since the advent of modernity. The
change that Taylor is speciﬁcally concerned with in A Secular Age is the diﬀerence in
terms of lived experience, not merely changes in belief or practice, or changes in the
public place of religion. Taylor is especially keen to distinguish his notion of
secularity from the sense in which it is used, perhaps most commonly, to refer to the
real or apparent decline in religious belief and practice. Taylor denominates his
specialized sense of secularity, “secularity 3,” in order to distinguish it from other,
more common, senses of secularity. It is in relation to this specialized
understanding of secularity that Taylor thinks the United States as a whole is
secular, and this in spite of the persistence of religious belief and practice in most
areas of American society. Taylor oﬀers “the majority of Muslim societies, or the
milieu in which the vast majority of Indians live” as contrast cases to the secularity
of the United States. “It wouldn’t mater,” for his claims regarding secularity 3
Taylor avers, “if one shows that the statistics for church/synagogue attendance in the
unbelief) see Peter Berger, A Rumor of Angeles: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of
the Supernatural (New York, NY: Anchor, 1970).
16

U.S., or some regions of it, approached those for Friday mosque attendance in, say,
Pakistan or Jordan (or this, plus daily prayer). That would be evidence towards
classing these societies as the same” in terms of secularity 2, but this would neglect a
remaining, more fundamental, diﬀerence in terms of the phenomenology of belief.
Taylor is interested in exploring a more fundamental diﬀerence: “it seems evident,”
Taylor claims, “that there are big diﬀerences between these societies in what it is to
believe, stemming in part from the fact that belief is an option, and in some sense an
embattled option in the Christian (or “pos-Christian”) society, and not (or not yet)
in the Muslim ones” (SA 3). We will explore this in more detail below, when we
consider Ruth Abbey's challenge to Taylor's secularity thesis, that is, his claim that
our age is secular in just this specialized sense of "secularity 3," that belief is an
option, and we can opt out.
This diﬀerence in terms of lived experience, of "what it is like" to believe,
which holds not only among our pre-modern forebears but arguably between the
modern West and some contemporary non-western cultures, or a sub-set thereof,
can be summed up as the fact that disbelief is even an option in our civilization,
whereas for others (past and contemporary) disbelief is not a viable option.
“[W]hy,” Taylor asks, “was it virtually impossible not to believe in God in, say, 1500
in our western society, while in 2000 many of us ﬁnd this not only easy, but even
inescapable?” (SA 25).
17

Throughout A Secular Age Taylor develops his answer to this question
through an account of this change in the form of a monumental history, a “grand
narrative,” of the shifting conditions of belief in the West. Taylor distinguishes
secularity 3 from two other senses of secularity, which are prominent candidates, or,
as he says, “families of candidate,” for an understanding of secularity. Although
secularity 3 is his primary focus, he also thinks that a deeper understanding of the
conditions of belief will help us to understand the concept of secularity more deeply,
and to some extent help account for the other senses in which we are usually taken
to be a secular society.
The ﬁrst major candidate for understanding secularity focuses on the place of
religion in the institutional life of people in the modern West, in contrast to the
pervasiveness of religion in the past, or in contemporary non-western cultures.
Reference to religion has all but disappeared in modern western public life, whereas
in the past it would have been impossible to avoid reference to religion in all spheres
of public activity.
If we go back a few centuries in our civilization, we see that God was present
… in a whole host of social practices—not just the political—and at all levels
of society… In those societies, you couldn’t engage in any kind of public life
without “encountering God”… But the situation is totally diﬀerent today. (SA
2)
The diﬀerence is even more stark when the place of religion in public spaces is
contrasted with archaic societies, where “the whole set of distinctions we make
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between the religious, political, economic, social, etc., aspects of our society ceases to
make sense.” Religion was not set apart from these other spheres of public activity
in archaic societies, but was integral to the purpose and meaning of the all activities
that made up the public life of society. “[A]s we function within various spheres of
activity—economic, political, cultural, educational, professional, recreational—the
norms and principles we follow, the deliberations we engage in, generally don’t
refer us to God or to any religious beliefs; the considerations we act on are internal
to the “rationality” of each sphere…” (SA 2)
The second common understanding of secularity is more directly focused on
the question of the decline of religious beliefs and practices. This is the sense in
which the term “secular” is most commonly used, and probably captures the
ordinary use of the term. This is the sense of secularity usually associated with
sociological studies on religious belief and church attendance.  It is also more
controversial whether or not, or to what degree, contemporary western societies
may be said to be secular in this sense, especially in the interpretation of statistics on
religious belief.
Taylor recognizes the importance of these two common notions of secularity
but he thinks that secularity 3 oﬀers a more comprehensive understanding of what it
means to be secular. Rather than focusing on the decline of reference to God or the
transcendent, or ultimate reality, in the public life, or tracking the changes in beliefs
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and practices of individuals in society, secularity 3 is about the shape of the
background, or the changing resources for the moral and spiritual life in the modern
West insofar as these present conditions represent a major development such that
God, or the transcendent is displaced as the default option in the economy of moral
or spiritual experience in the modern West. Secularity 3, then, is not a question of
the content of belief, the number of believers, or level of religious practice; rather, it
is a question of “the conditions of experience of and search for the spiritual.” Taylor
is trying to understand secularity at the level of lived experience, the sense in which
it is “a matter of the whole context of understanding in which ur moral, spiritual or
religious experience and search takes place.” This “context of understanding” that is
the focus of secularity 3 involves “matters that will probably have ben explicitly
formulated by almost everyone, such as the plurality of options, and some which
form the implicit, largely unfocused background of this experience and search, its
'pre-ontology,' to use a Heideggerian term.” That is to say, in pre-modern society
belief in transcendence, was integral to pre-reﬂective, or primary experience, and
this made religious belief unproblematic and “naïve” (in a sense Taylor borrows
from Schiller). Today, however, this kind of naivety is no longer an option, and has
been replaced by a reﬂective stance, which problematizes transcendence. It is
diﬃcult to deny Taylor’s claims here, that belief in transcendence has somehow
become destabilized in contemporary life, that it is “no longer axiomatic,” and
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“there are alternatives.” Choice in this domain is inescapable, for believer or
unbeliever alike (SA 3).
Ruth Abbey’s Challenge to Taylor’s Secularity Thesis
Taylor’s description of the secular situation that he explores, especially with respect
to the way in which belief or unbelief show up as legitimate choices, makes his
claims regarding secularity 3 diﬃcult to deny. The close association of secularity 3
with secularity 2, the sense that focuses on belief and practice, however, has led to
some misunderstandings about Taylor’s claim regarding the secularity of the
contemporary West. Ruth Abbey, in particular, has challenged some of the claims of
Taylor's secularity thesis.
An important and sympathetic commentator on Taylor for many years, and a
former graduate student of Taylor’s, Abbey has recently questioned his claims
about the secularity of our society, arguing that we are not really so secular as
Taylor seems to think, and in particular, that his fears regarding the threat to
transcendence are unfounded. 11 She challenges Taylor’s depiction of our age as
secular not in order to challenge the general insights and analysis of A Secular Age,
but to “complement Taylor’s overall analysis.” Correctly identifying one of the
Taylor supervised Abbey’s dissertation on Nietzsche.  The best example of
her inﬂuence as a commentator on Taylor’s work is her excellent monograph on
Taylor. See Ruth Abbey, Charles Taylor (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ,
2000).
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main points in the book, which is to demonstrate “the tenacity of religion in modern
western societies,” she thinks his claims regarding secularity 3 actually undermine
his claims regarding the endurance of religion. “In short,” she claims, “Taylor’s own
framework can be used to show that religious belief is not as marginal to the lives of
most contemporary westerners as many of his remarks suggest.” Thus Abbey oﬀers
a kind of internal critique of Taylor. She claims that given Taylor’s rather wide
deﬁnition of religion the empirical data (primarily in the form of opinion polls)
contradicts his secularization thesis, while oﬀering support for his claims for the
endurance of religion. She argues that the data seems to support a picture of the
modern West as still quite religious, in the wide sense that Taylor gives to “religion”
in A Secular Age. She goes so far as to suggest a better title forA Secular Age would
have been What Secular Age? (SA 9-10, 8). 12
Abbey’s challenge to Taylor on the secularity of the age is ultimately based on
a misreading of his position, especially what he means by secularity 3, and what it
Ruth Abbey. “A Secular Age: The missing Question Mark,” in The Taylor
Eﬀect: Responding to A Secular Age, ed. Ian Leask, Eoin Cassidy, Alan Kerns, et al.
(Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 8. I note that
aside from the problematic main thesis Abbey’s article is particularly enlightening in
some of the ancillary interpretations she oﬀers of A Secular Age. To cite just one
example, she very helpfully points out the relevance of self-interpretation to
secularity 3: “Readers familiar with Taylor’s though will recognize that this concern
with what it is like to live as a believer or non-believer in contemporary western
societies is an extension of his career-long concern with self-interpretations, with
how individuals understand themselves” (SA 10).
12
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entails with respect to secularity 2, or the decline in belief and practice. Abbey also
doesn’t adequately appreciate the nuances in Taylor’s deﬁnition of religion, which
leads her to an interpretation of his deﬁnition that appears to be much less
expansive than she recognizes. Her reading of Taylor in both cases, though
ultimately diﬃcult to support, is understandable, since Taylor is often far from clear.
Indeed, as Abbey points out, his writing does tend to evince a “ﬂexible, openminded and characteristically relaxed attitude towards matters of deﬁnition.”  It i
instructive, therefore, to see how Taylor’s “relaxed attitude” has lead to a
misreading of his position, and should aid us in a more precise understanding. 13
One of the diﬃculties with Taylor’s construal of secularity 3 lies in identifying
the relationship between this third sense and the other two, especially the second,
which centers on belief and practice, and whether this is in decline or not. Taylor
points out that most people are interested in belief, rather than the conditions of
belief. In particular Taylor is trying to articulate the diﬀerence between the earlier
naïve acceptance of God, or the transcendent, and the modern turn to the possibility
of taking a reﬂective stance on the question. And although Taylor recognizes that
there are important relationships between the three diﬀerent meanings of secularity,
he also argues that “there is no simple correlation” between them. Abbey is not the

13

Ibid.
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only sympathetic critic of Taylor who seems to have drawn too quickly a strong
relationship between secularity 3 and secularity 2. Richard Bernstein has suggested
that Taylor’s distinction between the second and third senses is “merely heuristic.” 14
Abbey seems to think that the relationship is such that a society is secular in Taylor’s
third sense just in case there is a correlative decline in belief. We have already seen
that this is not necessarily the case. For Taylor, secularity 3 is a condition of the
possibility of a decline in religious belief but does not necessitate such a decline. It
may follow as a symptom, but this is not necessary in order to classify a society as
secular in the sense of secularity 3. In his initial discussion of the third sense Taylor
speciﬁcally oﬀers the United States as an example of a society that is secular, he
thinks, “as a whole," but is hardly secular in the second sense (according to most
studies of belief and practice in the U.S.). He admits that religious belief and
practice can be high, without touching the deﬁning feature of secularity 3, which is
the possibility of choice between immanence and transcendence. It is just the fact
that “belief in God… is understood to be one option among others, and frequently
not the easiest to embrace.” Whether or not, or just how extensively, the option for
unbelief is taken, is strictly speaking irrelevant. “It wouldn’t matter,” Taylor points
out, “whether one showed that the statistics for Church/synagogue attendance in the

14

Bernstein, “The Uneasy Tensions," 13.
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U.S…. approached those for Friday mosque attendance” in Muslim countries, since
the comparable rates of belief and practice between two societies does not account
the possibility that there may yet be “big diﬀerences between these societies in what
it is to believe, stemming in part from the fact that belief is an option.” Taylor might
agree, as I have just indicated, that secularity 3 might play an important role in
accounting for decline in belief and practice in a society where this has happened,
but “there is no simple correlation” and it is perfectly conceivable that a society may
not be secular in the second sense, but still be considered so in the sense of secularity
3. Indeed, this appears to be the case in the United States (SA 3).
Is Abbey correct to point out that Taylor commits himself to claims about the
diﬃculty of religious belief under modern conditions and that it is “an embattled
option,” which may be conﬁrmed by empirical evidence? Abbey argues that
Taylor’s “claims about the diﬃculty of sustaining religious belief in a secular age are
quasi-empirical ones,” yet there is no such evidence for these claims, and
furthermore, the evidence appears to support the opposite claim. Perhaps we
should expect to see a statistical decline in religious belief if Taylor is correct about
the embattlement claim.  Nevertheless, it is the optionality of belief that is te
deﬁning feature of secularity 3, not the embattlement claim.  And of course absence
of any “hard evidence” for a decline in belief and practice oﬀers nothing in the way
of support for a claim about the experience one way or the other. Taylor’s
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embattement claim is perfectly consistent with a majority of people in a society
opting for faith, which, for all we know, may well have been a diﬃcult process of
working one’s way to belief (or unbelief) without the assurance of naivety in the
turbulence of reﬂection. Taylor’s claim on behalf of secularity 3 only requires that it
was an option at all.
It also seems that the question of just how diﬃcult individuals in modern
western societies experience the choice between belief and unbelief is clearly
overdetermined by the available data. While opinion poll data that shows many,
even the majority, of a society choosing the believing option may indicate the choice
was unproblematic, it is conceivable that it also supports Taylor’s embattleent
claim. That is, widespread vague, undeﬁned, or inarticulate belief may be evidence
of a struggle.
There remains the question of whether, in Abbey’s words, Taylor
“undermines his own goal of showing religion’s endurance in the modern western
world by exaggerating the threat to religion”(SA 16). We can accept the charge of
exaggeration, however, without committing ourselves to the stronger claim that the
embattlement claim is false.  Taylor doesn’t, I think, exaggerate his claim in this
respect. In each case, and in the many diﬀerent ways that he asserts the
embattlement claim, he is very careful to qualify the claim.  For example, he says
that for “more and more people, unbelieving construals seem at ﬁrst blush the only
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plausible ones,” or that “the presumption of unbelief has become dominant in more
and more of these milieu; and has achieved hegemony in certain crucial ones,” or again,
that “unbelief has become for many the major default option,” and so on. 15 It is
important to note that Abbey cites all of these instances and more besides in defense
of her claim that Taylor exaggerates the diﬃculties facing believers in the modern
West. Nowhere does Taylor assert that the majority of individuals in the modern
West are unbelievers, nor does his embattlement clai entail that this is the case. As
her last bit of evidence for exaggeration Abbey faults Taylor for oﬀering “no
evidence for his declaration that those who deny the existence of God outnumber
those who believe such existence can be proven” (SA 17). Taylor may well have said
such a thing, but it hardly qualiﬁes as an exaggeration. Note that it only claims that
those who believe such existence can be proven are in the minority, which seems to me
perfectly consistent with the majority of people still believing in God, or the
transcendent, indeed, with the persistence of religion. After all, if you can’t believe
in God without also believing that his existence can be proven, then Taylor wouldn’t
qualify.
There is a ﬁnal reason for thinking that Taylor’s embattlement thesis doesn’t
undermine his claims regarding the persistence, or as Abbey puts it, the
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“endurance” of religion in the modern West. Indeed, rather than undermining
Taylor’s claim for the endurance of religion, his embattlement claim would sem to
be necessary; after all, endurance or persistence implies resistance or diﬃculty, in
some form, to some degree. Taylor’s claim regarding the persistence of religion in
the modern West, at its most basic, is that religion persists, or endures, in spite of
diﬃculty, and in spite of the choice between belief and unbelief; that is, secularity 3.
Taylor’s Working Definition of Religion
Of course, secularity, no matter how one understands it, is about religion.  This
poses a diﬃculty not only for Taylor, but also for any theorist of secularity, insofar
as it means that the controversial issue of the deﬁnition of religion has to be
confronted. What, exactly, does Taylor mean by “religion”? He admits early in A
Secular Age that religion “famously deﬁes deﬁnition, largely because the phenomena
we are tempted to call religious are so tremendously varied in human life… we are
facing a hard, perhaps insuperable task” (SA 15). Taylor doesn’t claim to have a
deﬁnition of “religion” that will ﬁt all cultures, or all ages. Taylor settles for what he
calls the “prudent (or perhaps cowardly)” approach to the diﬃculty of deﬁning
religion by limiting his use of the term to the way it is generally understood in the
modern West, what people usually mean in the modern West when they use the
term “religion.” In order not to be placed in the position of needing to “forge a
deﬁnition which covers everything “religious” in all human societies in all ages’ (SA
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15), he narrows the scope of his deﬁnition to “one particular civilization, that of the
modern West” (SA 15). Thus, Taylor oﬀers a deﬁnition of religion for the purposes
of his analysis in A Secular Age that stipulates a provisional, working deﬁnition “in
terms of the distinction transcendent/immanent” (SA 15). His rationale for this
“prudent or cowardly” approach to the deﬁnition of religion is of a piece with his
rationale for limiting the scope of his analysis of secularity to the modern West. In
defense of the limited scope of A Secular Age, Taylor pleads his case against the
impracticality of doing justice even to the variety of regional and national
diﬀerences within the limited compass of the modern West, or even, as he
sometimes puts it, the “North Atlantic world” (SA 21). Not wishing to “rush to
global generalization,” Taylor limits his focus to “the civilization whose principal
roots lie in what used to be called “Latin Christendom,” and recognizes that
“secularization and secularity are phenomena which exist today well beyond the
boundaries” of the West. Though he thinks that a global study of secularization and
secularity is both possible and desirable, he argues for a more piecemeal approach
that takes up the analysis of the phenomena “in their diﬀerent civilizational sites”
(SA 21). By the same token Taylor limits his deﬁnition of religion to the “particular
civilizational site” of the former Latin Christendom.” 16

Taylor has invited some confusion, and some criticism by his comparison
between Christianity and Buddhism on this point. It is often unclear whether or not
16
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The deﬁnition of religion in terms of immanence/transcendence, Taylor
argues, is “tailor-made” for the modern West. This is because the very distinction
(immanence/transcendence) is peculiar to western modernity, according to the
“grand narrative” Taylor develops in A Secular Age. The immanent/transcendent
distinction (or in its earlier version, natural/supernatural) is probably unique to the
modern West. The idea that,
an immanent order in Nature, whose working could be systematically
understood and explained on its own terms, leaving open the question
whether this whole order had a deeper signiﬁcance, or whether, if it did, we
should infer a transcendent Creator beyond it” was “the great invention of
the West. (SA 15)
This sense of the distinction between immanence and transcendence is a particularly
modern distinction, and Taylor contrasts it with the understanding of transcendence
we ﬁnd in Plato. Although Plato is working with a conception of transcendence, it is
not the strong sense we ﬁnd in modernity, in which the transcendent is understood
in strong ontological distinction and independence from the immanent order of

he intends the latter to fall within the scope of his deﬁnition of religion in spite of its
diﬀerent “civilizational site.” I would argue that in those places where his is making
this comparison Taylor is really trying to illustrate only one aspect of the more
narrowly drawn “western” deﬁnition of religion, one he thinks is shared by some
forms of Buddhism. It is arguable that Buddhism would not ﬁt his deﬁnition of
religion in what he calls “the strong sense” because (by some accounts) it requires no
belief in a transcendent deity. However, it does seem safe to say with Taylor that
Buddhism includes a conception of self-transcendence, which it shares with
Christianity, notwithstanding other major diﬀerences.
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nature. “You couldn’t foist this [distinction] on Plato,” Taylor points out, “not
because you can’t distinguish the Ideas from the things in the ﬂux which “copy”
them, but precisely because these changing realities can only be understood through
the Ideas” (SA 15). That is, for Plato there is an integral connection between the
Universal Forms and particulars, whereby the transcendent forms in some sense
explain or account for the existence of the particulars. Properly speaking, the sense
of transcendence/immanence at work in Taylor’s deﬁnition of religion is a strict
dualism of separation. This is transcendence understood in strict opposition to a
conception of nature understood and explained without recourse to anything
beyond it. So the sense of transcendence that Taylor uses in his deﬁnition of religion
is one that hinges on a very strong contrast inherent in the natural/supernatural or
immanent/transcendent distinction. Whether or not the immanent/transcendent, or
natural/supernatural dualism is indeed unique to the West, Taylor is correct in
identifying this distinction, in this speciﬁcally modern form, to be particularly
salient in the current debates over religion in our time, in that it largely deﬁnes the
major opposing positions with respect to belief and unbelief, and that it
distinguishes the dominant understanding of religion throughout modernity.
Belief in transcendence, or in a transcendent reality beyond the immanent
order of nature, however, is not adequate to deﬁne religion in the modern West,
according to Taylor. Thus Taylor supplements his deﬁnition of religion in terms of
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belief in transcendent reality in the strong sense above, with the additional belief
that this transcendent reality provides the goal for moral and spiritual orientation,
one’s identity, that is beyond life, or what is ordinarily understood as human
ﬂourishing. Thus, Taylor deﬁnes religion “in the strong sense… by a double
criterion: the belief in transcendent reality, on the one hand, and the connected
aspiration to a transformation which goes beyond ordinary human ﬂourishing on
the other” (SA 510). What makes this deﬁnition of religion “strong,” is the ﬁrst
criterion, however, not the second. Taylor’s initial gloss on this second sense of
transcendence is in terms of “ﬁnal goals.” Taylor asks, “does the highest or the best
life involve our seeking, or acknowledging, or serving a good which is beyond, in
the sense of independent of human ﬂourishing? In which case, the highest, most
real, authentic or adequate human ﬂourishing could include our aiming (also) in our
range of ﬁnal goals at something other than human ﬂourishing” (SA 16). From his
initial description of the second criterion, what we might call the weak sense of
transcendence, it is clear that the object of aspiration beyond human life may remain
ontologically indeterminate, admiting a plurality of interpretations which may or
may not make essential reference to the transcendent understood to be ontologically
distinct from the immanent order of nature.
We can think of these two senses of transcendence that together make up
Taylor’s deﬁnition of religion in the strong sense as distinguishable on the basis of
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the strength of the ontological commitments each involves. The ﬁrst criterion, belief
in a transcendent reality, implies a strong ontological dualism, a strong contrast with
the immanent order. In terms of the ontology of the self developed in Sources of the
Self, the second criterion is a matter of what Taylor cals “hypergoods,” which
function as a source of the moral or spiritual identity, “something the undistorted
recognition of which empowers us to do the good” (SS 342). The kind of
transcendence in question is not the stronger ontological sense of a transcendent
reality (agent, power, deity), but merely the weaker sense in which one’s hypergood
goes beyond ordinary human ﬂourishing, or beyond life, and brings about a
transformation, a new orientation, which radically changes identity by decentering
it. Taylor’s deﬁnition of religion can thus be understood to include any
“hypergoods perspective." By "hypergood" Taylor means any conception of a good
that provides the basis for strong discriminations (judgments) of higher or lower,
better or worse.  On some readings Taylor believes that hypergoods are necessary
features of self-identity, and thus of any undamaged human being. The hypergoods
in question go beyond ordinary human ﬂourishing, but is also intimately connected
with belief in transcendent reality in the strong sense. What Taylor ultimately thinks
is the most important thing here is whether or not the hypergood can eﬀect a
transformation leading back to an aﬃrmation of life. Although religious
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hypergoods are clearly the best candidates here, nothing in the nature of Taylor's
argument bars non-religious hypergoods.
Problems Arising from Taylor's Critique of Modernity in Sources of the Self
It is important to remember that Taylor’s deﬁnition of religion in the strong sense is
really only a working deﬁnition. The work that his deﬁnition is intended to
contribute to is to advance the primary thesis of A Secular Age. His deﬁnition of
religion is subordinated to this particular project, which is to describe the present
spiritual shape of the modern West, which he calls secularity 3, as we saw above.
Many have made the mistake of taking Taylor’s admittedly “monumental” work to
be the book he claims would be necessary to fulﬁll the postponed expectations from
the ﬁnal chapter of Sources of the Self, where Taylor asserts that the central moral
dilemma of the modern West may be overcome best by “Judaeo-Christian theism,”
that our best hope for overcoming what Taylor calls the “dilemma of mutilation” lies
in “the central promise of a divine aﬃrmation of the human, more total than
humans can ever attain unaided” SS 521). But A Secular Age is not that book. Taylor
is best seen to be only tangentially getting to this kind of argument inA Secular Age.
He is not arguing there for a superiority claim at all, although the ﬁnal chapters, and
substantive part V as a whole, may be read as his articulation of the religious
(speciﬁcally Christian in structure) understanding that would certainly feature in
any account he might oﬀer of his defense of the superiority claim. The closest that
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Taylor comes to advancing an argument for his claims regarding transcendence, and
Christianity in particular, is his Marianist Award lecture, “A Catholic Modernity,”
yet even there he stops short of claiming that only religious transcendence will
suﬃce.
Before we consider Taylor's view of transcendence in Chapter Four, we need
to consider some of the problems to which he thinks transcendence (in some sense)
provides an important part of the solution. The concluding chapters of Sources of the
Self outline the set of diﬃculties that Taylor takes up again in A Secular Age, and it is
beneﬁcial to consider here his general statement of the problematic before
continuing. I will brieﬂy explain the modern moral situation as Taylor presents it at
the end of Sources, with particular emphasis on the question of the adequacy of the
sources of modern morality, on the one hand, and the question of whether any
adequate sources are overly demanding, and as such threaten "mutilation" on the
other. I will return to this in Chapter Four, where I consider how Taylor envisions
his understanding of transcendence to be one possible solution to these problems,
and how the emphasis on transformation is both integral to any acceptable form of
transcendence, and that it is not limited to religious interpretations.
Now I turn to the question of what Taylor considers to be the primary
problem faced by our secular age that, in Sources of the Self he describes as “our
greatest spiritual challenge,” the “dilemma of mutilation," and the associated
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problem from A Secular Age that Taylor argues must be faced by both traditionally
conceived religious transcendence, as well as exclusive humanists, "the maximal
demand" (SS 521; SA 655).
In Sources of the Self Taylor takes it for granted that he is addressing modern
western readers who are committed to  set of moral demands, demands the history
of which he traces through parts II through V of the book. In the language he uses
to describe the fundamental positions regarding transcendence in A Secular Age this
means that Taylor has in mind those he calls exclusive humanists, who "exclude"
transcendence, as well as the religious camp in the debate about transcendence. This
“we,” however, would exclude the “neo-Nietzscheans,” as he calls them.  At least it
excludes the consistent neo-Nietzscheans, if thereare any. This last is a complex
question, cannot be taken up here, but in A Secular Age Taylor argues that most neoNietzschean critics of modernity, indeed ofhumanism, remain practically committed
to the set of Enlightenment standards they theoretically call into question in spite of
a professed commitment to the metaphysical primacy of life. Nevertheless, Taylor
claims that we all face a dilemma peculiar to the modern West that he refers to, both
in A Secular Age and Sources of the Self, as the dilemma of “mutilation.” By this he
means that we appear to be faced with a hard choice between abandoning
transcendence as a safeguard against the negative eﬀects associated with notions of
transcendence, such as, and perhaps especially, the denigration of the body and
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ordinary desires, our ordinary happiness, and the threat of violence. Abandoning
transcendence, however, he asserts (without argument) also necessarily involves
sacriﬁces. Taylor thinks that human beings desire to transcend, and limiting
ourselves to immanence cuts us oﬀ from important moral sources, a situation he
likens to a “spiritual lobotomy.” Ultimately he doesn’t think that this is impossible
to overcome, that there is a way out of the dilemma of mutilation, but he stops short,
in Sources, of making the case for his understanding of transcendence that would
satisfy the demands for spiritual wholeness without (necessarily) involving a
repudiation of this life as worthless. While we will take this up in more detail in the
next chapter, here we focus on the dilemma of mutilation as Taylor sketches it in the
ﬁnal chapter of Sources of the Self.
In Sources of the Self Taylor argues that we of the late-modern West are
inheritors of a set of moral imperatives that have a long developmental history, but
took their present shape primarily in the Victorian age, something he examines in
Chapter 22. As “inheritors of this development” he claims,
we feel particularly strongly the demand for universal justice and
beneﬁcence, are particularly sensitive to the claims of equality, feel the
demands to freedom and self-rule as axiomatically justiﬁed, and put a very
high priority on the avoidance of death and suﬀering. (SS 495)
These are the basic set of moral imperatives regarding life, or “life goods,” that
Taylor thinks sets a foundation of broad moral agreement in contemporary western
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culture, and it is easy to see how these ﬁgure in obvious ways as a kind of
unquestioned set of moral presuppositions in the culture. Notwithstanding a broad
agreement on these imperatives, Taylor argues that there is a deeper disagreement
regarding moral sources that the surface agreement tends to obscure. The question
at issue on this deeper level is just what constitutes these life goods as good. What
is/are the appropriate constitutive goods, or moral sources, that we can appeal to in
order to justify our commitment to these life goods which we always already ﬁnd
ourselves, one way or the other, committed to (at least in practice).  It is at this level
of moral sources that the real problem lies: “but under this general agreement, there
are profound rifts when it comes to the constitutive goods, and hence moral sources,
which underpin these standards. The lines of battle are multiple and bewildering”
(SS 495). 17
Taylor has oﬀered what he calls a “schematic map” to help organize this
confusing, indeed, bewildering disagreements on the question of sources for
(adequately) undergirding our larger agreement. This map “distributes the moral
sources into three broad domains: [ﬁrst] the original theistic grounding for these

In Chapter 3 of Sources of the Self Taylor argues that this underlying
disagreement over sources and their adequacy for supporting the generally agreed
upon life goods is part of what motivates the development of procedural ethics
without reference to the good. Procedural ethics basically brackets the question of
moral sources and tries for justiﬁcation of the life goods through procedure.
17
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standards, a second one that centers on the naturalism of disengaged reason, which
in our day takes scientistic forms; and a third family of views which ﬁnds its sources
in Romantic expressivism or in one of the modernist successor visions (SS 495). In
eﬀect, Taylor argues that the second two moral sources of our commitments to the
life goods of modernity result from the breakdown, or collapse, of the “unity of the
theistic horizon.” Thus, today the sources of these life goods “can now be found on
diverse frontiers, including our own powers [i.e. naturalism of disengaged reason]
and nature [i.e. Romantic expressivism]” (SS 496).
While admitting that “satisfactions of greater sel-understanding” is certainly
one of his motives for painting his portrait of the modern self, its “connections
between the modern moral outlook and its multiple sources,” as well as “the
evolving conception of the self and its characteristic powers,” Taylor also thinks that
“getting this straight can give one insight into issues that are hotly debated in our
time. In particular, one can understand better the standing areas of tension or
threatened breakdown in modern moral culture” (498). There are three primary
areas of stress in late modernity on Taylor’s “schematic map.”
The ﬁrst is the issue about sources, which we have already mentioned,
namely, “underneath the agreement on moral standards lies uncertainty and
division concerning constitutive goods.” The second primary issue Taylor points to
regards instrumentalism: “the conﬂict between disengaged instrumentalism and the
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Romantic or modernist protest against it,” and ﬁnally there is the issue about
morality, the question of “whether [our] moral standards are not compatible” with
the sought for fulﬁllment in the Romantic critique of disengaged instrumentalism.
To clarify the third area: Romantic expressivism develops as a critique of
enlightenment rationalism, speciﬁcally rational instrumentalism. This critique
basically makes claims on behalf of authenticity, or fulﬁllment in terms of selfexpression, which is what the Romantics understood to be placed under threat by
instrumentalism. So, the third issue, that of morality, is a question of whether the
“richer fulﬁllment” of expressivism, or the ethics of authenticity, are compatible
with the moral standards or life goods, which are the focus of the disagreement in
the ﬁrst issue, that about constitutive goods—that is, which goods constitute or may
constitute the life goods as good (499). All these areas of tension on Taylor’s
schematic map play an important role in A Secular Age, and as such this map is
helpful for navigating the considerably more diﬃcult terrain of the latter book18

In Sources of the Self Taylor takes up these “zones of potential conﬂict... from
the standpoint of the picture of the modern identity” he developed throughout the
book, and so does not oﬀer any sustained argument for his claims. “My goal,” he
says, “is less to contribute to the debate than it is to clarify further my portrait of the
modern identity by indicating what this view inclines one to say, and I will take the
license of a prospectus to be terse and dogmatic, to oﬀer a number of beliefs without
fully adequate proof” (499). The excuse he oﬀers for his “dogmatism,” as he calls it,
is that in order adequately to do justice to his claims he would need to write
“another book, at least” (499).
18
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Taylor emphasizes the second issue, that of instrumental rationality, in Sources of the
Self, but here I want to look at the ﬁrst in more depth, since it is the most relevant to
the question of transcendence in the moral economy of the modern subject.
Many critics of modernity seize on the apparently wide range of diﬀerences,
and disagreements on morality in modern culture as a point of departure for
critique, Taylor, however, begins by pointing out just how much we late moderns
share in our conception of morality. The disagreement, according to Taylor, is not
about the moral standards of modernity, but about the appropriate sources
underpinning, supporting, or constituting those goods as good. Regarding our
commitment to universal benevolence and justice, Taylor argues, "[t]here doesn't
seem to be an important conﬂict... We agree surprisingly well, across diﬀerences of
theological and metaphysical beliefs, about the demands of justice and benevolence,
and their importance" (SA 514). We experience these norms or demands of morality
in a number of ways. We might, for example, experience them in a sense of guilt for
failing to live up to them, or as a high when we do especially well in meeting them.
But, as Taylor points out, these experiences are not the same as aﬀective allegiance
to the ideal of human dignity, or sense of intrinsic value of humanity as such. The
distinction here is between the standards of morality, on the one hand, and their
supporting, underlying, sources. Feeling good about living up to the exceedingly
high demands of charity, in some particular case, is not the same thing as "to be
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moved by a strong sense that human beings are eminently worth of helping or
treating with justice, a sense of their dignity or value. Here we have come into
contact with the moral sources which originally underpin these standards" (514).
And it is at this deeper level of sources that Taylor thinks we moderns are in deep
disagreement. Whereas in the past the practical moral dedication to universal
standards of justice and benevolence were supported by the Christian notion of
ἀγάπη, the advent of secular modernity has shattered the original source; our
sources are now irremediably plural and incommensurate.
One natural response to this is to question whether it is even worthwhile to
dig deeper to the "sources" at all. Why not just rest secure with the general, if not
total, agreement at the level of life goods, or moral standards, and take the
disagreement over sources as just one of the prices to pay for living in a liberal,
pluralistic society? Taylor thinks that this is unacceptable, because of the potential
cost in terms of the practical commitment to the realization of the demands of our
rather demanding moral standards. Taylor doesn't think that merely coasting on
our agreement on the level of standards is sustainable, in the long run because
neither a feeling of inadequacy nor of accomplishment are adequate to bring about
the kind of transformation necessary for sustaining our commitment in practice. As
Taylor explains it,
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High standards need strong sources. This is because there is something
morally corrupting, even dangerous, in sustaining the demand simply on the
feeling of undischarged obligation, or guilt, or its obverse, self-satisfaction.
Hypocrisy is not the only negative consequence. Morality as benevolence on
demand breeds self-condemnation for those who fall short and a depreciation
of the impulses to self-fulﬁllment, seen as so many obstacles raised by egoism
to our meeting the standard. (SS 516)
Of course, Nietzschean cynicism is one potential response, but Taylor rejects this as
well; his whole project is an attempt to overcome the Nietzschean response.  Taor
recognizes, however, that unless there is some an available moral source powerful
enough to give positive force to the aﬃrmation of humanity, Nietzsche is right
Nietzsche's challenge is based on a deep insight.  If morality can only be
powered negatively, where there can be no such thing as beneﬁcence
powered an aﬃrmation of the recipient as a being of value, then pity is
destructive to the giver and degrading to the receiver, and the ethic of
benevolence may indeed be indefensible... [Nietzsche's] unsettling conclusio
is that it is the ethic of benevolence which stands in the way [of an aﬃrmation
of being]. Only if there is such a thing as agape, or one of the secular claimants to
its succession, is Nietzsche wron. (SS 516)
It is my contention that Taylor does not believe his own Christian vision of ἀγάπη is
the only way forward but that there are indeed viable secular variants. At the same
time, however, these do not necessarily supersede the original theistic sources, as
fragile as these have become in our secular age.
Taylor points out other potentially negative consequences of "our rather
massive professed commitments in benevolence and justice" (SS 518), without an
adequate moral source to sustain them. It comes down, however, to a question of
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whether the sources of the modern West will continue to sustain the moral
standards of the Enlightenment:
The question which arises from all this is whether we are not living beyond
our moral means in continuing allegiance to our standards of justice and
benevolence. Do we have ways of seeing-good which are still credible to us,
which are powerful enough to sustain these standards? If not, it would be
both more honest and more prudent to moderate them. (SS 517)
Taylor also thinks that overestimating the power of exclusive humanist sources
because of the unacknowledged, unrecognized, reliance on religious sources in
another sense. As Taylor argues at length (in Chapter 19), the naturalism
underlying exclusive humanism is problematic because it is "parasitic" on the
original religious sources. That is, exclusive humanism's aﬃrmation of humanity is
fueled by its rejection of what is taken to be religion’s negative judgments on
ordinary human desires, and the body; this aﬃrmation of humanity is entirely based
on rejecting what is taken to be a religious asceticism rooted in a hatred of life.
Though in Sources of the Self Taylor speaks of Enlightenment naturalism, rather than
exclusive humanism, which term he uses ﬁrst in A Secular Age, his claims here about
the former apply equally to the latter.  AsTaylor points out, complete victory of
Enlightenment naturalism over religion would be a pyrrhic victory:
Is the naturalist seeing-good, which turns on the rejection of the calumny of
religion against nature, fundamentally parasitic? This might be in two senses:
not only that it derives its aﬃrmation through rejecting an alleged negation,
but also that the original model for its universal benevolence is agape. How
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well could it survive the demise of the religion it strives to abolish? With the
"calumny" gone, could the aﬃrmation continue? (SS 517)
From the point of view developed in A Secular Age and A Catholic Modernity? Taylor
questions whether non-transcendent sources are capable of the kind of
transformation necessary for "benevolence on demand," or universal justice. In
Sources he points to the need for a "transﬁgurative power" in this regard (SS 517).
There are other issues besides the question of the strength of our sources for
our demanding moral standards. In Sources of the Self Taylor also points to the
question of whether our continued commitment to universal justice and benevolence
does not in itself simply demand too much of us, whether they in fact somehow
exact too high of a price, that "the demands of benevolence can exact a high cost in
self-love and self-fulﬁllment, which may in the end require payment in selfdestruction or even in violence" (SS 518). This is one aspect of the standard
Enlightenment critique of religious transcendence, what Taylor refers to in both
Sources and A Secular Age the charge of "mutilation." This dilemma of mutilation is
the subject of the ﬁnal three pages of Sources and also a central focus on Chapter 17
of A Secular Age, and ﬁgures in both the Nussbaum's and Thomson's complaint
against transcendence in Taylor's work. Here we focus on Taylor's formulation from
the earlier book.
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As it ﬁgures in Enlightenment humanism's critique of religion, the charge of
mutilation is that because religion (in the strong sense) involves renunciation and
self-denial, because it displaces ordinary human life as the ﬁnal locus of human
fulﬁllment--it charges us with a spiritual imperative to transcend humanity, and this
aspiration to transcendence "actually damages us, unﬁts us for the pursuit of human
fulﬁllment" (SA 626). The idea that goods transcending humanity in some way
necessarily "stiﬂe or oppress us has been one of the motives for the naturalist revolt
against traditional religion and morality" (SS 519). Taylor, however, points out that
the problem here, of mutilation, is not limited to religious or strongly transcendent,
perspectives, but is common to any spiritual or moral outlook which sets the
standards of morality as high as we are wont to in the West--it is the demands of
universal benevolence and justice, commitments to which most forms of Christianity
share with exclusive humanism, and as such pose a threat to human fulﬁllment in
this world. Taylor's point is that it is the demanding moral standards that pose the
threat, not the interpretation. He thinks that this is as true of humanist perspectives
as well as of Christianity because "the general truth" involved here is that,
the highest spiritual ideals and aspirations also threaten to lay the most
crushing burdens on humankind. The great spiritual visions of human
history have also been poisoned chalices, the causes of untold misery and
even savagery. From the very beginning of the human story religion, our link
with the highest, has been recurrently associated with sacriﬁce, even
mutilation, as though something of us has to be torn away or immolated if we
are to please the gods... But the sad story doesn't end with religion. The
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Kharkov famine and the Killing Fields were perpetrated by atheists in an
attempt to realize the most lofty ideals of human perfection. (SS 519
Taylor thinks that it is considerations such as these that motivate the embrace of a
"sober, scientiﬁc-minded, secular humanism" that scales down our moral and
spiritual aspirations to a more "human" scale, one compatible with human
fulﬁllment in life (SS 519). Taylor rejects this as "too simple," and involves the
"cardinal mistake of believing that a good must be invalid if it leads to suﬀering or
destruction" (SS 519). Thus, for example, the Nietzschean strategy of unmasking
Christian and humanist ideals as really motivated by ressentiment, presupposes that
the negative consequences of the ideals is an invalidating feature of the moral
values. It presupposes that, "the self-destructive consequences of a spiritual
aspiration" is suﬃcient as a refutation of the aspiration. But surely Taylor is correct
to point out that this is too simple, and that, "Not only can some potentially
destructive ideals be directed to genuine goods; some of them undoubtedly are" (SS
519).
In A Secular Age Taylor calls the basic dilemma here shared by both exclusive
humanism and religion the "maximal demand." The maximal demand is a question
of the integrity, or moral and spiritual wholeness of human life. By "wholeness"
here Taylor means getting the aﬃrmation of ordinary life and our highest spiritual
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ideals into a single vision--or to formulate our highest ideals in a way that doesn't
involve unacceptable sacriﬁce or mutilation.
We can speak of dilemmas, or tensions, or even of attempts to square the
circle. Whatever we call it, the basic form seems to be this: how to deﬁne our
highest spiritual or moral aspirations for human beings, while showing a
path to the transformation involved which doesn't crush or mutilate or deny
what is essential to our humanity? Let us call this the "maximal demand."
(SA 640)
The upshot of Taylor's discussion of these issues in Sources of the Self for my main
thesis is that these are two of the primary moral and spiritual diﬃculties that
exclusive humanism and religion (in the strong sense) face. It is what motivates
Taylor's drive to rehabilitate religious transcendence, to retrieve the "buried goods"
of the Judeo-Christian tradition, but it also underlies his broader picture of the role
of transcendence as transformation, and the potential for an inclusive humanism
that oﬀers a better way of dealing with these problems than the strippe-down
secular outlook.
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Chapter Three
Varieties of Transcendence in a Secular Age
In this chapter I want to take a more precise look at Taylor’s understanding of
transcendence, especially as it ﬁgures in his solution to the set of problems that were
the focus of the previous chapter. Transcendence, and more generally religion, has
been central to Taylor’s thought throughout his long academic career, but it takes
center stage in his late work on religion and our late modern secular age. Two of his
most recent works are particularly important for an understanding of his approach
to transcendence. The ﬁrst is his 1999 Marianist Award lecture (“A Catholic
Modernity?") in which Taylor approaches the question of transcendence in a work
addressed speciﬁcally to his fellow Roman Catholics, and is the closest he comes to
removing the ﬁlter of philosophical neutrality on the subject of religion and God, or
the transcendent. The other recent work of primary importance to any discussion of
Taylor and transcendence is his monumental A Secular Age. It is important to note
that the issues surrounding transcendence were also central to much of Taylor’s
prior work, though less explicit. Indeed, Taylor prefaces his Marianist Award
Lecture with the following revealing comment:
I am very grateful… for this chance to raise with you today some issues that
have been at the center of my concern for decades. They have been reﬂected
in my philosophical work, but not in the same form as I raise them this
afternoon, because of the nature of philosophical discourse (as I see it,
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anyway), which has to try to persuade honest thinkers of any and all
metaphysical or theological commitments. 19 (CM 13)
As this comment indicates, any exhaustive study of Taylor on transcendence,
religion and modernity could not be conﬁned to these late works, and so at certain
points in this chapter and the following it will be necessary to reﬂect on Taylor’s
larger philosophical vision, and his decades-long engagement with these issues in
order to make sense of his approach to, and understanding of, transcendence.
With this in mind, this chapter lays the groundwork for Chapter Four, which
explains Taylor’s understanding of transcendence, and develops an account of his
positive position on the viability and importance of a continued transcendent
perspective in the late modern age, in spite of the pervasive secularity of the
immanent frame. In this chapter I begin with a discussion of Wessell Stoker's recent
"taxonomy" of philosophical and theological positions on transcendence in order to
focus the broader question of transcendence, and generally to orient the reader to
the wider philosophical possibilities and positions, of which Taylor's is particularly
unique. I also consider two concepts that ﬁgure in A Secular Age, and bear on his
view of transcendence, namely, exclusive humanism and the immanent frame.
Exclusive humanism is the most relevant to the present discussion, as it represents

James L. Heft, ed., A Catholic Modernity?: Charles Taylor's Marianist Award
Lecture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 13, (cited in text as CM).
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the position that Taylor is speciﬁcally concerned to dislodge from its position as the
default response to transcendence in our secular age.
On the Very Idea of Transcendence
The term “transcendence” is deployed in a bewildering variety of ways, often with
very diﬀerent meanings. The term is dangerously close to becoming so vague as to
be useless in philosophical discourse. Even Taylor, for whom the term is of central
importance, expresses regret for the lack of a more suitable substitute. 20 Ingolf
Dalferth points out that “the term [transcendence] has a long and complex history
with many diﬀerent meanings that cannot be merged into a single coherent
concept.” 21 This leads him to develop a taxonomy of transcendence from Plato to
Marion. Even Taylor recognizes the vagueness of the term on more than one
occasion, admitting that it is a “very slippery,” word, and expresses regret that no
better termis available to him (SA 16).
At the most basic, etymological level we ﬁnd the idea of “climbing beyond.”
In this most basic sense, what would seem to be minimally necessary to be
preserved in an acceptable usage is that the term must remain faithful to this basic
See, “Concluding Reﬂections and Comments,” in Heft, ed., A Catholic
Modernity?, 105—188.
20

Ingolf U. Dalferth, “The Idea of Transcendence,” in Robert Bellah, and Hans
Joas, eds., The Axial Age and Its Consequences (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of the
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 146—188.
21
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idea of “climbing beyond” (and we might add, “by ascent”). The etymology of
immanence, on the other hand, suggests dwelling, or remaining within, which oﬀers
the underlying contrast with transcendence as “going beyond through ascent.” 22
Though often opposed, “immanence” and “transcendence” do not necessarily
contradict each other, a fact that will be important for later discussions. The spatial
meaning of the root of both terms immediately suggests, of course, a metaphor for
temporal dimensions of both transcendence and immanence. It is important to note
that transcendence often includes a normative dimension whereby “beyond” is
construed as higher or better
The basic and most common notion of transcendence is most fully captured
in what is commonly called “vertical” transcendence, and often contrasted with
“horizontal” transcendence. The idea of vertical transcendence is perhaps most
familiarly illustrated in Plato’s cave simile in The Republic, and this is the sense of
transcendence that dominates the revolution in philosophical and religious
consciousness that Karl Jaspers called “the Axial Age.” “Vertical” transcendence
likewise gives powerful support to metaphysical dualism—it is, one might say,
paradigmatically theological. The contrast case of “horizontal” transcendence
The etymology here can be substantiated in any of a number of
etymological dictionaries. I have here relied on the classic, W. W. Skeat, An
Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, 4th ed., (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1910).
22
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conceives of the “beyond” of transcendence without necessarily involving a
commitment to metaphysical dualism. That is, “horizontal” transcendence is less
metaphysical than ethical, where recognition or acknowledgement of the other may
be understood in terms of going beyond while remaining within immanence.
Questions of what is sometimes referred to as “other transcendence” belong on this
latter horiontal level. These two notions of transcendence, while they certainly
contrast, are not contradictory. As Dalferth points out, while a number of inﬂuential
thinkers have seen a progressive development of the sense of transcendence from
the robustly vertical, “ontological” transcendence of Plato to a lateral or horizontal
“ethical” transcendence, that distinction is too simple to capture the nuances of the
various senses of “transcendence.” Dalferth endorses Regina Schwartz’s view that
“the categories… are heuristic distinctions that ultimately break down, for the
vertical inﬂects the horizontal, and vice versa.” 23 The distinction is an important
heuristic tool, and the spatial metaphors “vertical” and “horizontal” are important

Schwartz, qtd. in “The Idea of Transcendence,” 153. he theorists of the
horizontal-vertical conception of transcendence mentioned by Dalferth are C.
Pickstock, and W. Lowe. Another important philosopher who also endorses a view
of the modern understanding of transcendence as a shift from a horizontal to a
vertical understanding is H. Kunneman. Luc Ferry explicitly develops the idea of
horizontal transcendence, and is an important interlocutor of Taylor's on the idea of
transcendence in A Secular Age. See especially pp. 677—78. For Ferry’s reading of
the history and development of transcendence, see Luc Ferry, Man Made God: The
meaning of Life, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
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for gaining an initial purchase on the very idea of transcendence, especially in its
overtly religious forms, but if they are taken as rigid categories the ideas are
conﬁning. We certainly cannot understand Taylor in these terms alone. Indeed,
Taylor engages both aspects of transcendence in his work, for example, in the moral
ontology and account of agency developed in Sources of the Self. The horizontal
dimension of ethical self-transcendence may be (and Taylor suggests ought to be)
achieved through the vertical dimension by contact with the divine as a moral
source.
Wessel Stoker oﬀers an inﬂuential and helpful typology of transcendence that
broadens our understanding beyond the basic vertical-horizontal distinction. 24
Stoker is also critical of the simplistic and overly general nature of the horizontalvertical distinction, especially as a way of understanding the cultural and religious
developments of modernity. Stoker clariﬁes the types of transcendence to include
conceptions that run the gamut of contemporary philosophical discourse on the
topic. He distinguishes between four fundamental types of transcendence that are
prevalent in western culture since (at least) the Romantic period. The ﬁrst
understanding of transcendence in Stoker’s typology is “immanent transcendence,”

Wessell Stoker, “Culture and Transcendence: A Typology,” in Wessell
Stoker and W. L. van der Merwe, eds. Looking Beyond? Shifting Views of Transcendence
in Philosophy, Theology, Art, and Politics (New York, NY: Rodopi, 2012), 5—28.
24
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which he associates with Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Tillich (and I would add
Emerson, in some of his moods). On this view human beings relate to the
transcendent (God, or The Absolute, for example) through a discovery of an identity
with a transcendent reality, which nevertheless remains inﬁnitely beyond the ﬁnite
individual—transcendent reality is “experienced in and through mundane reality.”
The second type of transcendence Stoker calls “radical transcendence”—“radical”
because it posits a complete separation between transcendent reality and human
beings. On this view God is understood as "wholly other," and any "encounter of
the human being with God is an encounter with a stranger"—immanent and
transcendent reality are radically separated and any divine-human relationship
must be initiated by the divine. Stoker thinks that Kierkegaard, Barth, and Marion
fall within this category. Both immanent and radical transcendence, in Stoker’s
senses, are clearly developments of the Christian cultural heritage of the West, and
Stoker identiﬁes the ﬁrst with "metaphysical identity thinking," by which he means
the positing of some fundamental identity between the human and the divine,
whereas the “radical” version, which Stoker associates with Heidegger, posits the
ontological diﬀerence. Stoker ﬁnds a third type of transcendence, “radical
immanence,” in Vattimo’s work on Heidegger an Nietzsche. Radical immanence
relocates transcendence within immanence. “Both realities converge," Stoker
explains, "with the absolute emptying itself in mundane reality (κένωσις)."
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Completing this typology of transcendence, Stoker identiﬁes a version that he calls
“transcendence as Alterity.” Like “radical transcendence” this view posits a nearly
complete separation, but redeﬁnes the separation from the “wholly other” by
rejecting the opposition between transcendence and immanence. Beyond the
opposition “the wholly other can appear in every other.” 25
Stoker does not understand his typology to exhaust the varieties of
transcendence available to late modernity, but rather as “forms" or “open concepts”
that receive further speciﬁcation and diﬀerentiation by the addition of content by the
author or artist: “A type or form of transcendence is thus like a pattern or template
that is ﬁlled in by content, by a certain type of spirituality.” His typology is
presented as a useful “heuristic tool for analyzing the meaning, role, place, and even
critique of transcendence” in many cultural domains. For our purposes Stoker oﬀers
a necessary, if incomplete, ground map for negotiating the contemporary landscape
in the philosophical debates on transcendence. Although Taylor does not ﬁt easily
within any of Stoker’s ideal types, he oﬀers four dominant forms of transcendence
against which to measure his unique vision of transcendence. 26
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Wessel Stoker, “Culture and Transcendence,” 8.
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Ibid., 11, 26.
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The Immanent Frame
Taylor argues that we late moderns live under historically-contingent conditions of
pervasive disenchantment where belief in transcendence is marginalized, and that
the lives of believers and unbelievers alike are understood to take place “within a
self-sufficient immanent order” (SA 543). Taylor calls this the “immanent frame.”
The immanent frame imposes a now familiar dualism between the “natural” and the
“supernatural,” or “immanent,” and “transcendent,” and includes what Taylor calls
“spin” in favor of immanence that problematizes religious belief in transcendence in
historically unprecedented ways. Taylor goes on to defend the possibility of belief
in transcendence, however difficult such belief may be. The immanent frame,
briefly, is the framework, or background against which the world, including
ourselves, makes sense.
Our late modern "framework" is an immanent frame because it occludes
transcendence as a possibility, but not so completely as to render it impossible. The
immanent frame is the common background for all in the secular age, and is not
optional. Both believers and unbelievers understand themselves and their world
through the immanent frame. Disenchantment is irreversible, according to Taylor,
and the meanings that once were to be discovered, or passively accepted, are no
longer naively available to the modern subject. The modern identity is "buffered,"
according to Taylor, always at a remove from an unreflective acceptance of a
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meaningful life. With this comes an increased social alienation, and the hegemony
of instrumental rationality. In nearly all of this Taylor follows Weber on the
disenchantment of the world, but he adds "one more background idea: that this
frame constitutes a "natural" order, to be contrasted to a "supernatural" one, an
"immanent" world, over against a possible "transcendent" one" (SA, 542). Taylor's
use of the term "immanent frame" echoes another frame that plays a role in his
critique of modern epistemology. And just like modern epistemology, Taylor argues
that the immanent frame is a picture that "holds us captive" (SA 549). Rather than a
set of beliefs we hold about the world and ourselves, it is the "sensed context about
our predicament," that "we have trouble often thinking ourselves outside of, even as
an imaginative exercise" (SA 549).
The immanent frame, however, is not Weber's "iron cage." While some will
be held "completely captive," so to speak, the possibility of imagining alternatives
remains open in principle. Developing his reading of William James, Taylor thinks
that by dint of imaginative effort, and articulation, it is possible to stand in "the
Jamesian open space" where you can "feel the pull of the force of each opposing
position" (SA 549). The immanent frame conditions the possibilities for the
"obvious." From the believing stance immanence obviously gestures to something
"beyond" immanence, whereas it can appear just as obvious to the unbeliever that
immanence bars the possibility of a beyond. The Jamesian open space that Taylor
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thinks is possible, though perhaps difficult to achieve, is where it becomes possible
not only to imagine how others may live the frame (open or closed) but, going
further, to actually feel the force, or appeal of the opposing possibilities.
Standing in the Jamesian open space requires that you have gone farther than
this second state, and can actually feel some of the force of each opposing
position. But so far apart are belief and unbelief, openness and closure here,
that this feat is relatively rare. Most of us are at level one or two, either unable
to see how the other view makes sense at all, or else struggling to make sense
of it. (SA 549)
The immanent frame is crucial for understanding why Taylor thinks that the
transcendent/immanent distinction is something we're stuck with, but also that it is
something that we can overcome. Much of A Secular Age is aimed at disabusing his
readers of any simplistic view of what is "obvious" about transcendence and
immanence. A major element in achieving this goal is to point out how their beliefs,
even what appear at ﬁrst glance to be "obvious," are dependent on a wider,
historically contingent, context--this is what he calls the immanent frame.
Exclusive Humanism: The Modern Alternative to Religious Transcendence
It will be most helpful for the present purpose, that is, understanding the role, and
sense of transcendence at work in Taylor, if we begin by considering the position
that he opposes to his own view, a position he refers to most consistently as
“exclusive humanism,” in A Secular Age, and “A Catholic Modernity?” His usage is
not consistent here, and he sometimes uses secular humanism as a synonym, or at
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times merely “humanism” to refer to this primary contrast case to the traditional
religious notion of transcendence in the West. Gaining clarity about exclusive
humanism, the primary and most pervasive alternative to religious transcendence,
will aid our later consideration of Taylor’s positive position. Likewise,
understanding what Taylor thinks are the limitations, and seriously problematic
nature of exclusive humanism will greatly aid in our later consideration of the
demand that Taylor puts on any acceptable form of transcendence.
Taylor argues at considerable length in A Secular Age that what he calls
exclusive humanism is increasingly hegemonic in our age, and that it is the very
possibility of exclusive humanism that accounts for the secularity of the secular age,
in his sense of “secularity 3.” Exclusive humanism is a form of humanism in that it
is an aﬃrmation of humanity and the good of human life and human ﬂourishing.
What makes exclusive humanism unique, what makes it “exclusive,” is that it
excludes any aim or goal for humanity beyond the good of human ﬂourishing, or as
Taylor sometimes puts the matter, any good beyondlife. “Exclusive humanism,”
Taylor tells us, is a version of humanism “based exclusively on a notion of human
ﬂourishing, one that recognizes no valid aim beyond this” (CM 19). It is a “purely
self-suﬃcient humanism… accepting no ﬁnal goals beyond human ﬂourishing, nor
any allegiance to anything else beyond this ﬂourishing” (SA 18). Although Taylor
recognizes that there may have been variants of exclusive humanism in the ancient
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world restricted to an elite minority (he names Epicureanism as a potential
candidate), he argues that it only becomes a viable alternative to transcendence on a
large scale with the advent of modernity—that it is coterminous with the coming of
the secular age.
It is helpful to consider a parallel with exclusive humanism and pre-axial
religion that Taylor draws, in passing, in a recent work. Pre-axial religions are
religions prior to what Karl jaspers called the “axial revolution.” This major shift in
human religious and philosophical consciousness, which developed in the centuries
leading up to the Common Era, involves a radical re-conception of the transcendent
and of the human good, according to Taylor. The transcendent is relocated. It “may
now be quite beyond or outside of the cosmos… [and] loses its ambivalent character,
and exhibits an order of unalloyed goodness…” The second change that Taylor
ﬁnds in the Axial Revolution is that,
the highest human goal can no longer be to ﬂourish, as it was before [in preaxial religions]. Either a new goal is posited, of salvation which takes us
beyond what we usually understand as human ﬂourishing, or else Heaven or
the Good lays the demand on us to imitate or embody its unambiguous
goodness, and hence to alter the mundane order of things down here. This
may, indeed usually does, involve ﬂourishing on a wider scale, but our own
ﬂourishing… can no longer be our highest goal. 27

Charles Taylor, “What Was the Axial Revolution?,” in Robert Bellah, and
Hans Joas, eds., The Axial Age and Its Consequences (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
the Cambridge University Press, 2012), 35.
27
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In contrast to the post-axial understanding of the transcendent and human
ﬂourishing, pre-axial religions understood the transcendent or the divine as
ambivalent powers, which, at best, must be placated in order to secure ordinary life
goods. “What people [in pre-axial religions] ask for when they invoke or placate
divinities and powers is prosperity, health, long life, fertility; what they ask to be
preserved from is disease, dearth, sterility, premature death.” While this concern for
the ordinary goods of everyday life is easily understood, even for us late moderns,
relatively insulated from the daily risks faced in the ancient world, there is a great
diﬀerence between this earlier situation and the post-axial age. In post-axial
religions human ﬂourishing, where human ﬂourishing is understood in terms of life
and the means of its preservation, does not exhaust the point of life. The parallel
with exclusive humanism is helpful. Like pre-axial religion, exclusive humanism
identiﬁes human ﬂourishing as the highest good. “What makes modern [exclusive]
humanism unprecedented,” Taylor points out “is the idea that this ﬂourishing
involves no relation to anything higher.” 28
Exclusive humanism is still a bit of a vague notion, however. Part of the
diﬃculty here, as Ian Fraser points out in his recent engagement with Taylor’s
Marianist Award lecture, is that Taylor nowhere in that work “informs us which
Ibid., 33, and 34. It might be suggested in passing that Richard Rorty is the
best candidate for a representative of exclusive humanism.
28
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thinkers fall under that rubric.” 29 A Secular Age, published after Fraser’s remark,
also oﬀers no speciﬁc examples of thinkers who may be counted among the ranks of
exclusive humanists. In earlier works, especially Sources of the Self, Taylor uses the
term “naturalist humanism,” which is a recognizable philosophical position in the
academy. Likewise, especially when discussing the parameters of contemporary
philosophical debates, Taylor often mentions “secular humanism” where one might
expect him to use exclusive humanism. The reason for this is that exclusive
humanism does not name a philosophical position, or a theory, in the precise sense.
Rather, it is an identity-shaping perspective on spiritual and moral life. In terms of
Taylor's ontology of the self, exclusive humanism is a pervasive perspective. It is
Taylor’s name for the condition of selfhood oriented by a conception of the good,
which is exhausted by ordinary human ﬂourishing—by what he also refers to as the
“metaphysical primacy of life.” Together with the primary contrast case, religious
transcendent perspective, it deﬁnes the context within which the philosophical
debate takes place; philosophical theories can be understood as reactions to, or
developments out of, apparently incompatible conceptions of the highest good—
“life,” or something “beyond life.” The philosophical debate, Taylor says, “is

Ian Fraser, Dialectics of the Self: Transcending Charles Taylor (Charlottesville,
VA: Imprint Academic, 2007), 35.
29
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shaped by the two extremes, transcendent religion, on the one hand, and its frontal
denial, on the other” (SA 20).
Of course, religious transcendence and exclusive humanism do not exhaust
the plurality of options, and Taylor recognizes varieties of non-religious nonhumanisms, which he associates with the thought and inﬂuence of Nietzsche.  We
will reconsider the role of these non-humanist options below, options Taylor often
refers to as “neo-Nietzschean.”  For now we only note that unlike exclusive
humanism, non-humanist options (religious or non-religious) are not committed to
the constitutive goods that empower enlightenment values, and reject not only the
primacy of life as the sole end or goal (exclusive humanism) but as any worthy end
at all, besides which non-humanist options simply do not have the wide appeal in a
culture still committed to the enlghtenment aﬃrmation of humanity—indeed, this
is something that Taylor thinks we can even detect in all but the most consistent
neo-Nietzscheans.  As we will see inmore detail below, Taylor shares with exclusive
humanism a concern for human ﬂourishing, for what he calls “life goods,” and his
critique of exclusive humanism is rooted in his belief that its rejection of
transcendence places his shared commitment in jeopardy. Taylor makes common
cause with exclusive humanism against the anti-enlightenment perspective, which
aligns Taylor against those who reject humanism from a religious, transcendent
perspective, as we see in MacIntyre, or reject transcendence along with ordinary
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human ﬂourishing (Nietzsche is Taylor’s favorite example of this, although h also
associates it with so-called “postmodernism”). Although exclusive humanism and
the non-humanism are both anti-religion in so far as they deny transcendence (at
least the ontological view of transcendence found in the ﬁrst two versions of
transcendence of Stoker’s typology, namely immanent transcendence and radical
transcendence), Taylor emphasizes that they diﬀer radically on the issue of
humanism: “The camp of unbelief is deeply divided—about the nature of
humanism, and more radically, about its value” (SA 636). For Taylor the
contemporary modern debate is about more than religious belief in transcendence; it
is also about the nature and value of ordinary human ﬂourishing. Rather than a
“struggle between two protagonists,” or two “camps” of belief and unbelief, he sees
a “three-cornered, even perhaps a four-cornered battle”:
There are secular humanists, there are neo-Nietzscheans, and there are those
who acknowledge some good beyond life. Any pair can gang up against the
third on some important issue. Neo-Nietzscheans and secular humanists
together condemn religion and reject any good beyond life. But neoNietzscheans and acknowledgers of transcendence are together in their
absence of surprise at the continued disappointments of secular humanism,
together also in the sense that its vision of life lacks a dimension. In a third
line-up, secular humanists and believers come together in defending an idea
of the human good, against the anti-humanism of Nietzsche’s heir. (SA 637)
Taylor also identiﬁes a distinction within the camp of belief, which introduces
the possibility of a “fourth party” to the debate. It is this fourth option with which
Taylor himself identiﬁes, and as we will see below in more detail, takes into account
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the problems faced by both the transcendent and exclusive humanist perspectives.
This “fourth corner” also forms the basis of Taylor’s positive suggestion for an
understanding of transcendence that overcomes the conﬁning categories of the
three-cornered debate:
A fourth party can be introduced to this ﬁeld if we take account of the fact
that the acknowledgers of transcendence are divided. Some think that the
whole move to secular humanism was just a mistake, which needs to be
undone. We need to return to an earlier view of things. Others, in which I
place myself, think that the practical primacy of life has been a great gain for
human kind, and that there is some truth in the self-narrative of the
Enlightenment: this gain was in fact unlikely to come about without some
breach with established religion… but we nevertheless think that the
metaphysical primacy of life espoused by exclusive humanism is wrong, and
stiﬂing, and that its continued dominance puts in danger the practical
primacy. (SA 637)
Taylor introduces his fourth option only tentatively in A Secular Age, since his stated
aim in that work is merely descriptive and diagnostic. In A Secular Age Taylor wants
to describe the “spiritual shape of the present age,” and identify the problems facing
belief and unbelief. His fourth option, which is clearly his own perspective, isn’t yet
on the moral horizon of modernity—that he wishes it were, is a diﬀerent matter
altogether. Taylor hints (and sometimes more than hints) at what his fourth option
might look like, at the criteria for a suitable transcendent perspective, throughout A
Secular Age. This fourth option is the focus of the following section of the present
chapter, and the basis of what I call Taylor's inclusive humanism.
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With this picture of the contrast case of exclusive humanism, and his
understanding of post-axial visions of transcendence, we are in a better position to
grasp what Taylor understands to be the relevant notion of transcendence in his
critique of modern secularity, and the threat posed by the perspective of exclusive
humanism and “neo-Nietzscheanism.”  It will also help us understand how this
notion of transcendence ﬁts into his proposed solution to what we might call the
paradox of transcendence, and how it helps us to understand what he ultimately
thinks may be the only way for a transcendent perspective to meet what he calls the
“maximal demand.”
In both A Secular Age, and A Catholic Modernity? Taylor readily recognizes a
paradox in any religious/transcendent perspective. He argues, however, that the
paradox ultimately due to a deep misunderstanding prevalent in contemporary
culture. This misunderstanding is in part due to the “post-revolutionary climate” of
modernity that strengthens an entrenched and narrow picture of transcendence.
One of the goals of Taylor’s work, and not only his work explicitly dealing with
religion, is to disabuse us late moderns of this overly simplistic picture of
transcendence, and to make room at the table for a fourth neglected position, an
implicit, though overlooked option within the camp of transcendence.
Understanding the contrast between exclusive humanism and religious
transcendence in the terms that Taylor suggests reveals an inherent diﬃculty for
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advocates of transcendence. The inherent tension within the transcendent
perspective is between the aﬃrmation of human ﬂourishing, on the one hand, and
the belief (deﬁnitive of the transcendent perspective) that the ultimate goal of life is
beyond human ﬂourishing, that the “ﬁnal end” of life is something beyond life. If
“the highest and best life involve[s] acknowledging, or serving a good which is
beyond, in the sense of independent of human ﬂourishing,” the belief that “the
highest, most real, authentic or adequate human ﬂourishing could include our
aiming (also) in our range of ﬁnal goals at something other than human ﬂourishing,”
a problem is immediately raised. Taylor recognizes that in the Judeo-Christian
religious tradition, which is paradigmatic for western culture, and the central
concern in Taylor’s work, the ﬁnal goals have indeed been conceived in exactly this
way. He notes that, “in this tradition God is seen as willing human ﬂourishing, but
devotion to God is not seen as contingent on this. The injunction 'Thy will be done'
isn’t equivalent to 'Let humans ﬂourish,' even though we know that God wills
human ﬂourishing.” Taylor marks an “inherent tension” here, or a “paradox,” that
assails any transcendent perspective that aﬃrms the good of human ﬂourishing, of
life, yet nevertheless refuses that good as a ﬁnal end. Taylor’s paradigm case, and
the obvious one for the West is Christianity, but we have seen how the possibility of
this paradoxical relationship between transcendent ﬁnal ends and ordinary life
goods arises with the axial revolution and the shift in the understanding of
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transcendence that accompanies it. On Taylor’s reading of the axial revolution, a
major development in human understanding of the divine is that it its understood to
have an unambiguously beneﬁcent attitude toward human beings, as opposed to the
ambivalent, capricious, even hostile, attitude of the pr-axial sense of the divine.
This shift opens up the possibility, realized, according to Taylor, in Christianity, that
the divine so conceived may function as a moral source empowering the practical
goals of human ﬂourishing. Taylor speculates that Buddhism is another post-axial
religion that may involve the same paradoxical relationship (SA 16-17).
The paradox may be seen in sharper relief if we take into account that this
understanding of the divine involves the renunciation of human ﬂourishing insofar
as it locates the (true) ends of humanity beyond human ﬂourishing, while at the
same time maintaining the aﬃrmation of human ﬂourishing in light of the
unconditional benevolence of the divine. While Taylor recognizes a tension in this
view of transcendence between renunciation and aﬃrmation of life, he argues that
the paradox may be resolved. This resolution is realized by a Christian view of
transcendence he advances most directly in A Catholic Modernity?
Of course, framed in the way Taylor understands it, this paradox inherent in
religious transcendent perspectives does not appear in all religious or philosophical
views that defend a conception of transcendence. In the ﬁrst place, this paradox
only aﬀects senses of transcendence with a strong vertical emphasis. In terms of
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Stoker’s typology this would restrict the paradox to at least some versions of the ﬁrst
of his two types, immanent transcendence and radical transcendence. In both of
these types there is a strong vertical emphasis that locates the transcendent beyond
life. More than a strong sense of transcendence is necessary, however, for the
paradox to show up. There must also be some sense in which the good that
transcends life, and calls for renunciation, is also (and thus paradoxically) the
ground for the aﬃrmation of the goodness of the life that is renounced. To illustrate
this diﬀerence between views acknowledging transcendence Taylor contrasts
Christianity with Platonism (rather narrowly conceived). “In the Christian case,”
Taylor points out, “the very point of renunciation requires that the ordinary
ﬂourishing foregone be conﬁrmed as valid. Unless living the full span were good,
Christ’s giving himself to death couldn’t have the meaning it does. In this it is
utterly diﬀerent from Socrates’ death, which the latter portrays as leaving thi
condition for a better one”(SA 17). Platonism avoids the paradox, then, by
renouncing life outright, as indeed do some forms of Christianity, especially postReformation forms.
The paradox of transcendence, so understood, points to a division within the
camp of transcendence that Taylor alludes to in the passage quoted above as a
possible “fourth party” to the existing three-cornered debate on transcendence.
Those who acknowledge transcendence are divided on the question of the value of
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human ﬂourishing. On one side there are those who wish to aﬃrm both the higher
good beyond life as well as human ﬂourishing, and so embrace some form of the
paradox of transcendence—an understanding that Taylor characterizes as a
“symbiotic relationship” between human ﬂourishing and a good that transcends
human ﬂourishing. The alternative stance that Taylor identiﬁes with certain forms
of Protestantism, especially Calvinism, “solves” the paradox by coming down on the
side of transcendence against life and human ﬂourishing. Taylor calls this the
“stance of purity” and the relationship with the Protestant Reformation is clear.
This stance of purity rejects the symbiotic view, and “insist[s] on returning religion
to its purity, and posit[s] the goals of renunciation on their own as goals for
everyone, disintricated from the pursuit of ﬂourishing. Some are even moved to
denigrate the latter pursuit altogether, to declare it unimportant or an obstacle to
sanctity” (CM 174). The stance that each view recommends toward the
Enlightenment makes the distinction all the more striking. The ﬁrst, seemingly
paradoxical view welcomes the moral standards of the Enlightenment as genuine
achievements, indeed, Taylor sees them as genuine developments of the “gospel
ethic.” The second picture of humanity’s relationship with the transcendent seeks to
return to pre-Enlightenment visions of the good life, and rejects the Enlightenment
as an unmitigated error. There are “boosters” and “knockers” (to use two favored
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categories of Taylor’s30) within the camp of transcendence as well as the camp of
those who reject transcendence. While this completes the basic outline of Taylor’s
view of the placeholders in the debate on transcendence, it does not exhaust the
diﬃculties for the transcendent viewpoint. The “boosters” on the side of
transcendence remain faced with the paradox inherent in the symbiotic view.
Taylor takes a more nuanced stance on transcendence that solves the paradox
inherent in the symbiotic view and remains committed to Enlightenment values, bu
mixes his aﬃrmation with criticism and even a warning. Before Taylor brings his
version of the fourth corner option to the table, however, he needs to oﬀer a way of
solving, or dissolving, the paradox of transcendence.
He does this in two ways. First he tries to disabuse his readers of an overly
simplistic view of the options available on the side of transcendence, which he
attributes to a pervasive prejudice stemming from the Enlightenment context in
which the debate was originally undertaken. Taylor refers to this as a “postrevolutionary climate” in the West since the Enlightenment. In addition to
diagnosing modern blindness to transcendent alternatives, Taylor advances his
personal religious view, that is, he ﬁlls in the content of the basic form of the

These terms refer, respectively, to those who view modernity as
unquestionably a good thing, and those who understand it to be unquestionably a
bad thing. Taylor uses them in many places.
30
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solution only adumbrated in A Secular Age with his personal religious
understanding. This latter view is one of the main theses defended inA Catholic
Modernity, and it shows that Taylor’s deep originality as a thinker is not limited to
his philosophy, but extends to his spiritual life. It also shows how deeply his
confession of faith and his profession of philosophy deeply inform one another, as
against some critics who, focusing one-sidedly on the inﬂuence of his faith on his
philosophy, maintain some version of the charge that Taylor’s philosophical position
must be tendentious, or at least fatally compromised by his religious belief. Taylor
argues that, not without good reason, moderns are wary of religion and of any talk
of “going beyond” human ﬂourishing.
From the perspective of his fourth corner Taylor contemplates the rise of
exclusive humanism and the development of modern secularity with a mixture of
humility and apprehension. On the one hand he is humbled by what he sees as the
necessary decline in religious faith, and the rise of secularity for a true
universalization of originally Christian moral ideals, such as modern rights culture,
as well as the moral sources that empower them, such as the ideals of universal
benevolence, authenticity, and modern freedom. So it is with a spirit of humility
that Taylor explicitly repudiates the idea of “Christendom,” as paradoxically
antithetical to the advance of the very ideals it putatively symbolized (though never
realized). On the other hand Taylor is apprehensive about the prospects for the
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continuing commitment of these ideals. He identiﬁes the threat to their continuance
in the eclipse of the transcendent with the rise of unbelief in modernity. We’ll
explore this in more detail below when we consider Taylor’s arguments for
transcendence. It is clear, however, that Taylor views the development of a viable
form of transcendence as an exigent demand determined by his commitment to the
value of the enlightenment. Driven neither by confessional prejudice, nor
philosophical point scoring, Taylor’ work is compelling because it is driven by high
moral purpose.
Besides the various ways in which modern secularity tends toward a closed
perspective on transcendence, something we considered earlier in greater detail,
Taylor identiﬁes other more mundane factors that conspire to occlude the vision of
transcendent possibilities in modernity. First, transcendence is generally taken,
especially religiously inﬂected notions of transcendence, to be exhausted by the
“purist,” or reform understanding of transcendence.
As we saw, the “purist,” version of transcendence avoids the paradox by
embracing a negative view of life in relation to the transcendent. This
understanding became hegemonic after the rise of exclusive humanism as a genuine
possibility during the Enlightenment, and provided the primary target, and much of
the fodder for the Enlightenment attac on religion. In the process, the very notion
of a legitimate alternative to the purist reform picture of religious transcendence
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became lost from view. According to the “Reform Master Narrative” that Taylor
tells in A Secular Age, during the process of reform within Christianity it was the
purist reform understanding of religious transcendence that came to be identiﬁed
almost exclusively with the understanding of religious transcendence as such, and
any serious alternative recedes from view. The stance of ἀγάπη /karuna, the vision
of transcendence powered by love, Taylor says, “becomes invisible… because a
transformed variant of it has, in fact, been assumed by the secularist critic” (CM
175). More speciﬁcally, in the context of charges of mutilation of the body, or life,
leveled against Christian religious transcendence from Nietzsche to Nussbam,
Taylor makes the point that the charges are overly narrow in their target and that
there are alternatives. It is not accidental that the passages where Taylor considers
this aspect of the development of secularity in A Secular Age happen to be just those
where he comes closest to slipping into an apologetic voice; this is integral to his
personal religious vision as well.
A second major explanation of the occlusion of alternatives to the purist
reform version of transcendence stems from what Taylor calls the
“postrevolutionary climate” of modernity. By “postrevolutionary climate” Taylor
means the hypersensitivity to real or perceived threats by the previous regime to the
gains of a revolution that pervades the order of things following in the wake of a
revolution. Generalizing to contemporary modern culture in the West, Taylor
75

claims to see “a milder but very pervasive version of this kind of climate” in the
wake of the Enlightenment with respect to transcendence. “To speak of aiming
beyond life is to appear to undermine the supreme concern with life in our
humanitarian, “civilized” world. It is to try to reverse the revolution and bring back
the bad old order of priorities, in which life and happiness could be sacriﬁced on the
alters of renunciation” (CM 176).
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Chapter Four
Transcendence as Transformation and the Promise of Inclusive Humanism
What is Taylor's positive view of transcendence, and what role does it play in his
account of the moral life in late modernity? As we saw above, Taylor often
characterizes transcendence in a minimal sense as "going beyond," a sense that often
includes belief in and commitment to a monotheistic creator God who transcends
"this" world. Taylor's characterization of transcendence, however, falls short of
insisting on strong ontological claims about the existence, or nature of deity, or the
transcendent. I argue in this chapter that Taylor advances a vision of transcendence
that is intended primarily to be compatible with humanism, that is, he is defending a
version of religious humanism, a humanism that does not exclude transcendence. 31

This idea, which I argue is central to Taylor's pluralistic standpoint, bears
striking resemblance to the later thought of Jacques Maritain, the preeminent Roman
Catholic philosopher of the first half of the twentieth century. Maritain agrees with
Taylor on the problem, and offers a similar solution. Taylor and Maritain both share
a commitment to political and ethical pluralism, a communitarian critique of
liberalism, social democratic politics, and both thinkers share a commitment to a
humanism based on a markedly similar account of agency. What I am here calling
inclusive humanism is also quite close to Maritain's notion of integral humanism.
Briefly, integral humanism is the term Maritain gives to the political philosophy he
developed after he abandoned the Action française (a monarchist/fascist political
movement of the 1920s and early 1930s which initially attracted many Roman
Catholic intellectuals, including Maritain). Maritain's ideal of integral humanism is
an attempt to elaborate a "theocentric" humanism, which preserves the underlying
values of liberal humanism while rejecting the naturalistic and anthropocentric
presuppositions. With Taylor, he argues: "Western humanism has religious and
transcendent sources without which it is incomprehensible to itself [my italics]."
31
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Moreover, I argue that Taylor is interested in advancing the possibility of an
inclusive humanism that may take either religious, or non-religious forms, but which
includes transcendence. Taylor is primarily focused on undermining, or exposing
the inherent weakness of a narrow, reductive exclusive or self-suﬃcient humanism
that requires the rejection of any good beyond humanity, which plays a role in the
determination of the goodness of humanity.
The best way to get at what Taylor means by transcendence, or as he often
says, "the transformation perspective," is to look more closely at the way it works for
his personal religious or theological view. I begin with a characterization of the

Maritain finds the root of a modern crisis of liberalism in the fact that "liberalbourgeois" humanism is now no more than barren wheat and starchy bread"
because it is supported by naturalist philosophy "emancipated" from any reference
to transcendence by which its continuing commitment to "some conception of
human dignity, of liberty and of disinterested values...[that still]... move men's
hearts and move them to action" might be justified. Maritain seeks "to save the
"humanist" truths disfigured by four centuries of anthropocentric humanism... at the
very moment when humanist culture is becoming tainted, and when these truths are
crumbling at the same time as the errors which vitiated and oppressed them."
Maritain's integral humanism is his attempt to reconceive humanism from a
transcendent perspective that integrates man's temporal and material rights as well
as his spiritual aspirations. Thus his vision of an integral humanism is "more human
[than liberal humanism] because it does not worship man but really and effectively
respects human dignity and does justice to the integral demands of the person"
(Jacques Maritain, Integral Humanism, edited by Otto Bird, Trans. Otto Bird, Joseph
Evans, et al. [University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame: 1996], 154, 155, 197, 155).
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picture of transcendence that emerges in A Catholic Modernity? 32 Unsurprisingly,
Taylor's recent work on secularity has gained the attention of theologians, and we
will now take a brief look at two recent characterizations of Taylor's theological
position. Carlos Colorado, in particular, has oﬀered a very clear theological reading
of Taylor's view on transcendence. Like Colorado, I also draw on Steven White's
characterization of Taylor's philosophical anthropology as a form of "weak
ontology," and his theism as "weak ontological theism" in my view of Taylor's
philosophical view of transcendence, which emphasizes the element of
transformation, and the compatibility with non-religious forms. White's idea of
"weak ontology" is also important to keep in mind as we consider some recent and
inﬂuential objections to Taylor on transcendence in the next chapter. Also, the idea
that Taylor is working with a "weak ontology" helps us appreciate his resistance to

See also, Charles Taylor, "Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy," in Dilemmas
and Connections, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2011), 3-23. Originally published in Maria Antonaccio and William Schwfeiker, eds.,
Iris Murdoch and the Search for Human Goodness, (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1996), 3-28. This work is noteworthy for a number of reasons. It sheds light
on the extent of the influence that Iris Murdoch had not only on Taylor's moral
thought, often remarked, but also on his religious thought. It is telling that much of
this essay is repeated verbatim, or with slight variations in terminology, in Taylor's
Marianist Award lecture. In particular, many of the passages on transcendence in A
Catholic Modernity? find nearly exact matches here, only with the Buddhist-inspired
trope of the "forest" substituted for the term "transcendence." He also has more to
say about the parallels between Buddhism and Christianity.
32

79

making strong claims for theism in A Secular Age, something that has caused some
readers to approach his work through a "hermeneutic of suspicion."
Taylor sees the basic form of transcendence that he sketches to ﬁt not only
some forms of Christianity, but also Buddhism, a faith which in the relevant form
implied here, does not posit a creator God. The articulation of transcendence can
thus vary even to the extent that it excludes the robust, traditional theological idea of
God, and immortality. It is true that in A Secular Age Taylor does deﬁne religion in
terms of transcendence in a strong sense (which he recognizes to be problematic
outside the western contest), and there explicitly states that "we should see religion's
relation to the "beyond" in three dimensions," namely, 1) "the sense that there is
something higher than, beyond human ﬂourishing... a possibility of
transformation... that takes us beyond merely human perfection." 2) "[T]he belief in
a higher power, the transcendent God of faith," and ﬁnally 3) a view of "our life as
going beyond the bounds of its "natural" scope between birth and death; our lives
extend beyond "this life""(SA 20). But this apparently highly restrictive deﬁnition in
A Secular Age, we must keep in mind, which insists on 1) self-transcendence, 2) God,
and 3) immortality, is merely his working deﬁnition, as we saw above in an earlier
discussion of the diﬃculties Taylor faces in deﬁning religion, and the potential for
confusion it has caused.
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In A Catholic Modernity? Taylor oﬀers a gloss on transcendence as follows.
"The fundamental idea" Taylor explains, "one might try to grasp in the claim that life
isn't the whole story" (CM 173). While he recognizes, however, that "one way to
take this expression" is to read it as indicating immortality, that "life goes on after
death," Taylor brings it up to point out to his Catholic audience that the view he
develops in his address is compatible with the stronger view. His more general
deﬁnition here hinges on the idea that "the goodness of things is not exhausted by
life, the fullness of life, or even the goodness of life." "Let us agree," he suggests, by
way of putting the point in higher relief, "with John Stuart Mill that a full life must
involve striving for the beneﬁt of humankind. Then acknowledging the
transcendent means seeing a point beyond that" (CM 173). This is a reading of
transcendence that is standardly objected to from the point of view of exclusive
humanism, which is seen to be threatening, even if mistakenly, for reasons we
considered in Chapter Three.
Taylor's solution to the problems associated with transcendence takes form as
a solution especially when he re-describes transcendence in terms of
"transformation," and "change in identity." This description, or re-description, of
transcendence builds on Taylor's moral ontology from Sources of the Self. In A Secular
Age, Taylor calls this view of transcendence the "transformation perspective." There
he contrasts it with views that explicitly take account of transcendence in terms of
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speciﬁc beliefs about the existence of supernatural entities (SA 430). With the move
to the transformation perspective, it is clear that Taylor is now taking the discussion
in a very diﬀerent direction, and that he is focusing on the importance, and
relevance, of religious experience. The transformation perspective involves what in
Sources of the Self he calls "moral orientation," and that he argues is the deﬁnitive
feature of selfhood, without which sel-identity would be close to impossible. For
Taylor, self-identity requires some unity of moral direction, which is provided in
each case by a moral source, a good, transcending the self. A person without any
understanding of the good such that identity is organized in relation to it (through
reﬂection and "articulation") would be pathological. 33 Taylor's view of moral
ontology here construes the "good as the object of our love or allegiance, or as Iris
Murdoch portrayed it in her work, as the privileged focus of attention and will" SS
3). In the case of religious transcendence the change in identity is brought about by
a change in will and given orientation by the understanding of God. 34 Taylor oﬀers

This is a brief gloss on a complicated picture of the modern self, which is
the topic of Sources of the Self. Elsewhere Taylor is clear that a range of final ends is
sufficient. He also doesn't think that articulation must be so oriented to a good, at
least not in the usual sense; for Taylor "articulation" is a term of art, and includes
more than language. Another idea of Taylor's, correlative to "moral orientation," is
"moral space," which is where the self finds its bearings, to continue the metaphor.
33

I take the idea of a "change in will" here from John Dewey, who, in A
Common Faith distinguishes this from a "change of will." In the first instance the will
is passive, Dewey calls it a "voluntary surrender," whereas the second is active, a
34
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the example of (Catholic) Christianity that involves "a radical decentering of the self,
in relation to God," but he also includes Buddhism as a paradigm case of the
transformative perspective, whereby "the change is quite radical, from self to 'no
self'" (CM 173).
From the transformation perspective the paradox of transcendence is also rearticulated in terms of self-transformation. Taylor's re-articulation of transcendence
in terms of a change in identity, or transformation, he points out, "brings out a
similar point to my ﬁrst way [going beyond human ﬂourishing] in that most
conceptions of a ﬂourishing life assume a stable identity, the self for whom
ﬂourishing can be deﬁned" (CM 173). 35 In this case, however, the concept of
transcendence is much more open than in the earlier case, more ﬂexible, and
amenable to a broader realization even outside of religious contexts. Here the

choice of direction of the will. My sense is that something like this distinction is also
important for Taylor, and it speaks to the question of whether the transformation
Taylor has in mind is something entirely under the control of the will. This may be
one of the most "Emersonian" sentences Dewey penned. It captures something of
the aesthetic-affective "stickiness" of Emersonian subjectivity. For the concept of
"stickiness" see Stephen White, Sustaining Affirmation (Princeton NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2000), 8-10, and my discussion of Taylor and weak ontology below.
Of course, this also distances Dewey from Nietzsche.
It is important to note that a "stable identity" does not rule out changes in
identity. Taylor is also very good on the phenomenology of this in Sources of the Self.
See also, his "Self-interpreting Animals," in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical
Papers, vol. 1, (Cambridge University Press, 1985), 45-76.
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relationship between the divine and human ﬂourishing is reconceived in terms of
the philosophical anthropology, the ontology of the self that emerges from Sources of
the Self. The moment of renunciation of the transformative view is conceived of as a
decentering of the self in relation to the good, however understood, as a moral
source and (re-)orienting transformative power outside or beyond the self, though not
necessarily beyond the world. Renunciation of life involves a transformation or
conversion of identity by changing one's moral allegiance. The moment of return and
aﬃrmation in Taylor's understanding of transcendence becomes possible only in the
face of the decentering source of meaning, or identity-orienting "source of the self."
Of course, for the purposes of Taylor's main thesis in A Secular Age he needs to
maintain a link with the dominant understanding of religion, and the religious, with
the central connection to the supernatural. There is, however, in principle no reason
that the initial moment of self-transcendence may not be realized in experiences that
lie outside the traditionally understood range of "religious experience." The
aﬃrmative moment clearly depends upon the speciﬁc form or forms of
acknowledgement and articulation of the source, not all of which allow for an
aﬃrmation of life. Concentrating on the transformation perspective also allows
Taylor to focus the question of transcendence on self-understanding, and to move
away from the stickier metaphysical questions about the existence of God.
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Summing up his position in A Catholic Modernity?, Taylor states that
"acknowledging the transcendent means aiming beyond life or opening yourself to a
change in identity" (CM 173). Jeﬀrey Stout, commenting on this sentence in his
review of A Catholic Modernity? takes issue with the "or." "Or?," he asks rhetorically,
following up with his objection:
One can aim for a change in identity, and in that sense aim for transcendence
of one's self, without aspiring to a metaphysical state that transcends life. The
possibility of self-transcendence would seem to be suﬃcient to avoid the
stiﬂing of the human spirit. 36
The ﬁrst sentence of Stout's objection is entirely correct, but it is hardly an objection
to Taylor's view on the matter.  As we saw above, Taylor is a pluralist with respec
to moral sources and their potential adequacy for motivating a change in identity.
Taylor is careful never to argue philosophically for his personal vision in this regard.
This is partly due to his dedication to certain philosophical principles of argument,
and in part due to his sensitivity to criticism motivated by the "post-revolutionary
climate" of modernity. Stout certainly seems to make what is not an uncommon
inference (implicitly or explicitly) by critics of Taylor from his faith commitment to

Jeffrey Stout, "Review of A Catholic Modernity?," by Charles Taylor, et al.,
Philosophy in Review, 18, no. 6, (2001): 426. One element of Stout's position that
Taylor would, I think, take issue with but which I do not take up here for lack of
space, is the question of whether one can "aim at a change in identity," or if one
could, whether such an intentional change would count, for Taylor and others such
as John Dewey, as an authentic case of self-transcendence.
36
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the idea that he might be pressing a religiously motivated agenda. It should now be
clear that Taylor acknowledges the possibility for a plurality of directions that the
desire to transcendence may take. Taylor is a careful philosopher, and a
straightforward reading, which Stout gives, shows that Taylor has no speciﬁc
ontological commitments in mind. Besides non-western religions (Buddhism),
Taylor also mentions deep ecology as a way "to reconstruct a non-exclusive
humanism on a non-religious basis" (SA 19).
But is "the possibility of self-transcendence" without the other two
dimensions of transcendence that Taylor lists, namely, God and immortality,
"suﬃcient to avoid the stiﬂing of the human spirit" as Stout suggests? Part of the
problem here is the vagueness of the phrase "stiﬂing of the human spirit." I think
Taylor would agree with the suggestion that self-transcendence is suﬃcient for
"fullness," as Taylor uses this term in A Secular Age. 37 Likewise, Taylor's use of the
phrase "stiﬂing the human spirit" refers to exclusive humanism, and that his sense of
pluralism is robust enough to accommodate a fairly wide range of non-exclusive

Taylor's use of the term "fullness" has occasioned a lot of contention in the
literature subsequent to the publication of A Secular Age. For a particularly
straightforward and relatively clear statement on "fullness" see Charles Taylor,
"Afterword," in Warner, Michael, Jonathan VanAntwerpen, Craig Calhoun, eds.,
Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,
2010), 316.
37
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humanisms. 38 But not all ways of transcending are equal for Taylor. The bigger
problem here is that some ways of transcending, in spite of the spiritual fulﬁllment
they may bring, may still be inadequate.
As potential counterexamples Stout suggests Emerson and Dewey as among
those who have explored "self-transcending religious possibilities that do not
involve commitments to transcendent metaphysics," and points out that "it is far
from clear whether Taylor would want to classify them as exclusive humanists." I
think, however, that from what we have already seen that Taylor would certainly
not discount Emerson, or Dewey's ideals of self-transcending as a form of
transcendence in line with the basic outline of the transformation perspective.
Richard Bernstein, a sympathetic, if critical reader of Taylor, makes a
closely related objection to Taylor's "suggestion, which seems much more than a
suggestion, that the believer in a transcendent beyond, the Christian believer
experiences a sense of fullness and spirituality that is deeper and more meaningful
than his more agnostic colleagues. I do not believe this and I wonder if Taylor
believes this" (Bernstein, "The Uneasy Tensions," 14).
38

I think the case could be made that fears such as those of Stout and Bernstein
could be allayed by a further consideration of Taylor's theory of selfhood. he
picture of subjectivity developed in Sources of the Self and elsewhere is of a dynamic
self, changing in response to successive attempts at increasingly perspicuous selinterpretations, though dependent on language, and resources of the cultural
background. Religion is one resource. For some, such as Bede, the best account of
his experience draws on Christianity. Others may ﬁnd diﬀerent resources in their
own struggle to articulate the sources of spiritual fullness. Everything is variable
here. It is not possible, however, to respond fully to Stout or Bernstein without a
more detailed explanation of Taylor's theory of the modern subject, which would
take us too far away from the questions surrounding transcendence.
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However similar these positions may be in this respect, there is still much room for
contention regarding the adequacy of the sources of self-transcendence. 39
Returning to Taylor's solution to the problem of transcendence, we can now
explore how Taylor ﬁlls in the basic picture of transcendence as a change in identity,
or transformation. For Taylor, the content that he ﬁlls in to complete his personal
picture of transcendence in a way that brings together renunciation and human
ﬂourishing is love, speciﬁcally love understood in terms of the Christian concept of
ἀγάπη. On Taylor's religious understanding of this concept, "renouncing--aiming
beyond life--not only takes you away but brings you back to ﬂourishing...
renunciation decenters you in relation with God, [but] God's will is that humans
ﬂourish, and so you are taken back to an aﬃrmation of this ﬂourishing, which is
biblically called agape " (CM 22). As Guido Vanheeswijck points out in an important
discussion of Taylor's notion of transcendence, Taylor believes that there is a kind of
transcendence that does not thwart human ﬂourishing; on the contrary, there

Stout, "Review of A Catholic Modernity," 426. Stout also mentions Santayana
to complete a trio with Emerson and Dewey, but I leave him out of the discussion
here because I am not in a position to defend the same claims about him as I do
about Emerson and Dewey. To my mind Emerson and Dewey are quite close to
Taylor on this question. Dewey, I aver, actually argues against what Taylor calls
"exclusive humanism," and his later work (especially A Common Faith and Art As
Experience) may well be read as trying for just the kind of middle ground between
exclusive humanism and religious anti-humanism. We will briefly return to Dewy
in the conclusion.
39
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remains the possibility of an openness to agapeic transcendence that promotes the very
aﬃrmation of ordinary life." 40 Vanheeswijck's term "agapeic transcendence"
excellently captures what is distinctive about Taylor's understanding of Christian
transcendence, his theological interpretation of transcendence as transformation.
Emphasizing the moment of aﬃrmation, it also points to the diﬃculty inherent in
transcendent perspectives between renunciation and aﬃrmation, and his
understanding of how Christian sources may be articulated to solve the paradox.
It is also clear that Taylor is a pluralist with respect to the variety of forms
that this "full-hearted love for some good beyond life" (SA 639) may take, so long as
love of God (or the Good as a moral source) returns one to an enlarged love of, and
aﬃrmation of life and human ﬂourishing. He also suggests, for example, the
Buddhist concepts of mett (loving kindness) and karuna (compassion) might also
work in their own context (or diﬀerent "civilizational sites" as he sometimes puts it).
However overdetermined by various contexts of articulation, and self-interpretation,
on this reading life renounced out of a love beyond life returns you to a love of
others, and a loving concern for their welfare.

Guido Vanheeswijck, "The Concept of Transcendence in Charles Taylor's
Later Work," in Wessell Stoker and W. L. van der Merwe, eds., Looking Beyond?
Shifting Views of Transcendence in Philosophy, Theology, Art, and Politics (New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2012), 68.
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If Vanheeswijck's reading of Taylor on transcendence as agapeic focuses on
the moment of aﬃrmation, Carlos Colorado develops a reading of Taylor on
transcendence that emphasizes the moment of renunciation. Colorado's
interpretation Taylor's emphasis on self-decentering, or change in identity, is read
through the lens of the New Testament concept κένωσις, often explained in terms of
"dispossession," or emptying. These are both technical terms from Christian
theology, and refer to the surrender of the will in a total act of obedience. 41 This
reading of Taylor does seem to capture one way to ﬁll out his understanding of
transcendence as transformation in more theologically weighted language than
either my account or Vanheeswijck's. Colorado argues that it is the dispossessive, or
kenotic reading of transcendence that allows Taylor to hold a diﬃcult position. On
the face of it, Taylor's commitment to transcendence, especially a strongly
transcendent monotheistic God, is in conﬂict with his commitment to pluralism.
Thus, the question is whether or not Taylor's theism gets in the way of his pluralism,
The canonical location for the concept of κένωσις is Philippians 2:7, "He
[Jesus] emptied [ἐκένωσεν] himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human
likeness." The theological concept of κένωσις is also central to Gianni Vattimo's
concept of "weak thought," but it plays a very different role than it does for
Colorado's reading of Taylor. For an interesting, and very recent statement by
Vattimo on religion, Christianity and "weak thought" see Richard Kearney, and
Gianni Vattimo, "Anatheism, Nihilism, and Weak Thought: Dialogue With Gianni
Vattimo," in Richard Kearney and Jens Zimmerman, eds., Reimagining the Sacred:
Richard Kearney Debates God, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2016), 7692.
41
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and the answer to this hinges on an account of the foundational role (if any) that
theism plays in Taylor's moral ontology.
In order to support Taylor on this question Colorado defends Stephen White's
characterization of Taylor's ontology as "weak ontology." Another way of putting
this is in terms of the relationship between Taylor's theism and moral value. To
what extent does Taylor's conception of God determine moral value? Colorado
convincingly argues that Taylor is a weak ontologist in the speciﬁc sense developed
by Stephen White, and further, that Taylor's conception of transcendence is in eﬀect
"weak" transcendence because it is underwritten by a weak ontology 42
In his elaboration of the idea of weak ontology, White admits to using the
term "ontology" in a unfamiliar way. He notes that around the middle of the
twentieth century there was a shift in the understanding of ontology. The new
understanding of ontology understood it to be primarily concerned with
investigating which entities one is committed to in virtue of holding a particular
scientific theory. It is easy to mistake the sense that White has in mind with a
concomitant transfer of this concern to the social sciences. To avoid this

Stephen White, Sustaining Affirmation: The Strength of Weak Ontology in
Political Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Colorado,
"Transcendent Sources and the Dispossession of the Self," 85.
42
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misconception, White is explicit: "One might think of such usage as a kind of
ontological turn in the social sciences, but that is not what I have in mind." 43
What White does have in mind is a subtler shift in the focus of ontology in late
twentieth century philosophy. The relevant "entities" under discussion in the turn to
ontology that White has in mind are those presupposed not by our theories (social or
scientific), but by our late modern ways of being-in-the-world. White argues that
Taylor is among a loose group of contemporary philosophers who have turned to
ontology, but without taking on a full commitment to an ontology which rejects any
relationship between moral and political intuitions and commitments (such as
Rortian irony). These thinkers nevertheless admit the instability and contestability
of former certainties thought to determine our commitments. Rather, these recent
late twentieth century thinkers allow for an ontology of the self that accepts the need
for stability, but falls short of determining morality in a strong sense. 44 White argues
that what he sees as an "ontological turn" in recent philosophy stems from the

43

Sustaining Affirmation, 4.

Of course, by "ontology" White is referring to a turn in philosophy that
begins with Martin Heidegger's analysis of being through an analytic of Dasein in
Division One of Being and Time (Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson [New York: Harper and Row, 1962]), and not the
dominant Anglo-American interest in ontological commitments presupposed by our
scientific theories.
44
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dawning "sense of living in late modernity," in that our former unreflectively
accepted certainties are contingent, mere convention.
The sense of living in late modernity implies a greater awareness of the
conventionality of much of what has been taken for certain in the modern
West. The recent ontological shift might then be characterized generally as
the result of a growing propensity to interrogate more carefully those
"entities" presupposed by our typical ways of seeing and doing in the modern
world. 45
At the same time White finds that philosophers such as Taylor, George Kateb, Judith
Butler, and William Connolly, in spite of this contingency and conventionality,
argue that some stability is necessary to make sense of ourselves and our moral life. 46
Accordingly, White argues that weak ontology "shift[s] the intellectual burden here
from a preoccupation with what is opposed and deconstructed, to an engagement
with what must be articulated, cultivated, and affirmed in its wake." 47 Weak ontologists
accept the weakness, the contestability of our fundamental understanding of what it
means to be a human being in the world, but also argue that such a foundation may
be contestable without requiring a stance such as Rorty's, which recommends an
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Stephen White, Sustaining Affirmation, 4.
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Ibid., 8.

47

Sustaining Affirmation, 9. Italics are mine.
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unproblematic acceptance of an ironic stance toward even our most cherished moral
and political commitments. 48
Thus White introduces the concept of "weak ontology" as a description of
what he takes to be a distinct philosophical position in contemporary thought, one
I've used Richard Rorty as a contrast to Taylor here because he proudly
wears the postmodern mantle, and fairly well fits the caricature of the antimetaphysical thinker that White has in mind, an ideal type, as it were. The contrast
is also evident in Rorty's later thought touching on religion. He disavows his earlier
aggressive atheism for a more conciliatory stance on religion, a stance that might be
called "ironic atheism," a form of "atheism" difficult to distinguish from nihilism.
Rorty's position on religion invites the possibility of an "ironic theism," differing
from his "atheism," only insofar as it excludes "God," or the language of religious
belief as part of a final vocabulary that is useful only for private self-creation.
Rorty's understanding of irony incorporates both his anti-metaphysical views as
well as his insistence on the division between the private and public within a
person's "final vocabulary." In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity Rorty defines "final
vocabulary" as the "set of words which [human beings] employ to justify their
actions, their beliefs, and their lives." A human being's final vocabulary "is final in
the sense that if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no
noncircular argumentative recourse." Final vocabularies are not final in the sense of
an unchanging or immutable body of "truths," but the words we use to define our
selves and our relationship to others. In this sense the finality of final vocabularies
expresses Rorty's anti-metaphysical stance. Anyone who possesses a heightened
awareness of the radical contingency of her final vocabulary, Rorty calls an "ironist,"
that is, one who has moved beyond the desire for metaphysical certainty. We might,
at this point, make the contrast with weak ontology by pointing out that Taylor
recognizes the desire as legitimate, and in need of satisfaction, whereas Rorty takes
it to be a nostalgia to be overcome. Rorty contrasts the ironist with White's strong
ontologist, or "metaphysician," who refuses to question the "platitude which says
there is a single permanent reality to be found behind the many temporary
appearances" as well as the ordinary person of "common sense" for whom an
inherited final vocabulary is merely accepted uncritically" (Richard Rorty,
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity [New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989],
73, 80).
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that he contrasts with "strong ontology," on the one hand and what is often called
postmodernism on the other. The idea of weak ontology offers what White refers to
as "figurations" of self, other, and world that resist returning strong ontological
solutions to late modern problems, such as God, which ground moral and political
life. "Strong are those ontologies," White explains, "that claim to show us "the way
the world is," or how God's being stands to human being, or what human nature
is...[and] [f]or strong ontologies the whole question of passages from ontological
truths to moral-political ones is relatively clear." Strong ontologies, in contrast to
weak ontologies, "carry an underlying assumption of certainty." 49 Against antifoundationalism, or anti-metaphysical gestures from the "postmodern" camp, weak
ontology re-emphasizes that there remain pressing moral and political concerns in
need of the immediate constructive concern of philosophy.
My own understanding here is that what White calls weak ontology is a
working, or interim, position between modernity and a genuine postmodernity.
Neither modern, nor properly postmodern, our age is "late modern". Late
On this point White suggests that Alasdair MacIntyre counts as a strong
ontologist in spite of his "willingness to engage alternative perspectives in a
sustained and sensitive fashion" because "there is behind his philosophical
reflections a core of absolute certainty when he contrasts his own Catholic tradition
with others." I agree with White when he suggests that he "can't imagine [Taylor]
deploying the metaphor of light and darkness to characterize the relation of his own
tradition to that of his opponents," that is, Taylor does not think absolute certainty
(in this life) is possible (Stephen White, Sustaining Affirmation, 7 n.9).
49
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modernity is a liminal stage; we are at the threshold of the next. White takes this as
a presupposition of his understanding of the turn to weak ontological conceptions of
subjectivity in contemporary thought. It is a powerful vision; it does justice to what
Taylor captures with the idea of a generalized malaise of modernity, and it also
offers legitimate hope for the future.
It is the late modern "disengaged self," what White often refers to as the
"Teflon subject," that is a primary focus of weak ontologies. The Teflon metaphor is
intended to get at the idea of the isolation, or separation of the modern sense of self.
White contrasts it with a "stickier self" suspended between modern and pre-modern
senses of the self. This self is separated from both its background understanding
(now destabilized in the wake of late-modernity), but also from what White calls the
"foreground," the external world of nature, including other subjects. All of this goes
to make up a picture of modern subjectivity as in a state of skeptical anxiety and
paints a picture of the self as alienated, distanced. Nothing sticks. Weak ontologists
want something in-between, something stickier than the modern, though not as
"porous" as the pre-modern (to use Taylor's descriptor for this in A Secular Age).
Besides the emphasis on a "stickier self" there are other features shared by
weak ontologies that emerge. Briefly, weak ontologies refuse the dichotomy of "no
ground," and "absolute ground," opting for a via media that affirms fundamental
conceptualizations of a human being's self, world and the other, while recognizing
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their contestability. Weak ontologies accept contestability, but also believe in the
necessity of fundamental conceptualizations for morality. As White points out, the
need for an "adequately reflective moral and political life... demands from us the
affirmative gesture of constructing foundations," while owning the contestability
"prevents us from carrying out this task in a traditional fashion." Thus weak
ontologies face considerable difficulty articulating the affirmation of humanity.
White argues that a final feature of weak ontologies is "cultivation." The idea here is
that the appeal of any particular weak ontological "figuration" (to use White's term)
is necessarily oblique, and that the moral and political demands made by a weak
ontology requires the cultivation of spiritual engagement with the source. In terms
taken from Taylor's ontology of the self, this is the idea that articulation brings us
closer to the good as a source. 50
Colorado's defense of both the consistency of Taylor's ontological
commitments and his commitment to moral pluralism hinges upon whether White
is correct in his assertion that Taylor is a "weak ontologist," in the speciﬁc sense that
White understands this philosophical position. Colorado convincingly argues that
White is correct to read Taylor as a weak ontologist, and this in spite of his avowed
commitment to theism. White calls Taylor a "weak ontological theist," that is, his
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Stephen White, Sustaining Affirmation, 8.
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theism informs his moral and political life without allowing it to determine
absolutely in a way that excludes all margin of contestability. 51
Colorado also recognizes that Taylor often sounds like a strong ontologist,
especially when he is speaking to his fellow Roman Catholics, but that "his theistic
formulations must be contextualized within his wider anthropological and moral
vision. He consistently discusses Christianity and scripture, and even theism in
general, as a best account of what it is to be human and to live the good life, an
account that issues forth from the hermeneutical stance and that takes history
seriously." 52
In fact, I believe that Taylor's appeals to transcendence are even weaker than
Colorado suggests here. In Sources of the Self Taylor appeals to what he calls the
"best account principle" (or "BA principle" for short) in his argument for moral
realism, that is, for the reality of moral value. Taylor oﬀers a kind of transcendental
argument, or an argument from conceptual necessity, such that until there is a better
account of the ontological status of moral sources that is true to our moral
White's characterization of weak ontology fits Taylor remarkably well-nearly too well. Many of the crucial terms of White's account of weak ontology, and
the weak ontological turn in recent philosophy, are taken from Taylor. For example,
he takes "sources," "goods," "disengaged subjectivity" directly from Taylor, and other
major features of weak ontology, such as "cultivation" are explicitly central to
Taylor's ontology, though expressed in different terms.
51
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Carlos Colorado, "Transcendent Sources," 85. Italics are mine.
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experience--faithful to the phenomenology of being a moral agent--we should take
them to be real, to be features of the world (notwithstanding that these "sources"
come into being with humanity). 53 The BA principle (although it only yields what
Ruth Abbey calls a "falsiﬁable realism," since it remains open to challenges and
falsiﬁcation by a "better" accout) is intended to make a stronger claim than Taylor
makes regarding theism, for theism is not necessary to any account, only to some
self-interpretations. The BA principle defends ontological claims, though weak,
which are aimed at convincing the skeptic--it aims at universal agreement.
When Taylor invokes what sounds like the BA principle in his defense of
transcendence in the strong sense he is not oﬀering a best account, but (in the terms
of Sources of the Self) an exploration of objective order through personal resonance
(SS 510-512). The BA principle is supposed to incline one to accept the ontological
status of values, that is, moral sources. Because there is no longer a publically
accessible moral order our only access to sources is through personal resonance, and
articulating these brings us into closer proximity, or fuller contact with the source.
This doesn't mean that everyone will, or should, feel their way to an objective moral
order in the same way. In fact, the subjective element here precludes a uniform

This is a central thesis in the first part of Sources of the Self, and is also well
(and more compactly) argued in Charles Taylor, "Ethics and Ontology," Journal of
Philosophy 100, no. 6 (June 2003): 305.
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approach as each individual explores sources in their own way. 54 For Taylor, his
Christian faith doesn't have the appeal as a best account of what it is like to be a
moral agent, but makes the best sense of the life he is living. So much so, in fact, that
he can claim that it is "inconceivable that [he] would abandon [his] faith" (SS 53).
Colorado's account of Taylor's sense of transcendence supports my own
reading in many ways, and although his emphasis on κένωσις emphasizes the
decentering moment of renunciation in Taylor's vision of transcendence, he does
recognize the aﬃrmative moment as well. Colorado is surely correct to note that
"Taylor argues that Buddhism and Christianity present us with complementary
notions of how an encounter with transcendence initiates a decentering movement
away from the self or atman that leads to an inevitable return to immanence that
upholds human ﬂourishing." 55

It is important to note, and Taylor is clear on this in Sources of the Self, that
the fact that this exploration of an objective moral order through personal resonance
is undoubtedly subjective, it is not on that account to be assimilated with a
subjective stance on morality--moral sources are real, and as such part of an
objective order. Still, as Taylor also points out, the subjective element carries an
inelimitable danger of falling into subjectivism in spite of the fact that his whole
point here is to overcome subjectivism. With the decline of a publically accessible
order we only have contact with an order through subjective responses. See,
especially, SS 510-514.
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Colorado, "Transcendent Sources," 87.
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My understanding of inclusive humanism is supported by a weak ontology
such as Taylor's. The picture that emerges here is a view of ontology compatible
with a wide range of possible claimants for our allegiance, which need be
understood in a strongly transcendent sense. Indeed, if White is correct in his
reading of Taylor as a weak ontologist, even faith commitments are questionable as
to their objective validity, if not their spiritual strength to power practical dedication
to high standards.
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Chapter Five
Two Critics of Taylor on Transcendence
Criticism of Taylor on transcendence has been robust, especially as responses to A
Secular Age continue. Leaving aside those who object to the idea of transcendence in
any sense (e.g. Rorty), the most important and sympathetic recent critiques fall into
two broad camps. On the one hand, there are those who question the ontological
commitments and implications of Taylor’s insistence on transcendence “beyond
life,” especially the unavoidable theistic overtones in this idea. Martha Nussbaum
and Iain Thomson both mount strong criticisms of this sort. The other broad
criticism of Taylor on transcendence is internal; these critiques claim to uncover
inconsistencies between Taylor’s thought on transcendence and his larger
philosophical project. The following discussion takes up Nussbaum’s objections
ﬁrst, followed by those of Thomson. Taylor himself has engaged Nussbaum on this
matter in a dialogue that extends over several published exchanges, and Taylor
considers her objections at considerable length in A Secular Age. Taylor’s response to
Nussbaum is developed in the context of outlining what he takes to be the
“romantic” critique of transcendent religion by nonbelievers. In this case he takes
Nussbaum to be an outstanding example of the romantic critique. I dwell longer on
Nussbaum than Taylor's other critics because her agreement on some aspects of the
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question of transcendence help clarify Taylor's sense of transcendence as
transformation as much as her criticisms does.
Inspired by Heidegger and Nietzsche, Thomson’s argument againstsome
forms of transcendence are especially important for deepening our understanding of
Taylor’s pluralism. Also, because it challenges the consistency of Taylor’s position,
Thomson provides a transition to the category of internal critique.
Martha Nussbaum on Internal Transcendence and Drawing the Line
Taylor initiated a dialogue with Martha Nussbaum on the issue of transcendence in
a 1988 review of her book The Fragility of Goodness. 56 Taylor’s discussion of
transcendence in this review article is one of his earliest direct discussions of
transcendence. His interest in transcendence is especially apparent in the fact that
this is an extensive review; clearly Taylor has been thinking about the issues he
addresses here for some time. As Nussbaum herself points out, in response to
Taylor’s review, “Taylor’s article is of far more substance and interest than the usual
review article, and can be warmly recommended to anyone with an interest in the
issues.” 57 Writing one year before the publication of Sources of the Self, and nearly

Charles Taylor, Review of The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek
Tragedy and Philosophy, by Martha C. Nussbaum. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18,
no. 4 (December 1988), 805.
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Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature,
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twenty years before A Secular Age, the article attests to Taylor’s claim that the
question of transcendence had been in the background of his philosophical thought
many years before his recent work where, for the ﬁrst time, transcendence takes
center stage. In this early article Taylor adumbrates his later developed notion of
transcendence, relates it to elements of his broader critique of modern moral
philosophy and suggests, as he does elsewhere, that the desire for transcendence is a
necessary feature of selfhoo, part of human nature.
In his review Taylor is very appreciative of Nussbaum’s work, and he ﬁnds
common ground with her critique of a tradition in moral thought going back to the
Greeks that tries to come to terms with the insecurity and vulnerability of the human
condition at the cost of, in Taylor’s words, “denying and forgoing central human
goods.” 58 While the motives of invulnerability, control and commensurability are
understandable as strategies for preserving the good against the vicissitudes of
fortune by identifying it with the intention of the agent, thereby placing it under the
purview of the will, as with Kant among moderns, and the Stoics among the
ancients, Nussbaum, Taylor argue that the cost, in terms of the goods of human life,
is too high:
What above all falls victim to [these strategies] are the goods of friendship
and love. To love humanly is to love particular people, and hence to be
58
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terribly vulnerable to fortune; it is to be open and receptive, and is
incompatible with the drive to dominate; and it places us squarely in the
realm of the incommensurable: someone really loved is precisely not
replaceable by another with the same universal properties. 59
Finally, Taylor endorses Nussbaum’s interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics presented in
The Fragility of Goodness, and registers his enthusiastic agreement with her Aristotleinspired “commitment to a kind of all-inclusive humanism, an aspiration to leave no
human good in principle outside the purview of our aspirations, even though in
particular circumstances we may be forced to make hard choices. In principle we
seek the whole human good and won’t settle for les.” 60 The question, however, that
Taylor raises at this point is whether, for Nussbaum, “the whole human good”
includes the desire for, or aspiration to, transcendence.
It is important to note that Taylor’s framing of this challenge to Nussbaum,
his question of the place of transcendence in the “whole human good,” anticipates
his later more developed thought on transcendence, especially A Secular Age. His
endorsement of what he calls Nussbaum’s “all inclusive humanism,” helps us to
understand better just what Taylor means by the contrast case “exclusive
humanism,” which is so central to his later critique of secularity. Taylor also
distinguishes between “two possible readings of… “let’s have the whole human
59
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good”.” This distinction is important for understanding his later critique of
exclusive humanism. One reading excludes transcendence from any conception of
the human good, and posits an inherent paradox between renunciation and
aﬃrmation, as I framed the issue above. As he frames the issue in his review of
Nussbaum, “there are various defenses of this [principle, “let’s have the whole
human good”] which deﬁne Platonic (or other forms of) self-transcendence as the
adversary. These represent mistaken or self-destructive forms of understanding
which lead to self-mutilation and related forms of social oppression. This has been
the basic form of critique of religion since the Enlightenment.” As I pointed out
above, Taylor takes this narrow view to miss both the possibility of an
understanding of transcendence that overcomes the renunciation-aﬃrmation
paradox, and the possibility of understanding any form of the human desire for
transcendence to be necessary for the full aﬃrmation of human ﬂourishing and the
integrity of selfhood.  This criticism is implied in his initial engagement with
Nussbaum, but is explicit in his more recent work, especially A Catholic Modernity?
On his account, this reading of the principle assimilates any desire for transcendence
to the overly simpliﬁed platonic, or purist/reform context, sidelining an alternative
reading of the principle that “includes (at least some form of) this aspiration [to
transcendence] in the human good,” and he is quick to point out that from the point
of view opened up by this second possibility of interpreting the principle “the
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standard Enlightenment critique is itself in breach of the principle, since it is
depreciating this fundamental human aspiration.” 61
It is clear from our earlier discussion that for Taylor an “all inclusive
humanism,” must conceive of the “whole human good” as necessarily including a
desire for transcending human limitations. He oﬀers the following succinct initial
statement of the latter position whichhe doesn’t explicitly defend until many years
later in A Secular Age: “The striving to surpass ourselves can also be seen as
essentially human (on the inclusive interpretation). And what is more, the
transcendent can be seen as endorsing or aﬃrming the value of ordinary human
attention and concern, as has undoubtedly been the case wit the Judaeo-Christian
tradition.” 62
Taylor raises this issue in the context of his review of Nussbaum’s The
Fragility of Goodness in part because of the absence of any clear indication on her part
which interpretation of the basic principle she endorses. At issue between them, and
what provoked her response, is the question of just how inclusive her “all inclusive
humanism” really is. Nussbaum oﬀers her detailed response in “Transcending
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Humanity,” 63 the concluding essay in the collection Love’s Knowledge. In turn, Taylor
returns the favor by making Nussbaum’s position on transcendence a central focus
of his attentionin a crucial discussion of transcendence in A Secular Age.
Nussbaum admits to what she calls her “unexplained silence” in The Fragility
of Goodness on what she considers “an issue of real importance,” and a
“philosophical question that eminently calls for further examination,” that is,
whether or not she endorses what Taylor calls an “inclusive” view of “the whole
human good” or what in his review he calls a “narrower view” (which he will later
call “exclusive humanism”). 64
Rather than directly responding to this question, however, Nussbaum takes
an indirect approach. She begins with the very concept of transcending humanity as
such, and points out certain diﬃculties with the very idea, arguing that there is
something incoherent in the desire for transcendence. She goes on, however, to
develop a conﬂicted view regarding the legitimacy of the desire to transcend
humanity within certain boundaries, and given restrictions rooted in the ideal of
human excellence. In “Transcending Humanity,” Nussbaum can be read as
following up on her claims regarding the independent attraction of transcendence in
This was originally delivered as her William James Lecture at Harvard
University.
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her interpretation of Plato. There she admits that there is more to Plato’s desire for
transcending humanity than just a sublimated desire for overcoming human
ﬁnitude, weakness, and vulnerability, and that there is a real attraction for the
transcendent which is independent of humanity’s exposure to an uncertain fortune.
She summarizes her position in “Transcending Humanity" as follows:
I argue that the negative motivation to escape from vulnerability and pain
cannot suﬃce to explain Plato’s position: for we must also take note of the
positive draw of transcendence itself, a positive draw that is… not only
intelligible without reference to inadequate or obscure metaphysical
conceptions, but actually a powerful part of human ethical experience. 65
At the same time, in The Fragility of Goodness Nussbaum seems plainly to endorse a
reading of the Aristotelian understanding of the human good that seems to limit it to
the human good, and thus to contradict her claims regarding the legitimacy of the
aspiration to transcendence in her discussion of Plato in The Fragility of Goodness.

Nussbaum, “Transcending Humanity,” 368. In “Transcending Humanity”
Nussbaum also responds to a critical question from Taylor regarding her
interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics. The related but tangential question is whether
Aristotle Platonizes in the direction of transcendence in his understanding of the
divine life, and whether this is consistent with his view of human ﬂourishing set out
in the Nicomachean Ethics. At issue, basically, is whether we can square Aristotle’s
conception of the divine life of thought with his notion of ἐυδαιµονία. Aristotle, for
example, sounds quite like any good member of Plato’s Academy at Nicomachean
Ethics 10, 6-8: 1177b 31-34. For a discussion of this problem, Nussbaum’s response,
and its larger relation to Taylor, see Fergus Kerr, Immortal Longings: Versions of
Transcending Humanity, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame IN, 1997, pp.
1-23, especially pp. 16-18.
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In her reply to Taylor Nussbaum develops an understanding of
transcendence that is an attmpt to reconcile both aspects of her own position. One
the one hand, she wants to defend the legitimacy of the desire to transcendence,
indeed its importance for the moral life of a human being. On the other hand, she
wants to to understand the limits of legitimate striving to transcendence that does
not involve the incoherencies of transcendence she believes beset the idea as usually
understood in the tradition going back to Plato. The distinction she makes is
between what she calls “internal transcendence,” and “external transcendence." As
the language of internal/external implies, Nussbaum wants to draw the line between
acceptable and illegitimate aspiration to transcendence at the boundary of human
life. That is, she tries to make the case for a form of, or understanding of
transcendence, that would rule out a kind of vertical, Platonic version of
transcendence (or at least without “reference to inadequate or obscure metaphysical
conceptions”), but would retain a robust enough notion of transcendence for the
requirements of morality and human ﬂourishing that is incomprehensible without
the drive to overcome human limitation.
Nussbaum develops her criticism of the human desire to transcend the
human in terms of the Homeric Greeks and the (rather peculiar) relationship they
had with their gods. Taking sides with the Greeks on the matter of transcendence
comes down to recognizing, and living with, a tension in the Greek image of
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divinity. On the one, hand the lives of the immortal Olympians are best understood
as an object of human desire, that is, life without the limitations that can make life
for so many so miserable. Thus the gods are an “image of divinity [as] an image of
human self-transcendence, the image of an anthropomorphic perfection made
visible by imagining the removal of constraints that make human life a brief, chancy,
and in many ways miserable existence.” Surely, Nussbaum asserts, anyone would
desire such a transcendent life for themselves or their loved ones, given the
opportunity. “Who, given the chance to make a spouse or child or parent or friend
immortal would not take it?” she asks rhetorically, adding, “I would grab it
hungrily, I confess at the outset.” This image of human transcendence presented in
the gods, however, is in tension with another aspect of the Greek relation to the
divinities: their lives are not always cast as human lives only better, as though the
gods were humanity squared. As Nussbaum points out, their lives were also
understood to be “totally, strangely diﬀerent,” that is, lacking something integral to
human, in contrast to divine, excellence. The form of life of the gods, “lacking, as it
does, the characteristic movement and structure of human life, lacking the
constraints imposed by mortality, lacking vulnerabilities of many kinds, lacking the
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demands and the ﬁnitude of the mortal body, will of necessity lack, as well, some of
the forms of life that we now ﬁnd valuable and pursue as ends.” 66
Nussbaum’s primary example here is the athletic contest. The activity of the
athlete depends for its excellence upon the human limitations against which the
athlete strives. Human achievement “has a point and value only relatively to the
context of the human body, which imposes certain species-speciﬁc limits and creates
certain possibilities of movement rather than others. To excel is to use those abilities
especially fully, to struggle against those limits especially successfully.” From the
perspective of species-speciﬁc human excellence, the form of life of the Homeric
gods appears not to be an “image of human transcendence,” a perfected humanity,
but a diﬀerent life altogether. On this view the good life for a human being could
never really be that of the gods, who, lacking human possibilities and limitations
also lack properly human excellence and achievement. Both the point and the
interest in a footrace would be lost on “swift Hermes.” As Nussbaum puts it: “many
of the activities we now prize and consider ﬁne will not ﬁgure in a divine life,
consistently imagined.” 67
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This tension between the Homeric gods as an image of human transcendence,
and therefore an object of human aspiration on the one hand, and the apparent
incoherence of this aspiration in light of the species-speciﬁc excellence for human
beings on the other, is found in the realm of human virtue as well--the gods are not
political beings. Here Nussbaum is following Aristotle, for whom the political life is
unique to human beings. Sounding very much like John Dewey's critique of religion
in A Common Faith 68, Nussbaum points out that for Aristotle "[p]olitics is about using
human intelligence to support human neediness; so to be truly political you have to
have both elements. Beasts fail on one count, gods on the other.” 69 So too does
Aristotle deny the life of virtue to divinity. Moral virtue is incoherent without
human limitations. Certainly Nussbaum is correct to claim that the undying gods
could not properly be courageous, for example, and that such a life would
necessarily lack human moral excellence altogether.

John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1962). Here Dewey argues that "Men have never fully used the powers they possess
to advance the good in life, because they have waited upon some power external to
themselves and to nature to do the work they are responsible for doing.
Dependence upon an external power is the counterpart of surrender of human
endeavor" (46). Taylor makes nearly the opposite claim that secular sources
inevitably motivate merely ephemeral commitments to improving social conditions,
or the realization of a better world.
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[W]e see… that each of [the virtues] will seem pointless, more or les
unintelligible, in the god’s life; and yet, each has a claim to be an end in itself
for a human life. Courage is the clearest. Homeric gods usually cannot and
do not have it, since there is nothing grave for them to risk. On the other
hand, courageous action seems to be a ﬁne human achievement… Moderation
will go out too, since for a being who cannot get ill or become overweight or
alcoholic, there is not only little motivation to moderate intake, but also littl
intelligibility to the entire concept. On the other hand, moderation is a
challenge and a ﬁne thing in human life: there are so many ways to go wrong
here, so few ways of ﬁnding what is truly appropriate. 70
But perhaps the starkest diﬀerence Nussbaum notes between the life of an
unlimited god and the life of a human being is that the gods do not experience death
or suﬀering. Although human beings are worse oﬀ than the gods with respect to
death and suﬀering, “their morality is a response to the fact of suﬀering.” Indeed,
from our human point of view the transcendent perspective of the immortal gods is
strikingly inhuman. If, Nussbaum points out, “we prize compassion, we have to say
that in their dealings in our realm, the gods are not just indiﬀerent, but worse."
Indeed, she correctly identiﬁes Taylor’s position regarding the adequacy of
Christianity as a transcendent source of morality, and concedes his point that
“Christianity has turned us back to our own world with new attention and concern,”
pointing out that “the universal compassion for human suﬀering which one
associates with Christianity at its best is diﬃcult to imagine apart from the paradigm
of human suﬀering and sacriﬁce exempliﬁed in Christ.” Likewise, she concedes
70
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(with the important qualiﬁcation “if it can be made coherent”) that the Christian
doctrine of the incarnation, suﬀering, and death of Christ is consistent with the
“thought that god actually loves the world.” 71
What are these reﬂections on the Greeks and their gods supposed to show us
with respect to the human good? Ultimately, Nussbaum is arguing for the
incoherence of the desire for transcendence if it means giving up limitations which
are necessary conditions for human excellence, physical or moral. “Human limits
structure the human excellences, and give excellent action its signiﬁcance. The
preservation of the limits in some form… is a necessary condition of excellent
activity’s excellence.” 72
So it would seem that, in Taylor’s terms, she settles on the reading of “the
whole human good” with the emphasis on “human.” That is to say, she rejects the
aspiration to transcendence as incoherent insofar as the achievement of a good
beyond life is inconsistent with the goodness of this life. To put this in terms of
Taylor’s terminology in A Secular Age, we might say that it appears that Nussbaum
is taking sides with the “neo-Nietzscheans” in the three (or our) cornered debate.
How deep is her sympathy with “Nietzsche’s analysis of the many ways in which
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directing our aspirations toward a “true world” has led to a denigration of our
actions and relationships in this one”? Although she has explicitly left out
consideration of the consequences of the desire to transcendence in “Transcending
Humanity,” focusing instead on whether it is coherent, she appears to challenge the
coherency of the desire to transcend life on the grounds that it conﬂicts with what
makes life valuable, and provides the conditions for human excellence. Her vision
of a conﬂict between the transcendent life of the gods and the central qualities that
make human life worth living--family, physical and moral excellence, virtuous
activity, even love--it seems that this is very close to a charge of “mutilation,” to use
a term from Taylor. It would seem, at the very least, that Nussbaum is arguing that
“the whole human good” cannot include the desire to transcendence, and that it is
limited to “this-worldly” life directed toward (and by) the range of goods embodied
in the human striving for species-speciﬁc excellent activity, which is incompatible
with the desire to transcend the conditions under which such excellent activity is
attainable.  This view of Nussbaum, however, takes for granted that Taylor’s
question to Nussbaum regarding the range and extent of the human good presents
two mutually exhaustive positions, namely, human excellence plus transcending, or
just this-worldly human excellence without any desire to transcend. Nussbaum,
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however, suggests that Taylor has over-simpliﬁed. “I believe,” she says, “matters
are more complex.” 73 She still has room in her account for legitimizing a certain
understanding of transcendence that not only does not contradict human
achievement, but may be a further condition.
To avoid what we might call “Taylor’s fork” (the choice of including or
excluding transcendence as an integral element in the full human good), Nussbaum
suggests qualifying the desire to transcend in a way that allows for an
understanding of transcendence that doesn’t threaten the conditioning limitations of
human excellence. “[T]here are,” she maintains, “various forms of transcendence.
And there is a great deal of room, within the context of a human life… for a certain
sort of aspiration to transcend our ordinary humanity.” In the ﬁrst place, she points
out, one does not have to posit humanity in a fallen state for there to be room to
overcome ordinary human failings. Indeed, even those who reject original sin are
still faced with the reality that “it is all too plain that most people are much of the
time lazy, inattentive, unreﬂective, shallow in feeling; in short, that most human
action falls well short of the fully human target of complete virtue set up by
Aristotle’s view as I have described it.” Adopting a view on the matter largely
inﬂuenced by Aristotle, Nussbaum argues that the diﬃculty inherent in the very

73

Ibid.
117

achievement of the human good opens up a ﬁeld for transcending in this life that
oﬀers more than enough work of overcoming, of “this-worldly” self-transcendence,
to keep us busy in this life. As Nussbaum points out, this is not unlike Aristotle’s
view of the life of virtue as both “common to many,” but also “a very diﬃcult
business, requiring much experience and practice, much ﬂexibility and reﬁnement of
thought and feeling. The point of imagining the virtuous choice as a “mean” is… to
place a tremendous emphasis on the diﬃculty of ﬁnding the point of rightness
among all the many points that would be wrong.” This is a transcendence of “our
ordinary humanity—transcendence, we might say, of an internal and human sort.” 74
Nussbaum contrasts “internal transcendence” with other forms of
transcendence, including “religious or otherworldly or even contemplative
transcendence.” All of which presumably contrast with her understanding of
"internal transcendence" in that they are external in the speciﬁc sense that they turn
one away from life toward a ﬁnal good (or some among a range of ﬁnal goods)
beyond or external to life. Essentially, Nussbaum’s notion of internal transcendence

“Transcending Humanity,” 378—379. Nussbaum cites Nicomachean Ethics
1106b28-32; cf. also, 1109a24-29, “Hence also it is no easy task to be good. For in
everything it is no easy task to ﬁnd the middle… any one can get angry—that is
easy—or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extend,
at the right time, with the right aim, and in the right way, that is not for everyone,
nor is it easy; that is why goodness is both rare and laudable and noble” (The
Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation).
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posits the “whole human good” to be achievable entirely within the natural scope of
a human life. It also requires, within that life, a constant eﬀort to overcome the
diﬃculties in the way of the pursuit of the good. Likewise, the desire to
transcendence may for Nussbaum be adequately satisﬁed by the pursuit of such an
internal transcendence: “There is so much to do in this area of human transcending…
that if one really pursued that aim well and fully I suspect that there would be little
time left to look about for any other sort.” 75 The question for Taylor, however, is
always whether or not this stripped-down secular view is compatible with the
aﬃrmation of the high moral standards of the modern West.
Nussbaum associates Henry James and Marcel Proust with her notion of
internal transcendence, arguing that they exemplify the ideal of internal
transcendence in their novels. On her reading, both authors take “the artist’s ﬁnetuned attention and responsiveness to human life” as a model for moral excellence 76
For Nussbaum, James and Proust advocate the cultivation of “precision of feeling
and thought” as analogous to the way an artist, perhaps especially the novelist,
75
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There is also a strong Emersonian ring to her reading of James. I think it
would be worthwhile, although beyond the scope of the present treatise, to consider
whether Nussbaum's notion of internal transcendence may be traced back to
Emerson, at least from James. Likewise, I think there is likely to be a link between
the immanent transcendence of Dewey and the influence of Emerson on his thought.
For Emerson on this topic, see Essays: First Series, especially "Art," and "Friendship."
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cultivates her ability to perceive the beauty and excellence unachieved in the human
world, even in the “dullness and obtuseness of the everyday.” In their literary work
James and Proust show their readers the possibility of “a more compassionate,
subtler, more responsive, more richly human world…[and] this is a view about
transcendence.” 77 It is this sense of internal transcendence that Nussbaum takes to
be integral to any adequate account of the “whole human good,” but it is not one that
reaches, or strives to reach, beyond the “whole human good,” in the terms of Taylor’s
original question.
Drawing the Line
One diﬃculty with her view on internal transcendence, a diﬃculty Nussbaum
forthrightly acknowledges, and one that Taylor takes up in A Secular Age, is the
problem of drawing the line between acceptable internal forms of transcendence,
and unacceptable external forms of transcendence. In Nussbaum’s conception of the
importance of the desire to transcendence for the moral life, transcendence, even of
the “internal” sort, involves a constant eﬀort in the direction of overcoming human
limitations. The diﬃculty, she admits, is that it is hard to say when the aspiration to
transcend human limitations becomes incoherent by aspiring to overcome
limitations that condition the possibilities for human excellence and so undermine
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what we ﬁnd valuable in this life and inform our aspiration to transcendence in the
ﬁrst place.
Nussbaum embraces this diﬃculty of distinguishing consistently, between
internal and external transcendence while continuing her adherence to the
importance of internal transcendence. “There is, and should be, no clear answer” to the
question “when does the aspiration to internal transcendence become the aspiration
to depart from human life altogether?” What is important to avoid on her account
(and this is signiﬁcant for understanding Nussbaum’s reluctance to accept the
outright non-transcendent horn of Taylor’s dilemma) is the situation where we fail
to legitimate a form of transcendence that involves a movement to a next, or farther
set of demanding limitations, and dissatisfaction with unrealized possibilities
inherent in our actual or present conditions. The thought that we might have
arrived at the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for determining the proper limits
of human striving for perfection may have consequences more dangerous than any
the striving for transcendence may bring with it. It is a question of moral
motivation: “It would be a disaster for humanity if the type of argument I am
presenting were taken to imply that the desire to push our limits back further was
an illegitimate desire, and that we should just live on the earth as we ﬁnd it.” 78
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Nussbaum’s reluctance to reject all transcendence as illegitimate has an
analogue in John Dewey’s notion of growth as the highest good. 79 Dewey also
retains a version of what Nussbaum calls internal transcendence, and for reasons
similar to those advanced by Nussbaum. In fact, her position on transcendence is
very close to the (largely underdeveloped) position of John Dewey. The primary
diﬀerence between the two is that Nussbaum remains much closer to the classical
Greek ideal of the human good, whereas Dewey distances himself from the tradition
of understanding ethics in terms of the “highest good,” whether after the thought of
Plato or of Aristotle. Rather, and this is one of Dewey’s most original contributions
to ethics, he remains within the (broadly construed) eudaimonistic tradition in the
western ethical tradition while proposing a (radical) pluralism regarding the human
good. On the one hand, for Dewey every particular “situation” has its own end,
what he calls the “end in view.” In this spirit Dewey develops an idea of the highest
good as growth itself. Although Nussbaum does not go as far as Dewey in rejecting
the notion of the ﬁnality of the good, her reluctance to “draw the line” is motivated
by a similar concern for the role that the desire for transcendence plays in human
striving to overcome present limitations, and achieving the demands of the good.
On the question of Dewey's notion of "growth as the highest good," and the
relationship between his perfectionist moral view and Emerson's, see, Naoko Saito,
The Gleam of Light: Moral Perfectionism and Education in Dewey and Emerson (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2005).
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This aspect of Nussbaum’s critique of religion also demonstrates the essentially
romantic strain in both of their critiques of religion, something not lost on Taylor,
who describes Nussbaum’s critique of religion under the heading of “romantic” in A
Secular Age. Her critique is a variation on the romantic replacement of religion with
art--something also evident in Nietzsche
Another element in Nussbaum’s critique of (external) transcendence that is
anticipated in Dewey’s work, and parallels a similar critique in Nietzsche, concerns
the question of moral motivation. This question is also central to Taylor’s defense of
some version of external transcendence, especially in his openly confessional work,
A Catholic Modernity. We may note here that both Nussbaum and Dewey make the
opposite assertions from Taylor regarding the merits of externally transcendent
goods when it comes to motivating and maintaining moral commitment. The claim
that non-transcendent, or really non-transformative, sources are insuﬃcient to
sustain the demands of morality is integral to Taylor's argument for religioustranscendent sources. Dewey and Nussbaum both believe that belief in
transcendence may actually hinder necessary human eﬀorts to continue to strive
against human limitations, or, in Dewey’s terms, threaten the human eﬀort to
grow. 80

Another important difference between Nussbaum and Dewey is that if you
take into consideration the latter's distinction between "religion" and "the religious,"
80
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Returning to Nussbaum’s account of internal transcendence, she recommends
a recovery of the Greek notion of hubris as the best guide to determining when to
press harder against our human limitations, and when to hold back in the face of
threats to the constitutive conditions of our humanity. She recommends a
fallibilistic approach to the question of drawing the line. On her account, “there is a
kind of striving that is appropriate to human life; and there is a kind of striving that
consists in trying to depart from that life to another life. That is what hubris is—the
failure to comprehend what sort of life one has actually got, the failure to live within
its limits…, the failure, being mortal, to think mortal thoughts.” 81
Nussbaum on the Incoherence of Immortality
But if it is hubris to think immortal thoughts, and such a desire for eternity is
actually incoherent and may even hinder one’s desire to pursue the good in this life,
does this imply that one should not wish immortality for oneself or (especially) for
those one loves? As already noted, Nussbaum admits to feeling the desire to have
her loved ones live forever, that given the chance she would "grab it hungrily." 82
The question remains whether having shown this desire to be incoherent, or at least
he may be read to be in essential agreement on the importance of the kind of
"religious" dedication and concomitant transformation (conversion to the good)
required for any metaphysically and practically adequate account of ethics.
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paradoxical, does this mean that this desire for the immortality of the beloved must
be surrendered and that one’s aﬀective reality must give way to reason? Is the
conﬂict unavoidable, and should one “actually not want the people one loves to live
forever?"
Nussbaum has a nuanced view here, and once again points to what appears
to be an inescapable paradox: We want our loved ones to live forever, and this feels
perfectly legitimate, something that, if lacking, might actually bring the profession of
love into question. Yet the incoherency here lies in the fact that it is just such an
achievement of immortality that would eliminate all one ﬁnds valuable in the life of
those we love. “[W]hat we actually love and prize would not survive such
translations” to eternity. Nussbaum returns here to her athletic analogy: “We
shouldn’t, perhaps, imagine that we can coherently wish for immortality. And yet it
seems reasonable to fear death, for oneself and for another, and to seek to avoid it, at
any time when active living is still going on in a valuable way." Nussbaum ﬁnds a
similar paradox faced by the athlete, where "complete victory," over our human,
physical, limitations “would be disaster and emptiness—or at any rate, a life so
diﬀerent from our own that we could no longer ﬁnd ourselves and our valued
activities in it." 83
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Her response, consistent with her position on drawing the line, is to embrace
the tension in the paradox as part of the tragic dimension of human life, and itself
part of the best life for a human being.
This tension, which is close to being a contradiction, seems to be a part of the
best human life. It is diﬃcult enough to understand it, far less to live it. In
this sense, the best human life in my own conception contains more tension
and conﬂict around this issue of transcendence than Aristotle’s best life… Not
enough, perhaps, to make it Taylor’s “inclusive view.” But more than his
“narrow view." 84
Taylor responds to the question of drawing the line between legitimate and
illegitimate versions of transcendence in A Secular Age in the course of complicating
the question that underlies conﬂict in the usual course of the debate. 85 He argues
that partisans of both immanence and transcendence face some of the same moral
dilemmas that are too often thought to be problematic only for the opposition.
The Maximal Demand
In A Secular Age Taylor takes up Nussbaum’s response to his review article, and
rejects the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of transcending,
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Complicating the usual paradigm of discussion (academic and otherwise) is
a signature move on Taylor's part, and one of the aspects of his work that makes it
both challenging (because it disappoints our expectations rooted in the usual run of
debate) and rewarding (because it opens up possibilities of understanding and
critique outside the taken-for-granted state of debate). Not unlike John Dewey,
Taylor is at his best when breaking inherited, unquestioned, cultural categories.
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whether along Nussbaum’s original lines of “internal,” and “external,” or anything
else. He is, in a way, actually in agreement on the relevance of transcending for the
moral life. In fact, Nussbaum comes close to a partner in what I call "inclusive
humanism," and it is not a coincidence, I think, that it is in his engagement with
Nussbaum that Taylor coins the term. What is most clearly missing from
Nussbaum, that leaves her position outside the pale of a more inclusive humanism,
is an adequate account of transformation. 86
I now want to turn to two important areas of disagreement between Nussbaum
and Taylor, which center around two issues Taylor ﬁrst explicitly raised in the
concluding chapter of Sources of the Self regarding the adequacy of sources, on the
one hand, and the problem of "mutilation," on the other. Regarding the ﬁrst issue of
adequacy, Nussbaum (in substantial agreement with Dewey) argues not only for the
adequacy of immanence (or “internal transcendence”) as a motivation for morality,

For an interesting discussion of one of their most salient points of
convergence, see Stephen Mulhall, "Can There be an Epistemology of Moods?", in
Anthony O'Hear, ed., Verstehen and Humane Understanding: Royal Institute of
Philosophy Supplement: 41 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 191210. Mulhall offers a very clear discussion of the role of passions, moods, or
emotions in Nussbaum, Heidegger, Taylor, Cavell, Emerson and Wittgenstein, for
all of whom the affective life is necessary for knowledge of the world (and not just
the moral world). I would add John Dewey to the list. Moods, or "quality of an
experience" are central to his inquiry-based epistemology. See also, William
Blattner, "What Heidegger and Dewey Could Learn from Each Other," Philosophical
Topics, 36, no. 1, 2008, 57-77.
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but goes farther than this to claim that externally transcendent sources are harmful
for a ﬂagging moral commitment (not to mention dogmatic religious institutions).
Although their reasons for this appear to be the same, Nussbaum merely suggests
that for which Dewey oﬀers a direct argument. 87
The question of the charge of mutilation in Nussbaum is complicated, in part
because she speciﬁcally eschews any direct philosophical engagement on this
issue. 88 In spite of the fact that Taylor directly questions her on this issue, she
speciﬁcally declines to address his question regarding the consequences of external
transcendence, focusing instead on the question of coherence beyond passing
(though pointed) remarks. Her basic viewpoint, as both Taylor and Fergus Kerr
point out, can be gleaned from her other works, especially the chapter on Beckett
from Love's Knowledge. 89 Taylor’s engagement with Nussbaum in A Secular Age

John Dewey, The Later Works: 1925—1953, volume 9, ed. Jo Ann Boydson
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981—1992), 27. Hereafter cited
parenthetically as LW followed by the volume and page number.
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Nussbaum does return to this question in more depth in Martha
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press, 2000). We leave out a discussion of it here because that
work is more focused on literary criticism, and less a work of philosophy. For an
excellent discussion of Nussbaum and Taylor on transcendence from the point of
view theology, see Fergus Kerr, Immortal Longings: Versions of Transcending Humanity
(Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1997). Kerr, a Roman Catholic
theologian, also accuses Nussbaum of a "Nietzschean hatred of religion," 7-10.
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focuses on this question of mutilation and he develops his criticism of her in the
context of outlining what he calls the “romantic axis” of the modern critique of
religion. That is, he takes Nussbaum’s critique of religion in general, and of
Christianity in particular, to be paradigmatic to this "romantic" axis of critique.
In Taylor’s scheme for categorizing critiques of religion, Nussbaum’s critique
qualiﬁes as romantic because her concern is motivated by the thought that
transcendence poses a threat to the integrity of life, to its goodness, and is driven by
a will to rehabilitate the body and ordinary human desires. 90 To put it in Taylor’s
terms, the thought is that transcendence poses a threat to a human being’s sense of
fullness, and thus “mutilates,” or renders us unﬁt for happiness in this life. This is
the charge that there is something intrinsic about transcendence such that it "actually
damages us, unﬁts us for the pursuit of human fulﬁllment [and] does so by inducing
in us hate and disgust at our ordinary human desires and neediness," or otherwise
"poisons the joy we might otherwise feel in the satisfactions of human life as it is"
(SA 626).

It is also interesting to note that this aspect of romanticism, the charge
against religion for devaluing life, is not as explicit in John Dewey. In general
Dewey doesn't seem to bristle very much at the thought of religion, something he
thinks (or hopes) will die out in its present form and (with the aid of intelligence)
find a replacement in democratic society. Nietzsche is free from the hatred of
religion that characterizes some of Nussbaum's work.
90
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Rather than defending transcendence from this attack, Taylortakes a diﬀerent
approach. He spends much of A Secular Age (especially Chapters 17 and 18) arguing
that this general problem is not limited to transcendent perspectives only, but must
also be faced by exclusive humanism as well. exclusive humanism do not realize
that this criticism of Christianity (and other strongly transcendent religions) is
something they also face, that "their highest aspirations too run the risk of
mortifying ordinary human life" (SA 641). There is no easy solution to the threat of
mutilation, whether we embrace a secularist or a religious, inclusive or exclusive,
perspective. The general problem here Taylor refers to as the "maximal demand,"
that is, the demand for wholeness, where "wholeness" means, in the terms Taylor
used in his review of Nussbaum, "the whole human good." In the late modern West,
however, this can be problematic. The whole human good includes both ordinary
life, and the fulﬁllments of the body and desire, as well as the lofty moral and
spiritual ideals. According to Taylor, there is a tension in late modernity between
the demands of our morality and the satisfactions of ordinary life, the life of work
and family, production and reproduction. "Running through modern culture is the
sense of the wrong we do, in pursuing our highest ideals, when we sacriﬁce the
body, or ordinary desire, or the fulﬁllments of every day life" (SA 640).
We all of us late moderns face a dilemma, according to Taylor. This involves
the modern subject's demand for wholeness, for deﬁning "our highest spiritual or
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moral aspirations for human beings, while showing a path to the transformation
which doesn't crush, mutilate or deny what is essential to our humanity" (SA 640).
This Taylor calls the "maximal demand."
The maximal demand matters for us late moderns because of the strength
with which we demand the aﬃrmation of ordinary life, and the concomitant critique
of the pursuit of ideals that threaten to "mutilate" to ruin possible satisfaction with
ordinary life. It is of central concern to modernity that "ideals [should not] be
pursued at the expense of purging, or denigrating ordinary fulﬁllments" (SA 640).
Taylor traces this to the reformation critique of what was taken to be the monastic
pursuit of a "higher life" to imply a denigration of ordinary life, a critique eventually
leveled against Christianity itself, thus paradoxically an originally religious
motivation to save the ordinary which yields the most pervasive modern critique of
Christianity. High moral and spiritual ideals demand sacriﬁces of ordinary life that
we late moderns are loath to make, but neither are we willing to take the path of
Nietzsche and "repudiatea basic constraint on the maximal demand: that it reconcile
higher aspirations and ordinary fulﬁllments for everyone" (SA 642; italics in original).
Taylor argues, echoing a theme that runs throughout his career, and which I
have already pointed out as one of the central problems he considers in the
conclusion to Sources of the Self. According to Taylor the diﬃculty lies with the
universality of the humanistic moral commitments to universal benevolence, human
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rights, equal justice. For Nietzsche, as Taylor points ou, if we deny the demand for
universality "the way is open to see that an élite of the truly exceptional is capable of
bidding for excellence either without sacriﬁce, or in joyful acceptance of it." For
Nietzsche, "the fact that this achievement may weigh heavily on the masses is
neither here nor there" (SA 642).
Can the maximal demand be met and the dilemma overcome? Taylor, of
course, believes he has discovered the answer through his articulation of
Christianity and what he calls the transformation perspective, but he also recognizes
that there is not an easy or straightforward religious answer to the maximal
demand. As he points out, "there are clearly wrong versions of the Christian faith,"
versions that solve the dilemma by rejecting the goodness of ordinary life, and
which, along with Plato, are the target of Nietzsche's hatred of religion.  Whether or
not exclusive humanism can meet the maximal demand, Taylor says, with a note of
pessimism, "remains very much an open question" (SA 642).
Any solution, however, would require a transformation perspective, as we
saw in Chapter Four, but it is now possible to add that the transformation in
question cannot take the form usually attributed to Plato, and aacked by Nietzsche.
In Taylor's reading of Plato the transformation of philosophy, being led to the vision
of the Good, "means that some things which mattered very muh to us before cease
to do so. This is the strategy of achieving commensurability in ethical values by
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discounting one or the other of those in competition. 91 The Platonic transformation
is predicated on giving up appearances for reality. Or, as Taylor characterizes the
Platonic transformation, it is just,
the nature of a far-reaching transformation. It's no use protesting that our
present desires will be frustrated; these will disappear, because we will come
to see that they aren't really important, not part of what is required to realize
the Idea of a human being, which in turn means to come fully into
attunement with the Idea of the Good. (SA 643
As we have seen already in Chapter Four, for Taylor, all far-reaching
transformations require the kind of sacriﬁce implied in the mutilating critique.
Some, including articulations of Christianity and Buddhism, involve a
transformation that returns one to the world, to human life, with renewed concern,
compassion and love. A transformation that renews and sustains an aﬃrmation of
humanity and the goodness of life is what matters on Taylor's view.  Furthermore,
although his own best account requires articulation in a Christian context, the vision
of transcendence as transformation in his account can take non-believing forms as
well. In any case, what Taylor clearly thinks is important is an account of
transcendence that reconciles renunciation with aﬃrmation through transformation.

Of course, this reading of Plato is likely to be criticized. But Taylor is
making a larger point, and the "received" version of Plato, for better or worse, reads
him to renounce life and the body in light of allegiance to the form of the Good.
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The second main problematic that Taylor thinks any transcendent perspective
needs to solve--a challenge he argues exclusive humanism cannot meet adequately-relates to the strength of the moral sources of modern exclusive humanism over the
original religious roots. Taylor defends his religious vision of transcendence in A
Catholic Modernity?, but that this is not to be taken as the assertion of the absolute
superiority of his Roman Catholic faith, should be clear from Chapter Four--this is
his (personal) best account. Taylor recognizes competing accounts, and is open to a
variety of paths in an inclusive humanist perspective rooted in his understanding of
transcendence as transformation.
The (In)Adequacy of Exclusive Humanism
Taylor begins his Marianist Award lecture with a forthright admission on his part,
as a Roman Catholic, that the decline of the ideal of Christendom (never realized)
was necessary for the legitimate progress in the very core values professed by the
Church, and own up to the "humbling realization" that the "authentic developments
of the gospel" in modern liberal culture would not have been possible without the
"breakout" from the conﬁnes of the older structures of belief. The examples will
already be familiar from previous chapters. "For instance," Taylor points out,
modern liberal political culture is characterized by an aﬃrmation of universal
human rights--to life, freedom, citizenship, self-realization--which are seen as
radically unconditional; that is, they are not dependent on such things as
gender, cultural belonging, civilizational development, or religious
allegiance, which always limited them in the past. As long as we are living
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within the terms of Christendom... we could never have attained this radical
unconditionality. (CM16-17)
Although Taylor agrees that the decline of the hegemony of Christianity was a great
boon for the West, he argues that it doesn't come at a cost, or without dangers of its
own. Once again we ﬁnd Taylor exploring both sides in the debate, ﬁnding losses
and gains in each. Here I want to focus on one complication in particular, one
speciﬁc matter that, if Taylor is correct, should be a very serious concern indeed.
Taylor thinks that we in the late modern West are "living beyond our moral means"
as he claims in Sources of the Self (SS 517), and in A Catholic Modernity? he elaborates
on this.
In the ﬁnal section IV of A Catholic Modernity? Taylor returns to, and
elaborates, the problem of the strength of modern sources of morality that he raised
in Sources of the Self, something I raised as well in Chapter Two. Taylor makes the
case here that the transformation perspective is ultimately preferable to the
"stripped-down" secular view now dominant in our culture in the wake of secularity
3. He does not, however, think that there can be an argument for the superiority of
the transcendent perspective in absolute terms.
Many critics of modernity begin from the point of view that modernity is
deeply fractured, and in deep disagreement over ﬁrst things. Taylor begins from the
opposite pole. He argues that nearly all of us share the same highest moral
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standards. As an example of this deep agreement Taylor points to a convergence in
terms of personal resonance when presented with examples of practical eﬀorts to
make good on the universality of our moral standards. We are all (or should be)
moved by examples of solidarity with people on the opposite side of the globe, of
philanthropic endeavors such as Medcine Sans Frontiéres. The list is long:
The more impressed one is with this colossal extension of a gospel ethic to a
universal solidarity, to a concern for human beings on the other side of the
globe whom we shall never meet or need as companions or compatriots... the
more we contemplate all this, the more surprise we can feel at people who
generate the motivation to engage in these enterprises... [and] the less
surprised we are when the motivation... ﬂags, as we see in the present
hardening of feeling against the impoverished and disfavored in western
democracies. (CM 30-31)
Taylor's claim that "our age makes higher demands for solidarity and benevolence
on people today than ever before" is clear enough to be uncontroversial. The
question, however, is whether there is enough motivating force for the practical
work necessary to live up to humanist universal ideals without, in some sense, going
beyond humanity. "[W]e are asked" according to Taylor, "to maintain standards of
equality that cover wider and wider classes of people, bridge more and more kinds
of diﬀerence, impinge more and more in our lives" (CM 30). The question is
whether we can, as a culture, keep up the good work.
All of this presupposes that the commitment to the same underlying
standards is part of the modern identity, and again, whether we are "living beyond
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our moral means" as Taylor puts the problematic in Sources of the Self (517). This
dedication revealed in our aﬀective responses, "have become part of our self-image,
our sense of our own worth" and failure to live up to these standards leaves us with
a sense of moral inadequacy, even as instances of particular success, or participation,
give us "a sense of satisfaction and superiority when we contemplate others--our
ancestors or contemporary illiberal societies--who didn't or don't recognize them"
(CM 31).
Can the commitment to the high standards of humanism as Taylor conceives
of it be sustained in just this way? Certainly, one might say that we have been doing
well enough without answers to these questions, and that further argument over
"sources" is unnecessary. For Taylor things are not so easy, as we brieﬂy considered
in Chapter Two. The motivation to practical engagement with the goal of healing of
the world is "fragile" and "vulnerable" to setbacks as well as precipitous outpouring
of philanthropy, and in too many cases ineﬀective. The unconditionality and
universality with which a true humanism demands is very diﬀerent from the
"whimsical and ﬁckle" philanthropy rooted in "shifting fashion of media attention
and various modes of feel-good hype" (CM 31). To be clear here, although Taylor
clearly is pessimistic about the present default secular sources for sustaining our
aﬃrmation, he is not cynical. Indeed, Taylor never doubts that our feats of
philanthropy are honestly motivated by a genuine concern for humanity and by a
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true respect for human dignity. What he questions is whether the motivation is
sustainable in the face of human failure.
In fact because the demanding standards of humanism are in principle
realizable, 92 the human failure practically to live up to these demands inevitably risks
turning humanism against itself, and powering a disgust for humanity. On the
other hand, an in principle unachievable goal (in this life) has the advantage of
inspiring in the face of human failure and weakness, as well as empowering
continued action on behalf of the realization of the ideal, whether it is achievable in
the lifetime of the individual or not and whether or not individual eﬀorts every pay
dividends in success. Taylor does not make this exact argument, but it is in line with
his general thought. This is also a common theme in religious ethics, that
postponing satisfaction in this life (renunciation) is part of the demands of a love of
humanity, which in turn is rooted in a love beyond the human. From the
perspective of the transformation we are called to labor on behalf of an ideal, not to
achieve it. Is there a secular account that can ﬁre a commitment to ideals unlikely to
be achieved in this life without threatening to view any life of uncompromised
dedication to be wasted if it required renunciation of ordinary human fulﬁllments?

We will return to this question below, when we consider Thomson's
argument that the problem is because the ideals of transcendence in the strong sense
are in principle unrealizable allows us to draw the line between acceptable and
unacceptable senses of transcendence.
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Nicholas H. Smith understands Taylor to be making an indirect argument for
the superiority of God as the only qualifying hypergood when measured against the
problematic of adequacy. Smith is right to point out that for Taylor the question
hinges on whether or not something like Christian unconditional love of humanity
can be powered without some relation to a good beyond the human. Smith is also
correct in his reading of Taylor's argument from A Catholic Modernity? to be an
articulation of Taylor's account of why he thinks a theistic perspective is an adequate
solution.
What I think Smith gets wrong is that he presupposes Taylor to be mounting
an argument for religious transcendence in the strong sense. That this is not the case
becomes clear when we consider the vision of transcendence as transformation as
outlined above, and the promise of achieving a transformative perspective without a
strong ontological theism. As Smith points out, Taylor thinks that because theism
can give an answer to the question of what empowers us to unconditional love of
humanity, and thus represents an "epistemic gain" over non-theism. Smith points
out that theism can "tell us that the unconditional love of one human for another is
made possible in relation to something transcendent, or participation in an inﬁnite,
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non-human love. Human beings owe their power to realize the highest good to
their relation to a transcendent power." 93
I do not read Taylor to be making an argument for the superiority of a theistic
view in A Catholic Modernity? First of all, he is not doing philosophy per se in the
address to his fellow Roman Catholics, who presumably do not need an argument.
As I read Taylor, this is an articulation of theism as a moral source; he is giving an
account of why it matters, not making the case for its superiority over other possible
visions of transformation. If there is an argument here Taylor is claiming that our
best hope for the possibility of an unﬂagging commitment to the practical primacy
of human life lies in the rejection of the metaphysical primacy of life. Taylor's view
doesn't, as Smith thinks, require God--it is not an argument exclusively for God, or
for theistic sources alone, but may be generalized as an argument for an inclusive
humanism, for the need of a view from the transformation perspective. The point is
the need to believe even in the face of setbacks, and the impossibility of achieving in
one's lifetime, or the impossible demands of realizing practically the exigencies of
universal benevolence.
Beginning from where we already ﬁnd ourselves, from our present avowal of
universal benevolence and unconditional justice, Taylor challenges us to ﬁnd
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sources strong enough to empower the fulﬁllment of the demands of these, our
highest moral and spiritual ideals. God is Taylor's source, and he is not shy about
his claims for its adequacy. He does not, however, think that it is the only way.
Taylor's weak ontological theism is one possibility for an inclusive humanism, but it
does not exhaust the human possibilities for transcendence as transformation
adequate to the task. The failure of exclusive humanism should be taken as an
opportunity to elaborate new sources as well as a project of retrieval of old sources.
In this double project lies promise of a genuinely inclusive humanism.
Thomson on Ontological Inconsistencies and Drawing the Line
In “Transcendence and the Problem of Otherworldly Nihilism: Taylor, Heidegger,
Nietzsch,” Iain Thomson argues that there is an internal inconsistency in Taylor’s
ontology and that while it may be diﬃcult in hard cases to determine where to draw
the line between acceptable and unacceptable appeals to transcendence, it remains
possible to draw a line between some cases of transcendence. 94 Building on his own
inﬂuential reading of the later Heidegger's understanding of metaphysics as
ontotheology, Thomson challenges the consistency of the Heideggerian element in

Iain Thomson, “Transcendence and the Problem of Otherworldly Nihilism:
Taylor, Heidegger, Nietzsche,” Inquiry, 54, no. 2, (April 2011): 140—159. This article
was part of a special issue published by Inquiry, The Secular and the Sacred, which
included work by Taylor, Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly, Mark Wrathall and
Morganna Lambeth, Peter Gordon, and Albert Borgmann.
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Taylor's thought. Thomson argues that the inconsistency lies between Taylor's
commitment to both a "theoretical pluralism" and an "ontological monism." 95
Although bringing his thought in line with the later Heidegger would make Taylor's
position more consistent, Thomson also notes that this compromises any
commitment to a strong sense of transcendence, since Heideggerian ontological
pluralism is incompatible with the existence of God as traditionally understood by
the western metaphysical tradition. Beyond the question of the consistency of
Taylor's pluralism, however, Thomson also develops a Nietzschean critique of some
forms of transcendence, suggesting a Nietzsch-inspired criterion for drawing the
line between acceptable and unacceptably "nihilistic" senses of transcendence.

See Iain D. Thomson, Heidegger and Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics
of Education (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). In the first chapter
Thomson provides a convincing interpretation of Heidegger's understanding of
western metaphysics as ontotheology, which provides the "master key" to
Heidegger's later philosophy, that is, his deconstruction of metaphysics after he
abandons the project of fundamental ontology for an historicized ontology.
Thomson explains that Heidegger’s understanding of ontotheology begins with his
insight into the ambiguity of the questioning of reality, namely, "What is a being?"
This question can be heard to interrogate either the "what" or the "how" of a being.
The first aspect prescribes an ontological answer; it asks for that without which a
being is not, what it shares with all else that is. This is the ontological ground. The
second aspect of the question prescribes a theological response. It asks, "how is it
that a being is at all?" Thus the initial metaphysical question has an "ontotheological" structure, questioning both the external and the internal "ground" of
beings. Thus, ontotheology holds the successive, contingently stable "constellations
of intelligibility," or epochs, in play while they last, and gives the trajectory and
narrative arc to the development of the horizon of possibilities for an understanding
of the being of entities.
95
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Thomson's second argument is especially important to consider here because
it is a particularly strong version of the Nietzschean critique of transcendence, one
that focuses on Taylor's strategy for insulating the transcendent from neoNietzschean critique.  At the same time, it is instructive to consider Thomson's
critique insofar as it allows us insight into some of the subtleties of Taylor's
understanding of transcendence. I argue here that Thomson's position regarding the
consistency requirement for theoretical pluralists is correct, but that because Taylor
is not committed to a strong version ofontological monism he escapes Thomson's
critique. Second, although Thomson's powerful version of Nietzsche's attack o
"otherworldly nihilism" does allow for a principled way to distinguish between
acceptable and unacceptable nihilistic versions of transcendence, a closer
consideration of Taylor's position shows that he has the resources to respond to
Thomson, although ultimately I do not think a clear victor emerges. Finally, a
consideration of Thomson's arguments yields not only a clearer view of Taylor on
transcendence, but also highlights the depth of his debt to Heidegger by showing
that he is closer to Thomson (and thus to Heidegger) than it initially appears. I end
this chapter with a brief consideration of some of the directions that Thomson has
himself taken Heidegger beyond Heidegger in the direction of a more inclusive
humanism.
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Thomson questions Taylor's emphasis on the human quest for meaning as a
quest for one uniﬁed meaning, although the obvious suspicion falls on Taylor's
religious commitment to (some form of) monotheism. 96 Taking up the view of the
later Heidegger, whereby the very idea of a single overarching, uniﬁed meaning of
human life is part of the tradition of western metaphysics as ontotheology that
Heidegger thinks should be overcome, Thomson suggests that his reading of
Heidegger on this matter is more in line with Taylor's commitment to pluralis 97
since it involves an understanding of the meaning, or mattering of life to be
discovered interstitial plurality of meaning, rather than a strict unity. 98 Heidegger's
account is incompatible, according to Thomson's inﬂuential reading, with the

Ruth Abbey has recently defended Taylor against Stuart Hampshire's
charge that monotheism necessarily conflicts with moral pluralism. See, Ruth
Abbey, "The Primary Enemy?: Monotheism and Pluralism," in James Boyd White,
ed., How Should We Talk About Religion: Perspectives, Contexts and Particularities (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 211-229.
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Thomson develops his plural realism further in Heidegger, Art and
Postmodernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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I take the term "interstitial" from Taylor, which he uses to characterize a
similar position developed by Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly in All Things Shining:
Reading the Western Classics to Find Meaning in a Secular Age (New York: Free Press,
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traditional role of a monotheistic God anchoring the meaning of existence beyond
the world. As Thomson reads Heidegger,
the very idea that there is (or even could be) a single meaning of being in
general is something that the later Heidegger argues we should transcend as
part of the ontotheological legacy of western metaphysics--along with the very
idea of a creator God who stands outside the secular world, implicitly unifying the
meaning of existence... from his God's eye perspective or "view from nowhere." 99
In short, Thomson reads Heidegger as an ontological pluralist, one who holds the
view that meaning is irreducibly plural. He concludes that given the unavailability
of an ontotheological creator God, we late moderns may best discover a realm of
meaning independent of our subjective projection by attending to the many
meanings of being and cultivating an attentiveness to their appearance in ordinary
experience, to "cultivate a poetic sensitivity to multiple meanings," rather than
continue the quest for "some overarching or underlying unity to all things." 100
It is this view of the multiplicity of the meaning of being that Thomson argues
one would expect in Taylor, but Taylor remains committed to the idea of a unified
meaning of existence. Thomson also points out, correctly, that Taylor is committed
to a "theoretical pluralism," or the idea that the meaning of reality cannot be
captured in any one articulation. As a theoretical pluralist, Taylor is committed to
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the idea that our articulation of meaning is always overdetermined by phenomena.
What is missing from this account, and what seems to be required for the sake of
consistency, is an endorsement of ontological pluralism. Furthermore, Thomson
stresses the "phenomenologically realist intuition" informing Heidegger's
ontological pluralism. On this reading Heidegger holds that "it is the inherent
pluralism of what we like to call "reality" that lends itself to our multiple ways of
taking it up." 101 That is, for Heidegger "reality" is an independent plurality, which
affords a concomitant multiplicity of expression or articulation.
On the other hand, Thomson reads Taylor to hold the "more idealist intuition"
that reality is a unity but "our ways of taking it up are multiple." 102 Thomson
suggests that this view is motivated by Taylor's faith commitment to an ontological
creator God who transcends the world. Taylor, on Thomson's reading, offers no
rationale for his insistence on the unity of meaning, no rationale "perhaps, but faith:
If one believes in an ontotheological creator God who stands beyond space and time,
Ibid. Immediately following this quotation Thomson offers a parenthetical
explanation using Heidegger's own terminology of "earth," and "world." I also note
Thomson's original, and highly helpful, term "rift-structure" to describe this difficult
concept from Heidegger. "In Heidegger's terms of art, the border between our
intelligible "worlds" and the inexhaustible "earth" that "juts through" and supports
these worlds but also withdraws from them should be understood as a "riftstructure," that is, as a texture of rifts, edges, and partial borders that divide being
itself asunder, fracturing and pluralizing the source of historical intelligibility" (143).
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implicitly unifying the meaning of creation, then one's ontological commitments
include an appeal to something outside the limits of possible experience, something
on which our best theoretical efforts can gain no purchase." 103
I think it is helpful at this point to parse this criticism of Taylor in terms of
Stephen White's distinction between "strong" and "weak" ontology. Although
Thomson is correct that Taylor would be inconsistent if he advocated a theoretical
pluralism while also maintaining a strong foundational role for God, on closer
examination it becomes clear that Taylor does not hold an unacceptably inconsistent
view. A strong ontology would prescribe a unitary moral and political vision
anchored in a single overarching meaning. Even if this vision prescribed tolerance,
however, tolerance of difference is not pluralism.
As I argued in Chapter Four, however, Taylor is not a strong ontologist, or
not a strong ontological theist to be more exact. 104 Taylor simply does not think it is
possible to have certainty in the matter of the transcendent. As he explicitly states in
a recently published conversation with Richard Kearney, "we need to acknowledge
that we [Christians] are all part of one hermeneutical family, accepting that we know
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interesting to consider what effect the Christian doctrine of the trinity may have on
Thomson's reading.
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nothing for certain about the transcendent--that there is always a messiness and
fragility about all our efforts to get a hold on what is ultimately important here,"
adding that this "doesn't mean we stop trying." 105 White's reading of Taylor is also
helpful for negotiating Thomson's challenge on this point insofar as the idea of weak
ontology helps us to understand how Taylor can (as he quite often does) sound a lot
like what Thomson would call an ontological monist. But as we have seen Taylor is
best understood to be taking a weak position here, one that posits the idea of God or
the transcendent in order provisionally to make our way through the exigencies of a
troubled late modernity.
Thomson's secondary critique of Taylor is relevant to Nussbaum's insofar as
it involves the question of "drawing the line," and a version of the "romantic" charge
against transcendence. There remain important differences between Nussbaum's
critique and Thomson's, however. Thomson makes the case for a principled way to
draw the line, and he also makes the case for mutilation along the lines of
Nietzsche's attack on "otherworldly nihilism." While Nussbaum expresses
sympathy with Nietzsche, she does not explicitly take up his position. Although
Taylor does mention Nietzsche regularly throughout A Secular Age, he does not
seriously engage with either Nietzsche or the so-called "postmodernists." This lack
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of sustained engagement with Nietzsche, especially in the discussion of what he
calls the "romantic" critique of transcendence, represents a serious gap in Taylor's
argument. I hope that my consideration of Thomson's argument makes up for
Taylor's avoidance of Nietzsche.
Thomson develops the basic picture of Nietzsche's argument that any attempt
to anchor the meaningfulness of life beyond life results in "otherworldly nihilism,"
that is a meaningless world relative to the anchor in an illusory beyond. Nietzsche
makes a version of the mutilation charge against Christianity. As Taylor sometimes
puts it, the charge here is that the aspiration to transcend
actually damages us, unfits us for the pursuit of human fulfillment... by
inducing in us hate and disgust at our ordinary human desires and
neediness... inculcat[ing] a repulsion at our limitations which poisons the joy
we might otherwise feel in the satisfaction of human life as it is. (SA 626)
Of course, Nietzsche makes this charge not only against Christianity, but also
Platonism and Buddhism. In short, for Nietzsche, any aspiration to transcend
implies a negative judgment on life as it is lived, the life we actually live, relative to
an "otherworld" beyond life. Thus does transcendence "mutilate" because it
necessarily involves renunciation of this world, or life in this world. This renders the
world, the "earth" and life meaningless and so leads to nihilism. This is Nietzsche's,
by now classic, charge against Christianity that Thomson builds on in his critique of
Taylor.
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In a succinct explanation of Taylor's challenge to exclusive humanists to draw
a principled and defensible line between acceptable and unacceptable senses of
transcendence, Thomson homes in on the requirement that any such distinction
must show us late moderns how to overcome complacency, or self-satisfied
humanism, without sacrificing the goodness and legitimacy of the enjoyment of
ordinary life that is a perennial risk to all moral views involving universal moral
standards. Thomson explains Taylor's position on drawing the line as follows:
Taylor challenges the secularizing proponents of any closed immanent
perspective to draw a defensible distinction between "immanence" and
"transcendence," a distinction which does justice both to our recurring lack of
satisfaction with our existing world and to our ongoing efforts to transcend
the limits of the world as we find it. 106
At the heart of Thomson's critique is his suggestion that while there may be no
principled way to draw the line in all cases, there are some cases where a defensible
distinction is clear. "The fact that night and day blur together during dawn and
dusk does not mean that we cannot distinguish night from day in ordinary cases,"
Thomson points out, and he argues that immanence and transcendence, in the
relevant cases, can adequately be distinguished in a principled way that he takes
from Nietzsche's "otherworldly nihilism" argument.
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Focusing on what he takes to be the core of Nietzsche's argument, Thomson
makes a stronger version of the mutilating charge against transcendence. On this
more subtle reading, it is only "the unfulfillable desire for the other-worldly that
generates a false sense of the meaninglessness of this world." It is this dynamic that
Thomson thinks is the main point of Nietzsche's complaint against religious
transcendence, that it denigrates "even the best that we living human beings can
attain in the name of something we cannot; our "earthly" aspirations are devalued by
comparison to unfuflillable "otherworldly" dreams." How can we know in advance,
however, that our highest goals are unattainable? In more provocative terms,
Thomson distinguishes acceptable, non-nihilistic goals (in principle attainable), from
those unacceptable nihilistic "goals which require one to die first, as part of the price
of admission--and that the traditional religious understanding of Heaven is one such
goal." Surely, this is as clear as the day is from the night. 107
In Taylor's defense, I think that he has the resources to push back against
Nietzschean view Thomson develops in a number of ways. (1) Taylor challenges
what he takes to be a too simplistic understanding of renunciation. The assimilation
of all forms of "otherworldly" transcendence to the basic Platonic picture obscures
important and relevant distinctions. (2) Next, there is the question of whether
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Nietzsche's critique (and a fortiori Thomson's) applies only to strong ontological
visions of "going beyond." (3) Finally, there is an issue as to whether or not Taylor
has successfully shifted the onus of proof to the exclusive humanist insofar as the
question is really a matter of the adequacy of our moral sources for a humanistic moral
view. Nietzsche's critique leaves the question of adequacy intact, at least for those of
us who are not Übermenschen. Let me take each in turn, briefly. 108
Taylor challenges the fundamental presupposition behind Nietzsche's
nihilism charge. Must all who believe in a good beyond life, after death, a good to
which they look to as an anchor for the meaningfulness of the activities and
enjoyments of this life be, in Nietzsche's words, "despisers of life"? 109 Taylor, as we
have seen above, agrees that there are certainly some forms of religious
transcendence that fall afoul of this criticism--that it is a trenchant critique, and has
force for us because of legitimate reasons, which he calls "homecomings to the

An additional potential problem with the position Thomson explores in his
paper is the question of whether Thomson's position from the point of view of late
Heidegger would find Nietzsche's subjectivistic solution to the "creation" of values
an acceptable answer to the otherworldly generated nihilism. If not, another form of
nihilism looms in the wake of the death of God, and an adequate solution is needed.
I conclude the present chapter with a consideration of some of the contributions
Thomson has made toward a non-religious response.
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ordinary." 110 Taylor also readily admits that Nietzsche's attack gets some (more than
some) purchase in certain instances. "There are," he agrees, "clearly wrong versions
of the Christian faith" (SA 643). There are, however, other visions of the spiritual
economy at play in Christianity (and likely Buddhism). Taylor points out that the
renunciation of the world, of the value of life relative to the love of God (or hope for
eternity) is in many cases predicated on the value of this world, of ordinary life and of
the body. As we saw in an earlier chapter, he contrasts the deaths of Socrates, for
whom death was a "healing," and the suffering of Jesus in the Garden of
Gethsemane, whose sacrifice is incomprehensible "unless living the whole span [of
life] were good" (SA 17). This relationship between renunciation and affirmation,
In A Secular Age Taylor links this critique to the protestant reformers'
rejection of the ideal of the monastic vocation, and their rehabilitation of ordinary
life. The perspective of Reformed churches monastic life was part of a general
Catholic rejection of the goods of ordinary life, the life of production and
reproduction. Reformers viewed monastic life as one in which people "had
dedicated themselves to unreal ideals of austerity to which they were not called by
God, turning aside from the ordinary human path where they were supposed to do
his will" (SA 627). As Taylor has it in his narrative of the rise of secularity, this
charge was generalized, in time, to religion as such. In both cases the sloughing off
of the earlier ascetic demands of religion and perceived renunciation of ordinary life
was experienced as a sense of recovered value of the ordinary, of a "sense of the
value of unspectacular, flawed everyday love, between lovers, or friends, or parents
and children, with its routines and labors, partings and reunions, estrangements and
returns--a homecoming. Taylor argues that this experience is legitimate, and
indeed, constitutive of modernity because the affirmation of ordinary life is of such
importance for us as a moral source. At the same time, he thinks the blanket critique
of religion and/or transcendence ignores important nuances in historical
development that tends to obscure alternative viewpoints.
110
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Taylor points out, "often seems difficult to understand. It would be easy to
understand why you should give up the fullness of flourishing, if there were
something wrong with it. And that's how unbelief reads Christian renunciation, as a
negative judgment on human fulfillment" (SA 645). Taylor is not, as elsewhere,
"scoring points," but is making the case that the issues involved are more
complicated than the old polemics took them to be. It is the nature of sacrifice, and
not only in a religious or Christian context, that that foregone is understood to be of
value. If that given up has no value, there is no sacrifice.
Second, we ask whether Taylor escapes Nietzsche's and Thomson's critique
because of his weak ontological theism: does the critique of otherworldly nihilism
presuppose belief in a strong ontological God or a literal afterlife? As Thomson
points out, correctly, Taylor keeps his "views close to the vest" on these questions in
A Secular Age. Taylor doesn't think that a return to a pre-modern "enchanted world"
is either desirable or possible, and a major thesis of A Secular Age is that we are all
"cross-pressured," believer and unbeliever alike. His claims regarding the
legitimacy of religious transcendence in A Secular Age ultimately come down to the
weak claim that such beliefs are not, pace Nietzsche, illicit comforts. I don't think
Taylor gives us enough to settle the question, although it does seem that Nietzsche's
critique requires a strong belief in an afterlife.
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The third possible response Taylor might make at this juncture is that
Nietzsche is not a humanist. If Nietzsche is correct in his attack on Christianity, then
his argument also holds against the whole Enlightenment project, which is how he
understood it. Here Thomson diverges from Nietzsche, arguing that it is only the
"in principle unattainable" goals that are a threat to the worth and meaning of the
earth, and our ordinary life. This is the strongest point in Thomson's critique.
The problem might be put differently in terms of the onus of the argument. I
take it to be integral to Taylor's strategy to shift the onus of argument to the side of
unbelief by challenging exclusive humanism to offer non-transcendent sources that
are powerful enough to effect a transformation to sustain the affirmation of their
own humanist values.
Suppose Thomson's Nietzsche-inspired critique is correct, and only strongly
otherworldly goals that require "death as the price of admission" are ruled
inadmissible. This still raises the question of whether the remaining goals are
adequate to the task of upholding modern humanistic visions of morality. Nietzsche
didn't think so, and it didn't bother him. He was (so he claimed) ready to welcome
with joy the death of God and to celebrate the consequences. In Nietzsche's words,
the death of God ushers in not only the collapse of Christianity (and its cognates),
but "what was built upon this faith, propped up by it, grown into it." And he
specifies: "for example, the whole European morality." The "free spirit," of course,
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rejoices at this, and embraces the consequences, is "not at all sad and gloomy but
rather like a new and scarcely describable kind of light, happiness, relief,
exhilaration, encouragement, dawn." Certainly Nietzsche (and the neoNietzscheans) excludes transcendence, but he also rejects Enlightenment humanism.
On my reading of Taylor, A Secular Age and his other works directly relevant to
religion and transcendence, are aimed not only at recovering the lost or damaged
Christian "moral sources," but also at the project of discovering possibilities for a
new, inclusive, humanism. As I argue below, this situation places Thomson closer
to Taylor's side in the "four-cornered" debate on transcendence. 111
Returning to the question of drawing the line, another issue arises that I
considered briefly in the discussion of Taylor's challenge to his opponents for an
account adequate to sustain dedication to high demands of modern morality.
Thomson argues that he can draw the line between adequate and inadequate
transcendence by Nietzsche's criterion. Thomson's argument seems simple: Any
goal is ruled unacceptable, if it is conceived of as "otherworldly" in the strong sense
of implying that you have to die to achieve it. Perhaps, Thomson concedes, most
cases will be difficult to call, but this case seems a clear case of unacceptable
transcendence.
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I think there is a reply that Taylor could make, but does not. Taylor makes
the case that we late moderns are in a dilemma, and that we lack the resources to
maintain the kind of dedication to universal benevolence and unconditional justice
that can withstand the continual failure of human beings to live up to them. In other
words, Taylor might conceivably reverse the claim, and point to the weakness, or
inadequacy of in principle achievable but unachieved goals relative to the
unachieved because unachievable (in this life). He might fault the latter, which are
in principle achievable but which are nevertheless unachieved, due to weakening the
resolve in the modern subject's practical motivation to achieve their realization.
Likewise, it seems that an in principle unachievable goal may be an inexhaustible well
from which to draw a sustaining love of humanity that powers an unconditional
devotion and practical effort on behalf of the species. If living to see the
accomplishment of the goal is part of the goal, we are faced with the prospect of
utter disappointment in the interesting cases. Again, it seems that it may be better to
lower our standards or expectations, something that Taylor believes is an
unacceptable admission of defeat.
Either side of this question about drawing the line based on whether the goal
is realizable in life or not is, in the end, inconclusive. I think that this is a matter of
temperament--something that Taylor would agree with. Depending on any number
of contingencies one way or the other may appeal to an individual, and then again
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these things develop and change over time as identities evolve. This is central to
Taylor's vision of both the modern secular age and the modern self, which seeks a
meaning to ordinary life, as well as struggling to live up to moral standards it is
impossible to achieve.
To conclude this chapter on critiques of Taylor I would like briefly to consider
Thomson's contribution to a more inclusive humanism. Here I sketch two paths that
might be taken in the development of a neo-Heideggerian approach to the maximal
demand. The first involves some insights into the potential for a Heideggerian deep
ecology, and the second involves a reading of Heidegger's notion of "dwelling" as
revealing a motive for selfless action and overcoming the complacent selfsatisfaction of exclusive humanism. This is a view of moral self-transcendence
predicated on a concept of an immanent non-human good that potentially has the
power to take us beyond merely human flourishing, yet not beyond the things of
this world. It is also an excellent coda to our discussion of Thomson's critique of
Taylor because it shows that although he comes at the questions from a very
different angle and philosophical temperament, Thomson also evinces a keen
sensitivity to the cross-pressures of a secular age, though perhaps he does not find
himself in Jamesian open space.
The first contribution toward an inclusive humanism in Thomson's work is
his suggestion for overcoming a problematic anti-humanism in some versions of
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deep ecology. In "Ontology and Ethics at the Intersection of Phenomenology and
Environmental Philosophy," Thomson engages the "eco-phenomenology" movement
from the perspective of later Heidegger. 112 Identifying some of the unacceptable
"anti-human implications and anti-democratic conclusions" of many of the attempts
to develop a phenomenological approach to the environment, Thomson suggests
these difficulties may be avoided. Thomson suggests that we answer the question
"Which entities deserve intrinsic rights?", with "All Dasein," that is, all entities whose
being is an issue for them, and only those entities." 113 In this Thomson is clearly
aligned with Taylor against the (so-called) postmodernists, or what Taylor calls neoNietzscheans throughout A Secular Age. Thomson rejects appeals to "life per se" as an
acceptable criterion to determine which entities have intrinsic rights. Rather, he
suggests that "a life that has a temporally-enduring world that matters to it
explicitly" as the appropriate way to settle the question in terms of a Dasein-based
deep ecology.
The motive for such a Dasein-based deep ecology brings us to the second
consideration from Thomson's paper. Thomson, correctly I think, suggests that a
motive for such a Heideggerian response lies in the individual experience of
Iain Thomson, "Ontology and Ethics at the Intersection of Phenomenology
and Environmental Philosophy," Inquiry 47 (2004).
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"dwelling" whereby the inherently inexhaustible meaningfulness (not "value") of
things is revealed independently of the will. 114 Such a "conversion," or
"transformation," by providing a contrast case, will also reveal the roots of the
present dilemma in ontotheology. Thomson suggests, along with Heidegger, that
this conversion may be precipitated by "any appropriately thoughtful encounter
with the myriad" of "humble things... in which we recognize entities as being more
than resources awaiting optimization." 115
The connection between dwelling (transcendence as transformation) and
Thomson's suggestion that having an intelligible "world" is a sufficient condition for
having intrinsic rights, is that only Dasein can dwell, and it is just in dwelling that
Dasein achieves an opening to the independent mattering of the earth, or the
environment. Dwelling holds out some promise as an adequate basis for a deep
ecological ethic, an ecological ethic that is rooted in the meaningfulness of the
environment independently of its use value. In Taylor's terms, Thomson seems to
argue that dwelling is the best secular hope for revealing the environment (earth or
There is some overlap in the Heideggerian notion of "dwelling," and the
question of whether it can be under the purview of the will, whether one can
determine to achieve transcendence in the relevant sense. This is most clear in
Emerson (in certain moods), but is also very prominent in the later Dewey. You
cannot aim at a transformation, nor is "dwelling" to be achieved by willing. See,
also, my discussion above in footnote no. 35.
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nature) as a moral source that also allows a principled way of assigning human
beings (qua Dasein) a very high value in nature. 116 Heidegger's romantic ideal of
nature as a moral source is revealed clearly in the following passage, quoted by
Thomson, from "The Fieldpath": "The message of the fieldpath awakens a spirit who
loves the open air and, at a favorable place, leaps over even heaviness into an
extreme serenity... The expanse of all grown things which dwell around the
fieldpath bestows the world." 117
The emphasis in Thomson's reading of Heidegger is on what I would call the
intimacy with things in the experience of dwelling, rather than in shared collective
experiences. Elsewhere Thomson explains this aspect of his work as an expression
of his "enduring respect" for a "strand of anti-theological religious thinking... which
valorizes social alienation and the radical individuation it facilitates as an alternative
and at least equally genuine and important dimension of religious experience." 118
This shift of emphasis is key to Thomson's reconciliation of a Heideggerian selfdecentering with humanist moral intuitions, that is, his vision, too, supports an

For an interesting comparison both to this approach, and Taylor's, but one
which is more resolutely naturalist, see, George Kateb, Human Dignity (Cambridge:
The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2011).
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inclusive humanism. This also contrasts strongly with Taylor and others, such as
Sean Kelly and Hubert Dreyfus, who emphasize shared, collective experiences of
meaning. Thomson's emphasis on the individuating intimacy with the things of this
world revealed in their inexhaustible meaningfulness offers a striking contrast with
Taylor. At the same time, the seriousness of Thomson's obvious concern for finding
some principled way to reconcile human rights with deep ecology shows that he has
more in common with Taylor than may be at first apparent.
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Chapter Six
Pragmatism and Inclusive Humanism: Taylor and Dewey
Richard Kearney, in a recently published conversation with Charles Taylor,
summarizes the "conclusions" of A Secular Age. Kearney suggests that for Taylor the
future of transcendence in the West hinges on whether or not a new vision of
humanism becomes widely available, or the "dominant narrative of exclusive secular
humanism" continues to be the default position. This new understanding of
humanism Kearney refers to as "a new Christian humanism open to the
transcendent." 119 Kearney correctly characterizes Taylor's position to be a critique of
exclusive humanism but one which appreciates much of value in the historical
development of exclusive humanism as a viable option in the immanent frame. At
the same time, it is clear that Taylor also thinks we should explore possibilities for
belief and unbelief in the immanent frame beyond the usual, often uncritically
accepted polemics. "[W]hy," Kearney asks, "is atheistic humanism not enough?
Why is a Christian or transcendent humanism so important for you?" 120

Richard Kearney and Charles Taylor, "Transcendent Humanism in a
Secular Age: a Dialogue With Charles Taylor," in Richard Kearney and Jens
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Taylor's response to this question, and indeed, the rest of his otherwise quite
unfiltered conversation with Kearney, helps us understand the nuanced position on
the future of transcendence, and the role Taylor envisions for the transformation
perspective as a support for a new humanism. Taylor responds by distinguishing
between "two kinds of secular humanism. One, which rules out any "beyond," is a
kind of reductive materialism that recognizes no source of value beyond the
immanent frame. Then there is another kind, which does acknowledge something
else, some aspiration for something more, some "meaning of meaning... But its
notion of this surplus--for all its resistance to a general "flattening down" and
unlearning of the great wisdom traditions--remains intramundane." 121
Taylor distinguishes his understanding of the Christian version of a
transcendent humanism from the secular versions by contrasting the different
responses to death, and the details of the Christian vision of the transformation that
"breaks out of the immanent frame and looks beyond." 122 What Taylor and Kearney
refer to as "transcendent humanism," however, takes a narrowly religious sense, but
Taylor's understanding of transcendence as transformation admits a weaker
reading, one that allows for non-religious variants at least as strong in
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transformative potential as any based on an original Judeo-Christian theism. There
are inclusive, and exclusive versions of secular humanism. In his conversation with
Kearney, Taylor uses "transcendent humanism" as a synonym for a "Christian
humanism," so we can consider his use of these terms to exclude intramundane
transcendence. My use of his much earlier term "inclusive humanism" is intended to
capture both, on the condition of an adequate transformative potential. 123
At certain points throughout the previous chapters I have noted the relevance
of John Dewey's thought, and hinted at some of the directions this might take.

Taylor has been working on this idea for almost sixty years. See, for
example, his fourteenth journal article (out of 500 and counting) from 1960 (Charles
Taylor, "Clericalism," Downside Review 78, no. 252 [1960], 167-180]. Taylor argues
against clericalism ("the emphasis on hierarchical structure of the Church which
causes to be hid from view its life as the community of the faithful" [167].) which he
charges with causing the laity to be "indifferent to human development," and
describes "a clear link between the view that this human development is devoid of
significance and... clericalism, and also an important historical link between the
dissolution of the laity as a people and the denigration f their task, of secular
progress as a whole, a rejection of humanism" (169). In defense of what, in 1960, he
explicitly calls Christian humanism, he claims that clericalism obfuscates "works of
supererogation... as the normal vocation of the laity" (174). In defense of humanism
the much younger Taylor complains that "[t]he Church has done more to condemn
humanist doctrines... than it has tried to understand why all major humanist
doctrines of the modern era have been anti-Christian. By "humanist doctrine" I
mean some view of man which tries to show the scope and/or importance of human
development towards greater well-being freedom, unity, justice... All these views
have been anti-Christian for at least one main reason: that Christianity has seemed
to their protagonists a doctrine preaching the impossibility of human betterment or
its irrelevance" (177). Almost all the main points in Taylor's later philosophy of
religion are anticipated in this early work.
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Although I cannot develop it in detail here, I think that pragmatism in general, and
John Dewey's thought in particular is very well suited to a constructive engagement
with Taylor on the subject of religion, transcendence and the future of humanism.
In the rest of this conclusion I would like to bring out what I think are some of the
resources from the pragmatist tradition for just such a secular, though inclusive,
humanism. In particular, I think that the often-overlooked religious philosophy of
Dewey is best suited for the task of developing a pragmatic intramundane
transcendence as a basis for a secular inclusive humanism. I do not propose to
develop a Dewey-inspired all inclusive humanism in these concluding remarks, but
only to demonstrate a broad affinity Taylor shares with the classical pragmatists,
especially Dewey.
Taylor and Dewey: The Potential for a Constructive Engagement
John Dewey’s Terry Lectures, delivered in 1934 at Yale University, and published as
A Common Faith the same year, are probably best described as a highly idiosyncratic
attempt at a “third way” in the polarized dbate surrounding religion in the 1930s.
The mainstream protestant theological debates of the period tend to fall into two
camps, both characterized by their reaction to Darwin and to a deepening
disenchantment of the world in the wake of a dawning realization of human
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contingency. 124 This conciliatory approach, the attempt to remain above the popular
debate, is something that Dewey has in common with Charles Taylor. Dewey’s
“little book,” which runs to just over eighty pages, and Taylor’s “big book,”A
Secular Age, which is nearly ten times as long, complement each other in surprising
ways. Both works are aimed at disabusing the reader of any simplistic view of the
problem of religious belief in the modern world, nor do they neglect the important
role in morality that religion has played, and the importance of confronting the
potential impact on the ethical shape of modernity. Both works address the reader
who ﬁnds belief in the supernatural or transcendent, as these terms are usually
construed, to be diﬃcult or impossible. Taylor is focused on those who experience
the decline in religious belief as a loss, those who dwell in what he calls the
“Jamesian open space,” and feel pulled in two directions, and who recognize
something valuable in religious experience but nevertheless ﬁnd it diﬃcult or
impossible to believe. 125 Dewey is also concerned for those conﬂicted about religious
belief in the modern world. A major diﬀerence between Dewey and Taylor here is

For a fuller characterization of the historical milieu in America, and
Dewey's place in the debate, see Melvin L. Rogers, The Undiscovered Dewey: Religion,
Morality, and the Ethos of Democracy, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press,
2009).
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(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), see also, SA.
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that Dewey emphasizes the potential for a naturalized context for religious
experience, for the function of religious experience “emancipated” from institutional
religions and the supernatural (LW9: 1), whereas Taylor is primarily focused on
defending the viability of robust religious belief, in an institutional (or at least
communal) context. Dewey is addressing the "threat" posed to those unable to
accept belief in the supernatural, and who think that genuinely religious experience
is impossible without belief in supernatural entities. He argues that this need not be
the case, and that religious self-realization, 126 or what I called above, pragmatic
intramundane transcendence, remains a viable possibility within the context of his
naturalism. Taylor, on the other hand, makes the case for keeping open the
transcendent window; he argues that it is impossible to foreclose this option. It
should be clear from the argument from previous chapters, however, that Taylor
seeks a via media between radical positions--as does Dewey. Of course, this means
that they also share the circumstance of pleasing very few in their quest for a
The term "self-realization," has, unfortunately had a difficult time since
Dewey used it in the 1930s, especially as it is often featured in relatively superficial
"self-help" movements throughout the 1960s and '70s. However abused, I think it
remains useful. Dewey uses it in a way that reveals a strong Emersonian streak in
his thought. I read A Common Faith as Dewey's attempt to unpack Emersonian selfreliance in intramundane terms, one of Dewey's post-Romantic gestures, which
quite bewildered his secular humanist contemporaries. By "post-Romantic gesture,"
I mean to capture something of Taylor's writing on post-Romantic art, specifically
that it implies transcendence, "points beyond itself," but remains "ontologically
indeterminate" (see SA 620 ff).
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solution that satisﬁes everyone. Still, there is strong potential for bringing these two
thinkers together in a constructive engagement on a particular set of problems
facing religious belief in modernity, and I think it remains worthwhile. I hope my
closing comments will serve as an inspiration for further work on Dewey and
Taylor.
Taylor’s direct engagement with neo-pragmatists has been occasional, if longstanding, but is largely focused on his disagreements with Richard Rorty. These
disagreements illuminate as much about the shortcomings of Rorty’s brand of neopragmatism as they do about the narrowness of Taylor’s conception of pragmatism.
Taylor’s engagement with Rorty may have colored his conception of pragmatism,
and occluded a range of connections with his own philosophical outlook.
One question that I will not answer in what follows is just who really counts
as a pragmatist, although I think the discussion as a whole will contribute, if
indirectly, to the general idea of pragmatism. That pragmatism is notoriously
diﬃcult to pin down by way of a deﬁnition is often remarked. Richard Rorty
sometimes seems to talk as though the deﬁning feature of pragmatism is its antifoundationalism, and that feature does seem to be the focus of much of what he
ﬁnds praiseworthy in the classical pragmatists, but there is far too broad a range of
thinkers in the anti-foundationalist camp for this alone to serve as an adequate
indicator of pragmatism as a unique school of thought. Alternatively, there is the
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Peircian “pragmatic maxim,” and pragmatism is sometimes understood as primarily
a certain stand on the question of truth and meaning. Agreement on this score,
however, among those self-consciously working in the pragmatist tradition, boils
down to the very vague notion, widely interpreted, that “truth is what works.” In
the end it looks like pragmatism will have to remain a big tent, and we will have to
live without a precise deﬁnition. This in itself seems a ﬁtting characteristic.  Perhaps
the best suggestion, which was ﬁrst suggested by Hilary Putnam in Pragmatism: an
Open Question, is that focusing on the primacy of practice as a way of overcoming
representationalism most clearly unites the disparate band of pragmatists. Pointing
out Wittgenstein’s aﬃnity with pragmatism Putnam suggests that “a centra—
perhaps the central—emphasis with pragmatism [is] the emphasis on the primacy of
practice.” 127 It seems safe to say that the primacy of practice comes close to a
necessary condition for pragmatism. But is it a suﬃcient condition? To take the
primacy of practice as a suﬃcient condition would count a number of philosophers
as pragmatists who are not generally thought of as pragmatists, including, for
example, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and, indeed, Taylo himself.
But Taylor is not a pragmatist, and no attempt will be made here to assimilate
him with that tradition. Ultimately, Taylor may be, in his words, “some kind of
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pragmatist,” but only if we take the primacy of practice as a suﬃcient condition for
counting as a pragmatist, rather than merely (at best) a necessary condition.
Attempting to oﬀer a deﬁnitive answer to the questionof whether Taylor is a
pragmatist, however, would be helpful neither for understanding Taylor’s, nor
Dewey’s thought. Rather, this section oﬀers a survey of Taylor’s thought in relation
to the pragmatist tradition, and his aﬃnity with it.
Taylor shares a range of common philosophical commitments with
pragmatists besides the primacy of practice, for example, anti-foundationalism, antirepresentationalism, and pluralism. The primary philosophical inﬂuences that
brought Taylor to philosophical positions that overlap with many pragmatists,
however, are rooted in Oxford Philosophy of the 1950s, and the continental
tradition, rather than a close reading of the classical pragmatists James, Dewey, and
Peirce. In the following brief survey of their thought we will see that Dewey may be
the pragmatist closest to Taylor, as paradoxical as this might sound to those familiar
with the thought of both. It is fair to say that Taylor is a “fellow traveller” with
pragmatism—he is, as it were, the American pragmatists’ Canadian cousin.
If the question of whether Taylor (or anyone else for that matter) really counts
as a pragmatist is idle, for the purposes of the present work it is important to ask just
how far Taylor does travel, so to speak, along with the classical pragmatists, and
those self-consciously working within the pragmatist tradition. In an essay titled
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“What Is Pragmatism?”--a contribution to a Festschrift in honor of the pragmatist
Richard J. Bernstein’s seventieth birthday, Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment: Essays for
Richard J. Bernstein--Taylor considers this question himself. Prudently, he ultimately
leaves the question in his title unanswered, but rather points out what he takes to be
some of the core insights from the pragmatist tradition with which he agrees. He
acknowledges an intellectual debt to Bernstein, and recognizes that his longstanding
critique of the modern epistemological tradition runs parallel to a similar critique to
be found in the works of many contemporary pragmatists. In light of his proximity
to pragmatism on the question of the epistemological tradition Taylor muses, “So
perhaps I too, am some kind of pragmatist?” 128
The only sense in which Taylor suggests he might be a pragmatist of some kind
is that he accepts a broad understanding of the pragmatist critique of the
epistemological tradition, a critique that he ﬁnds he has in common with many
pragmatists. Taylor deﬁnes the target of this critique he shares with pragmatists in
terms of a set of “priority relations” in traditional epistemology that underlie the
general “picture of individuals as knowing agents, who build up their
understanding of the world through combining and relating, in more and more

Charles Taylor, “What Is Pragmatism?,” in Seyla Benhabib and Nancy
Fraser, eds., Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment: Essays for Richard J. Bernstein
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 73—92, citation on p. 74.
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comprehensive theories, the information they take in and that is couched in inner
representations, be these conceived as mental pictures (in the earlier variants), or as
sentences to be held true in the more contemporary versions.” 129 Taylor enumerates
three “priority relations” that support this picture:
(1) Knowledge of the self and its states comes before the knowledge of
external reality and of others. (2) Knowledge of reality as a neutral fact comes
before our attributing to it various values and relevances.  And, (3)
knowledge of the things of “this world,” of the natural order, precedes any
theoretical invocation of forces and realities transcendent to it. 130
The tentative understanding of pragmatism that Taylor proposes is that pragmatism
reverses some of these priority relations underlying the epistemological tradition.
“In particular,” Taylor says, “the target would be (2).” Denying, or reversing, the
second priority relation amounts to an aﬃrmation of the primacy of practice,
whereby our representations and beliefs arise from a pre-theoretical engagement
with an already meaningful world through our everyday background practices. As
Taylor puts it, “we are from the very beginning at grips with the world,” and “our
entire understanding of things comes to be framed only within this committed and
active perspective.” Thus Taylor singles out, along with Putnam, the primacy of
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practice as the best candidate for a necessary condition for deﬁning pragmatism.
“This might,” he adds, “be the core meaning” of pragmatism. 131
Further, Taylor suggests that the ﬁrst priority relation is so tied to the second
that the denial of the latter is implied by the denial of the former, so that the
“pragmatist tradition early on begins to challenge the primacy of the monological
agent in the epistemological tradition.” Understood, or tentatively deﬁned in this
way, it is clear that a number of philosophers not usually thought to be in the
mainstream of the pragmatist tradition would be counted as pragmatists, and Taylor
mentions Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgestein, as well as himself, as
thinkers who would, on this thin criteria, count as pragmatists. He calls this
understanding of pragmatism the ““broad church” deﬁnition of the family of
pragmatists.” Besides the “broad church” understanding of pragmatism, Taylor
also identiﬁes a “narrower” or “more radical sense of pragmatism” that includes a
denial of the correspondence theory of truth. 132
With the suggestion of a tentative “broad church” deﬁnition of pragmatism
Taylor is similar to Robert Brandom’s suggestion that pragmatism should be
understood along similar lines. In Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and
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Contemporary, Brandom identiﬁes what he calls “fundamental pragmatism,” based
on the same criteria of the primacy of practice, parsing this idea as a matter of
“understanding knowing that as a kind of knowing how… That is, believing that
things are thus and so is to be understood in terms of practical abilities to do
something.” 133 Drawing, in part, on the work of Stephen Levine on Brandom and
the classical pragmatists, in chapter four, below, we will revisit this question of the
primacy of practice, and the theory of truth, and ask whether Brandom and Rorty
count as fellow communicants with Taylor and Dewey in the “broad church”
understanding of pragmatism. There we consider Taylor’s engagement with Rorty
and Brandom in order to situate Dewey’s pragmatism closer to Taylor than either of
these latte-day pragmatists on the primacy of practice, the philosophical relevance
and nature of experience, as well as the question of truth and objectivity in ethics.
The rest of “What Is Pragmatism?” is interesting primarily as Taylor’s ﬁrst
engagement in print with one of the classical pragmatists. Taylor goes on to discuss
William James’s works Varieties of Religious Experience, and The Will To Believe and
Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. He defends a reading of James on religious belief
and experience that assimilates him to the “broad church” idea of pragmatism, that
locates James on his side (as opposed to Rorty’s) of the question of truth. “So what
Robert Brandom, Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and
Contemporary, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 9.
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kind of pragmatist is James?” Taylor ponders in the ﬁnal paragraphs of the essay,
concluding that, “It seems clear to me that he is the “broad” kind, rather than a
“radical.” There is a continuing invocation of unreduced truth in his argument.” 134
By “radical” pragmatist Taylor seems to have Rorty’s critique of truth primarily in
mind. But Taylor’s reading of James is tendentious, or at least highly selective,
limiting his interpretation of James to only two of his works.
Taylor returns to his discussion of James in a more recent book, Varieties of
Pragmatism Today: William James Revisited, where, besides repeating much of the
material in the earlier essay (some of it verbatim), Taylor adds a criticism of James
for lacking an adequate appreciation for, or indeed a rejection of, any role for
religious community, or communal practice, in his psychology of religious
experience. In this regard it is especially unfortunate that Taylor does not engage
Dewey’s A Common Faith, since Dewey does include a role for the community in his
religious thought. In fact, Taylor does not mention Dewey or Peirce anywhere in his
published work. The only other pragmatist from the classical period whom Taylor
mentions is George Herbert Mead, but only as an aside, or in a footnote.
In spite of the fact that Taylor does not even so much as mention John Dewey
anywhere in his extensive body of work, there are a number of parallels and points
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of convergence, not all of which bear directly on the question of the meaning of
pragmatism, or who counts as a pragmatist. At the same time, there are signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in their thought. Besides Taylor’s agreement with some of the general
features recognized, roughly, to be shared by many pragmatists, contemporary or
classical, there are several more speciﬁc points of convergence with the thought of
Dewey in particular. There are also diﬀerences. The most signiﬁcant diﬀerence is
that Dewey is a dedicated naturalist, and this commitment extends to his moral and
ethical work, whereas Taylor inveighs against naturalism in ethics. The question of
naturalism in ethics is one of the biggest challenges to developing a constructive
comparison between Dewey and Taylor. This challenge may, however, be overcome
by consideration of a deeper underlying agreement on ontology. While Rorty rejects
metaphysics outright, and regrets that his hero, Dewey, wrote an entire book
dedicated to the “generic traits of existence." This too helps us in the present project.
While Dewey is, like Rorty on the most charitable reading, a non-reductive
naturalist, he also oﬀers a rich ontology that informs his thought on selfhood and
ethics comparable to Taylor in important ways that distance his thought from
Rorty’s. Stephen White’s concept of “weak ontology,” especially as he applies it to
Taylor, is an important part of overcoming the gap between Taylor and Dewey on
ethical naturalism. It is plausible to read Dewey also as advocating a version of
“weak ontology.” "Weak ontology," as explained above, can be thought of as an
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ontological position falling somewhere between foundationalism and nonfoundationalism, or between an absolute grounding for objectivity, and Rortian
irony, or Vattimo’s “weakthought.” Besides assisting in the comparison with
Taylor, the concept of weak ontology also helps to highlight Dewey’s distance from
Rortian irony. In fact, many aspects of Dewey’s thought either downplayed or
rejected by Rorty are just those elements of Dewey’s thought that bring him close to
Taylor, and make the present work possible, and fruitful.
Other similarities, or points of convergence between Taylor and Dewey,
emerge from a consideration of their moral philosophy, including their respective
philosophical anthropology. Although Dewey does not develop his ontology of the
self in detail, it is an important presupposition in his ethical thought, and while he
does not rely on “sources” of the self as Taylor does, he does include a notion of a
highest good in his idea of growth. Also relevant in this regard is Dewey’s
understanding of ends-in-view, which informs his moral philosophy and is integral
to understanding his religious philosophy of self-realization in A Common Faith,
including his defense of the possibility of a naturalized moral theism (his argument
for retaining the name God). Other aspects of Dewey’s moral philosophy are also
relevant to our focus on his and Taylor’s religious thought. Dewey, again unlike
Rorty, but like Taylor, defends objectivity in ethics. Indeed, both Dewey and Taylor
argue for moral realism (on quite diﬀerent grounds). Dewey also rejects the
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distinction between ethics and morality, settling, like Taylor, on “morality” as his
preferred term for both. Both thinkers advance a form of eudaimonism, or a moral
theory focused on human ﬂourishing. As Taylor often phrases it, the focus is on
what it is “good to be,” rather than what it is “right to do.” An emphasis on selfrealization through transcending, or decentering the self (what Taylor calls
transformation) is also a salient point in the moral and religious thought of both.
Likewise, as Ruth Abbey points out in a footnote to her monograph on Taylor, both
philosophers are “theorists of the background.” This reference by Abbey is one of
the rare occurrences of a comparison of Taylor and Dewey in the literature. Noting
this similarity, she quotes Dewey at length, from Democracy and Education:
The things which we take for granted without inquiry or reﬂection are just
the things that determine our conscious thinking and determine our
conclusions. And the habitudes which lie below the level of reﬂection are just
those which have been formed in the constant give and take of relationships
with others. 135
Alan Ryan, in John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism, however, makes
what is perhaps the most striking claim regarding the striking similarity between
Taylor and Dewey. Ryan baldly states “Charles Taylor is for the most part a
Deweyan without knowing it.” While Ryan’s hyperbole goes farther than the

Ruth Abbey, Charles Taylor (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2000), 227 n. 13.
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present thesis, I think that he is correct to point up the, often striking, similarities
between these two philosophers. 136
In their political philosophy there are strong similarities, as well as important
diﬀerences, between Taylor and Dewey. The strongest similarity in this area is what
might be called the liberal-communitarian aspect of both thinkers that is tied to a
theory of individuality advanced by both, and which supports an abiding faith in
democracy. Likewise Taylor’s and Dewey’s political thought is critical though
aﬃrming of modernity (though for diﬀerent reasons). Diﬃculties, however, also
appear at the level of political thought. Dewey’s political thinking, in spite of the
fact that he is perhaps the most optimistic partisan of democratic politics, is open to
an internal critique by way of exposing a potential totalizing tendency inherent in
his over-emphasis on science, and his faith in instrumental reason. This is a good
example, however, of how it is constructive to bring Dewey’s and Taylor’s thought
into a constructive engagement. Dewey’s concept of “intelligence” is a potential
point of contact with Taylor’s ideal of practical reasoning.

Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (W. W.
Norton: New York, NY, 1995, p. 361). For another more recent discussion of Taylor
and Dewey, see Michael Kühnlein and Mattias Lu-Bachmann, eds., Unerfüllte
Moderne?: Neue Perspectiven auf das Werk von Charles Taylor (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag,
2011), especially the contribution by Ludwig Nagl, “”The Jamesian open space:
Charles Taylor und der Pragmatismus," 117-160.
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Finally, there are points of comparison between our two philosophers that are
of a more personal nature. Dewey and Taylor both ﬁt the bill as “public
intellectuals” more perfectly than any other philosopher of their respective
generations. Dewey was deeply involved in education reform, as well as education
theory, and engaged in nearly all the major political and social matters of urgent
importance during his near six decades-long professional life. Taylor too has been
and remains deeply engaged with the pressing issues of his time, going further than
Dewey by standing for public oﬃce several times in the 1960s, and he has been
deeply involved more recently in Canadian politics in his home province of Quebec.
Likewise their passionate commitment to their work is tempered by an
unpretentious writing style that usually avoids the technical jargon of academic
philosophy—something that has been cause for misunderstanding of both by their
peers in professional philosophy. And both men are optimistic about the future of
humanity, and indeed, each in their own way, are true believers.
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